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ABSTRACT

This study attempted to replicate and extend the study of Doherty, Mynatt,
Tweney, and Schiavo (1979), which introduced what is here called the Bayesian
conditionals selection paradigm. The present study used this paradigm (and a script
similar to that used by Doherty et al.) to explore confirmation bias and related errors
that can appear in both search and integration in probability revision. Despite selection
differences and weak manipulations, this study provided information relevant to four
important questions.
First, by asking participants to estimate the values of the conditional
probabilities they did not learn, this study was able to examine the use of “intuitive
conditionals”. This study found evidence that participants used intuitive conditionals
and that their intuitive conditionals were affected by the size of the actual conditionals.
Second, by examining both phases in the same study, this study became the
first to look for inter-phase interactions. A strong correlation was found between the
use of focal search strategies and focal integration strategies (r=.81, p<.001).
However, when the sample was limited to participants who selected at least one
probability conditioned on each hypothesis, the relationship was near random (r=.02).
Third, this study was the first in the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm
to provide a basis for selecting information that would be expected to confirm rather
than disconfirm the focal hypothesis. No support was found for predictor selection
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bias, but a nearly significant interaction was found between Attention and Motivation
(p=.07) in applying Bayes’ theorem only to information favoring the focal hypothesis.
Fourth, this study was the first to have a single normative posterior probability,
against which participants’ posterior probability estimates could be compared to yield
a quantitative measure of confirmation bias. This permitted measuring the
confirmation bias uniquely contributed by each phase, assuming the participant was
normative in the other phase. Focused attention was found to increase confirmation
bias in the integration phase (p=.03) but not in the search phase.
These last three findings challenge the field’s assumption that the search and
integration phases can be examined separately, and call for reinterpretation of research
done on only one phase.
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Introduction 1
Introduction
Decision making is defined as “selecting and committing oneself to a course of
action” (Anderson, Deane, Hammond, McClelland, and Shanteau, 1981, p. 73).
Studies have shown people have trouble with risky (probabilistic) decision making.
One reason for this difficulty is difficulty with probability revision, the changing of a
belief on the basis of new information. Nickerson (2004) states that, “Everybody
thinks probabilistically, whether knowingly or not” (p. ix). Probabilistic decision
making is both required by daily life (e.g., estimating the probability of finding a
parking space in various locations) and demonstrated to be flawed in non-experts and
occasionally in experts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). As Persi Diaconis said in
commenting on the topic, “Our brains are just not wired to do probability problems
very well, so I'm not surprised there were mistakes.” (Tierney, 1991, p. A1).
For example, the importance of probabilistic reasoning in decision-making is
highlighted by the trend away from defined benefit plans (social security, defined
benefit private pensions) towards individually managed retirement plans (IRAs, 401k,
potential private social security accounts). This trend will require more Americans to
make important probabilistic decisions.
The decision making process is commonly divided into two phases,
information search (where the decision maker gathers information to use in the
decision) and information integration (where the decision maker combines
information to make a decision). Non-expert decision makers suffer from many errors
in both phases. One class of errors that has been repeatedly demonstrated is a variety
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of common biases that are associated with the existence of a preferred or focal
hypothesis. These biases have been extensively researched (115,073 hits on the
PsychInfo Data base on 11/2/05) and demonstrated across a variety of paradigms and
cover stories. These biases are usually grouped together and commonly called
“confirmation bias” (or some variant of the term).
Unfortunately, this term has been not been consistently defined. Confirmation
bias has been used as a catchall for virtually any bias related to decision-making that
involves some form of focal hypothesis bias in selecting, remembering, or interpreting
information or in judging the likelihood of the focal hypothesis. This label has covered
both motivated and unmotivated biases and both those that occur in the information
search phase and in the integration phase. The various definitions have included: a)
biases in the search phase favoring information about the focal hypothesis (Doherty,
Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979); b) limitations of the range of information
collected to that which is consistent with the focal hypothesis (Trope & Bassok 1984);
c) preference for the collection of information that is expected to be supportive to the
focal hypothesis (Jonas, Schulz, Frey, & Thelen, 2001); d) biases caused by
differential rates of memory for favorable and unfavorable evidence (Perkins, Farady,
& Bushey, 1991); and e) interpretation of evidence in ways that support the focal
hypothesis. (Kelley, 1950). These five terms each refer to a different phenomenon, of
which only the last four will always result in a confirmatory effect.
Because the term “confirmation bias” has been used to describe a variety of
phenomena, the use of the term has led to difficulty in comparing results across
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paradigms and researchers. This has led to the recommendation that the term be retired
(Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). However, the position taken in this paper is that it
would be better to define the term clearly than to retire it. In this paper, "confirmation
bias” will be used to refer to any bias that actually results in a confirming effect (i.e.,
an increase in the estimated probability of the focal hypothesis above the normative
posterior probability). Confirmation bias as thus defined is a resulting effect of other
cognitive processes. These may be search or integration processes, which will be
referred to respectively as “Search Confirmation Bias” and “Integration Confirmation
Bias”. This definition works for all paradigms that result in judgment or choice
(Bayesian Conditionals Selection Paradigm, Bayesian Data Sampling Studies,
Covariation and Causation Studies, and Dissonance Theory Studies, see Research
Paradigms for a description of these paradigms).
This paper will use three terms that can be confused with confirmation bias and
with each other, and which therefore need to be clarified. These are the search phase
biases of “pseudodiagnosticity”, “hypothesis focus bias”, and “predictor selection
bias”.
“Pseudodiagnosticity” is here accepted as defined by Doherty, et al. (1979) in
a study examining participants’ search-phase behavior. They used the term to describe
the search phase phenomenon of participants selecting only one member of a matching
pair of conditional probabilities. A matching pair is defined as two probabilities both
relevant to the same datum with one conditioned on each of the hypotheses [e.g.
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selecting both p(Di|H1) and p(Di|H2)]. (See Tables 1 and 2). Matching pairs are
necessary for the application of Bayes' Theorem.

p(H1|D) =

p(H1) * p(D|H1)
______________________________________
p(H1) * p(D|H1) + p(H2) * p(D|H2)

Bayes' Theorem is the correct method for revising probability estimates on the basis of
new information. [p(H1|D) is the probability of hypothesis 1 given the new data, p(H1
or 2)

is the original probability of hypothesis 1 (or 2), p(D|H1 or 2) is the probability of

the data given hypothesis 1 (or 2)].
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Table 1
Definition of Four Quadrants of Conditional Probabilities
Expected direction

Data

Probabilities

Probabilities conditioned

of dimension’s

(Given)

conditioned on the

on the alternative

focal hypothesis (H1)

hypothesis (H2)

(Selected) (Hit Rate)

(Selected) (False Alarm

diagnosticity

Rate)
Predictor expected

D1

Quadrant 1: p(D1|H1)

Quadrant 3: p(D1|H2)

D2

Quadrant 2: p(D2|H1)

Quadrant 4: p(D2|H2)

to favor focal
hypothesis
Predictor expected
to favor non-focal
hypothesis
Note: Data would be in the form of the urn has two handles. The conditional probabilities in quadrants 1
and 2 would be in the form of the percentage of urns from Shell with two handles.
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Table 2
Examples of the Biases Using Quadrant Definitions from Table 1
Name of Bias

Definition of Bias

Pseudodiagnosticity Selecting only one member of a

Example from Table 1
Selecting p(Dx|H1)

matching pair

without p(Dx|H2)

Hypothesis focus

Selecting more probabilities

Selecting more

bias

conditioned on the focal

probabilities from

hypothesis than the non-focal

Quadrants 1 & 2

hypothesis
Predictor selection

Selecting more probabilities from

Selecting more

bias

dimensions expected to favor the

probabilities from

focal hypothesis

Quadrants 1 & 3

Doherty, et al. (1979) found that participants tend to choose disproportionate
number of probabilities conditioned on the focal hypothesis (hereafter symbolically
represented as H1, with the alternative hypothesis represented as H2). [This can also be
stated as choosing more p(D|H1) than p(D|H2)]. (See Tables 1 and 2). Doherty labeled
this bias “confirmation bias”. However, in order to avoid confusion, in this paper we
will substitute what we believe to be the more precise term “hypothesis focus bias”.
Pseudodiagnosticity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for hypothesis focus
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bias. Participants must be pseudodiagnostic in order to show a hypothesis focus bias,
but they can be pseudodiagnostic without showing hypothesis focus bias (by selecting
non-matched conditionals that are evenly split between the two hypotheses or that are
more often conditioned on the alternative hypothesis).
A key point stressed in this paper, which was first noted for hypothesis focus
bias by Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, (1983) is that neither of these search phase
biases alone or in combination necessarily results in making confirmation more likely
(that is, showing what is here called confirmation bias). The extent to which these
biases have a confirming effect would depend upon the conditionals selected and the
integration strategy utilized, as first noted by Snyder and Swan (1978). For example,
use of a hypothesis focus bias or pseudodiagnosticity would not result in confirmation
bias in combination with a Bayesian integration strategy and, in fact, would result in
no revision at all, due to the lack of matching pairs.
The third term that can be confused with confirmation bias, “predictor
selection bias”, is the preference for information from a variable that is expected to
confirm a focal hypothesis. [This can also be stated as selecting more p(D expected to favor
H1 |H1 or 2)

than p(D expected to favor H2 |H1 or 2)]. (See Table 1 for a description of a design

that would enable examination of predictor selection bias and Table 2 for examples of
these conditional probabilities). For this bias to operate there must be some basis for
expecting some variable or variables to favor the focal hypothesis more than other
variables (See Table 3 for definitions). This bias can exist with the selection of either
matched or unmatched conditional probabilities.
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Table 3
Definition of the Terms
Phase

Bias Name

Page

Original Name

Search
Phase
Only

Search
Confirmation Bias

2-3

p(H|D) greater than
normative from search phase

Pseudodiagnosticity

3

Not selecting both
conditional probabilities on a
dimension [p(D1|H2) &
p(D1|H1)

Hypothesis Focus
Bias

4

Confirmation
Bias (Doherty,
et al., 1979)

Selecting more conditional
probabilities conditioned on
the focal hypothesis p(D| H2)
than the alternative
hypothesis p(D|H1)

Predictor Selection
Bias

4

Confirmation
Bias (Jonas,
Schulz-Hardt,
Frey, &
Thelen, 2001)

Selecting more conditional
probabilities from
dimensions that are expected
to support the focal
hypothesis

(Selecting)

Definition

Integration Integration
Phase
Confirmation Bias
Only

2-3

p(H|D) greater than
normative from integration
phase

(Using)

Pseudodiagnostic
Integration

4-5

Not using both conditional
probabilities on a dimension
[p(D1| H2) & p(D1|H1)

Hypothesis-Focus
Integration Bias

4-5

Using more conditional
probabilities conditioned on
the focal hypothesis p(D| H2)
than the alternative
hypothesis p(D|H1)

Predictor Selection
Integration Bias

4-5

Using more conditional
probabilities from
dimensions that are expected
to support the focal
hypothesis

Confirmation Bias

2

p(H|D) greater than
normative from all causes

Base Rate Neglect

26

Ignoring or underweighting
p(H)

Both
Phases
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These three search phase biases (pseudodiagnosticity, hypothesis focus bias,
and predictor selection bias) all have corresponding integration phase biases, which
here will be referred to, respectively, as “pseudodiagnostic integration”, “HypothesisFocus Integration Bias”, and “predictor selection integration bias”. (The reason
“pseudodiagnostic integration” is not referred to as “pseudodiagnostic integration
bias” is because this error does not imply a direction in the participants’ departure
from normative). All three of these integration phase biases need to be studied in
addition to their search phase counterparts, because information that is selected is not
necessarily used.
Pseudodiagnostic integration is the use in integration of unmatched conditional
probabilities. Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias is the disproportionate use of
probabilities in integration that are conditioned on the focal hypothesis. (As was the
case in the search phase, pseudodiagnostic integration bias is required for the
possibility of Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias). Predictor selection integration bias
is a bias towards using predictors in integration that are expected to support the focal
hypothesis. This last definition is problematic in the abstract, because some predictors
could be expected in the search phase to support the focal hypothesis but in the
integration phase, on the basis of the data now in hand, to support the alternative
hypothesis. This problem is avoided in this study by making all predictors either
consistently favor or consistently oppose the focal hypothesis.
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Literature Review
Research Paradigms
Research on search and integration biases that can result in confirmation bias
has been conducted under at least the following seven paradigms: Bayesian
conditional selection studies, Bayesian data sampling studies, Wason selection task
studies, Wason rule-discovery task studies, classification studies, covariation and
causation studies, and dissonance theory studies.
In the Bayesian conditional selection studies, participants are asked to select
and/or incorporate conditional probability information to make revised probability
estimates. This paradigm usually, but not always, focuses on the search phase. In the
Bayesian data sampling studies, participants are asked which population a sample of
data was drawn from. These studies usually focus on the integration phase. The Wason
four-card selection task requires participants to select the information (cards)
necessary to test a logical rule and looks exclusively at the search phase. The Wason
rule-discovery task requires participants to seek information to assist in their
formulating and evaluating hypotheses. This task is the most open and involves
hypothesis creation, information search, and information integration. The
classification studies are similar in logical structure to the rule-discovery task. As in
that paradigm, participants must think up questions to test a hypothesis, but this time
about category membership. The covariation and causation paradigm asks participants
to select or evaluate information necessary to make a decision regarding the degree of

Literature Review 11
covariation or causation. These studies, with one exception, examine only the
integration phase.
Finally, the dissonance theory research paradigm has participants make an
initial decision and then presents them with the opportunity to select information that
would support or oppose this decision. These studies focus on the search phase.
Bayesian conditional selection paradigm. Research under this paradigm
presents participants with cover stories that require a probability revision. Typically,
participants are given the opportunity to select some but not all of the available
information in the form of conditional probabilities. These probabilities are
conditioned on two possible hypotheses, one of which has already been determined,
on some basis, to be the favored or focal hypothesis. As previously noted, the correct
way to incorporate new information into a probability estimate involves the
application of Bayes' Theorem. As applied to Bayesian conditional selection studies
Bayes’ theorem requires a prior probability estimate (typically provided to participants
as a base rate), one or more items of data (also usually provided to participants) and a
matching pair of conditional probabilities for the data. Participants usually chose
which conditional probabilities to be informed of, after being informed of the related
data. The focus of this paradigm is on the extent to which participants fail to select
matching pairs (exhibit pseudodiagnosticity) and the extent to which these unmatched
probabilities are conditioned on the focal hypothesis (exhibit hypothesis focus bias).
The groundbreaking study using a Bayesian conditional selection paradigm to
study search biases was Doherty, et al. (1979), to which the present study is closely
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related. They used an ocean archeology cover story to present participants with an
information search problem. Their experiment involved two steps. In the first step,
they presented participants with the problem (deciding which island an artifact was
made on), the base rate for each hypothesis, and descriptive data about the artifact.
Next, participants were required to choose two conditional probabilities from four
relevant to the descriptive data. Last, each participant was asked which hypothesis was
now more likely. This hypothesis was taken to be that participant’s focal hypothesis.
Half the participants were provided an equal base rate (odds ratio p(h)|p(-h) =
1:1), and half were provided a base rate that favored one of the hypotheses (odds ratio
of 10:1). This 10:1 ratio was designed to be so strong that the estimate as to which
hypothesis was more likely would not be changed even by either of the data favoring
the less likely hypothesis (with diagnostic ratios of 1:5).
The unequal base rate group produced two main findings. The first finding was
that the participants were pseudodiagnostic, with 49 of the 64 participants choosing
one conditional probability from each dimension, rather that the two required to form
a diagnostic pair. Therefore, these participants did not have sufficient information to
revise their probability estimates using Bayes’ Theorem. The second finding was that
52 of the 64 participants indicated as more likely the hypothesis favored by the data
rather than the base rate. This choice was incorrect for both those who chose
diagnostically (for whom the base rate was normatively stronger than the data) and
those who chose pseudodiagnostically (who had no normatively relevant evidence
other than the base rate). The authors stated that this effect was an indication of base
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rate neglect. Doherty, et al. (1979) did not report the degree to which the participants
who demonstrated the first error (pseudodiagnosticity) were same as those who
demonstrated the second error (base rate neglect).
In the second step, Doherty, et al. (1979) asked participants to select six
conditional probabilities from a set of twelve, to assist in making a second probability
revision. Six of these probabilities were conditioned on the focal hypothesis and six on
the alternative hypothesis, forming six matching pairs. Doherty, et al. examined this
second step in terms of both pseudodiagnosticity and hypothesis focus bias, and found
evidence for both search errors. First, 110 of the 121 participants failed to choose three
matched pairs, thus demonstrating some degree of pseudodiagnosticity. Because one
must be pseudodiagnostic to demonstrate hypothesis focus bias only the 110
pseudodiagnostic participants were examined for hypothesis focus bias. Each of these
110 pseudodiagnostic participants showed one of three possible patterns: a) choosing
probabilities conditioned evenly on the two hypotheses (50), b) choosing more
probabilities conditioned of the alternative hypothesis (9), or c) choosing more
probabilities conditioned of the focal hypothesis (51). The propensity of participants to
choose conditional probabilities conditioned on the focal hypothesis when they did not
choose evenly (51 to 9), indicates hypothesis focus bias (labeled “confirmation bias”
by Doherty, et al.). They interpreted this finding as a “strong bias to confirm”, despite
the fact that any actual confirmatory effect would be dependent on the participant’s
integration strategy.
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Doherty, Schiavo, Tweeny, and Mynatt (1981) conducted an experiment to
determine whether people can be induced to think diagnostically. They based their
experiment on the first step of the Doherty, et al. (1979) experiment, (specifically the
equal base rate condition), where participants had been asked to choose two
conditional probabilities from four that formed two matched pairs that favored one of
the hypotheses. They made four changes from the original experiment that were
intended to help participants think diagnostically.
Three of these changes were made for all participants: a) presenting the
problem four times, using different cover stories each time, b) providing accurate
feedback after each story as to which hypothesis was more likely, and c) making all
conditional probabilities above 50%. The fourth change was to give the half the
participants a third conditional probability from the original four. For participants who
chose non-diagnostically, this third conditional probability necessarily completed a
diagnostic pair whose diagnostic direction favored the second hypothesis. This
diagnostic pair would contradict the conclusion that would likely have been drawn by
participants who choose both probabilities conditioned on the first hypothesis. In this
case, the two conditional probabilities would both be above 50% and both would
likely be interpreted as supportive of the first hypothesis.
Following the initial study, Doherty, et al. (1981) found that participants who
did not receive the third conditional probability did marginally improve their rate of
diagnostic search over the four trials. However, those who received the third
conditional probability nearly tripled their rate of diagnostic search over the four trials.
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This suggests that participants have the capacity to think diagnostically when the
situation presents them with diagnostic information.
Two years later, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (1983) published a series of
studies that examined participants’ search phase behavior. In the first study, the
authors asked participants whether p(H1) (the base rate), p(D| H1) (the hit rate), and
p(D| H2) (the false alarm rate) are relevant to a probability revision. Approximately
90% of participants reported that p(H1) and p(D| H1) were relevant, but only 50%
reported that p(D| H2) was relevant. This was true regardless of whether the alternative
hypothesis was stated as a single possibility, multiple possibilities, or only an implied
other. This rate of interest in the alternative hypothesis declined even further when
subjects were told to stick to relevant information only. In a second study, BeythMarom and Fischhoff asked participants why each type of information was relevant.
Most (69%) of those who thought p(D| H2) was relevant, saw it as being relevant in
order to evaluate the alternative hypothesis directly (H2), rather than to make a
diagnostic comparison with p(D| H1). In a third study, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff
asked participants to make a revision with either diagnostic information (non-equal
p(D| H1) and p(D| H2)) or non-diagnostic (equal p(D| H1) and p(D| H2)). Beyth-Marom
and Fischhoff found that participants were more likely to revise on the basis of
diagnostic information than non-diagnostic, and to revise in the correct direction.
However, there was some evidence of base rate neglect, use of averaging strategies,
and use of non-diagnostic information. Therefore, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff
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concluded that, while not perfect, people are better at using information than at
seeking it out.
Fischhoff and Bar-Hillel (1984) examined the integration phase using a
between-subjects design. Across the cover stories, they varied the representativeness
of the data. Next, they provided conditional probabilities for these data (i.e., there was
no search phase). They found evidence of base rate neglect, which was stronger when
representativeness of the data was high, as well as the use of averaging integration
strategies.
Ofir (1988) used a series of between-subjects studies to examine integration
strategies. Information was provided to participants (i.e., there was no search phase);
and the base rate, the hit rate and the false alarm rate were all manipulated. Ofir had
two findings. The first was that his participants did not exhibit base rate neglect. The
second finding was that participants would use the false alarm rate data [p(D| H2)]
only if the base rate and the hit rate [p(D| H1)] were on different sides of .5 and
therefore psychologically inconsistent. This process appears similar to that identified
by Smith, Schoben and Rips (1974), in which thinking becomes more precise only
when necessary.
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragon (1993) examined participants’ search choices
(but not their integration phase) on two logically identical problems which were
worded differently. One problem was worded as a choice between two actions, and the
second, as a comparative evaluation between two hypotheses. They provided the
participants with a single hit rate and the choice to gather one more conditional
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probability from among a second hit rate and one of the two corresponding false alarm
rates.
Mynatt, Doherty and Dragon’s (1993) principal finding was that participants
were both less hypothesis focused and less pseudodiagnostic (i.e., more likely to select
the matching false alarm rate) when choosing between actions than when evaluating
hypotheses. Mynatt, et al. theorized that this difference was due to the outcome values
being intrinsic to the evaluation of action choices but extrinsic to hypothesis
evaluation, a difference that is more encouraging of comparison in action choices.
This difference between action choices and hypothesis evaluation supports the
conclusion that hypothesis focus bias is not an artifact of grammar or logical structure.
A second finding of this study was that participants in the inference condition
were more likely to choose diagnostically when the provided probability conditioned
on the focal hypothesis was below .5. The authors theorized that the low value of this
probability switched participants’ focus to the alternative hypothesis.
Bayesian data sampling studies. The Bayesian data sampling studies use the
same Bayesian framework but differ from the Bayesian conditional selection studies in
that the participants in the Bayesian data sampling studies are given the conditional
probabilities and must select data, while those in the Bayesian conditional selection
studies are given the data and must select conditional probabilities.
The same situation can be presented to participants using either Bayesian
paradigm. The Bayesian conditional selection paradigm might, for example, present
participants with two kinds of data (two handles, and picture of a horse) and ask them
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to choose among four conditional probabilities to use in revising their probability
estimate (see Table 4).

Table 4
Bayesian Conditional Selection Example
Feature of urn in

Percentage of Urns made

Percentage of Urns made

question

on Shell Island that have

on Coral Island that have

feature

feature

? % have two handles

? % have two handles

Urn has two handles
Urn has picture of a

? % have a horse

? % have a horse

horse

The Bayesian data sampling paradigm might, for example, present participants
with four conditional probabilities and ask the participants to select which (of the two)
kinds of data to use in revising their probability estimate (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Bayesian Data Sampling Example
Feature of urn in

Percentage of Urns made

Percentage of Urns made

question

on Shell Island that have

on Coral Island that have

feature

two handles

80% have two handles

40% have two handles

Two or One Handle(s)?
Picture of a horse?



30% have a picture of a

60% have a picture of a

horse

horse

Phillips & Edwards (1966) conducted the ground breaking study using this
paradigm. Their focus was on the integration phase and examined how participants
used the data that were provided (i.e., no search phase). They found that participants
tended to under-adjust for the new information, an effect they labeled “conservatism.”
(See Slovic & Lichtenstien, 1971 for a review of this and the other early studies on
conservatism).
Mynatt, Doherty and Sullivan (1991) conducted experiments on information
search using the Bayesian data sampling paradigm. They presented participants with
the decision as to which of two populations a sample had been drawn from.
Participants were told that the two population proportions were 70:30 and 30:70 and
that the proportion in the sample was 7:5. Participants were then presented an
opportunity to draw another sample from either the population from which the first
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sample had been drawn or from the other population. Similar to the findings using the
Bayesian conditional selection methodology, participants preferred to gather
information repeatedly about the focal hypothesis. This bias appears whether gathering
data or selecting conditional probabilities. This study collected no integration phase
information.
Trautman and Shanteau (1977) found that non-diagnostic information caused
participants to move towards a 50%-50% estimate of the probability that the data
probability came from one of two sources. Nisbett, Zukier, and Lemley, (1981)
replicated this finding, now called the “dilution effect”. This effect is non-normative,
and usually anti-confirmatory, diluting the impact of other information. Kemmelmeier
(2004) manipulated the instructions in order to examine the dilution effect in the
integration phase. Half of the participants were instructed to identify non-diagnostic
information before integrating. The other half of the participants were instructed to
identify non-diagnostic information and completely black it out with a marker before
integrating. The participants who blacked out the non-diagnostic information did not
exhibit the dilution effect. However, those who did not black it out exhibited the
dilution effect despite correctly identifying the non-diagnostic information.
Wason selection task studies. Wason (1966) introduced a new information
search paradigm with his four-card problem. In this paradigm, participants are
presented with four cards. They are told that each card has a number on one side and a
letter on the other. The four cards are displayed with one of each possibility showing:
even, odd, consonant and vowel. Participants are asked to indicate which cards must
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be turned over to test the rule that all the cards that have an even number on one side
have a vowel on the other (“If E then V”, more generally and commonly expressed as
the conditional rule, “If P Then Q”).
Wason found that participants most commonly asked to turn over two cards,
the E and the V cards, a pattern which he labeled “verification bias”. This pattern is
similar to hypothesis focus, gathering information about the focal hypothesis. If the
focal hypothesis is taken to be “If E then V”, then participants gather information
about the E and V cards, elements of the statement of the focal hypothesis.
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) replicated Wason (1966) and additionally
found that instructions to evaluate the effects of each card prior to choosing did not
improve performance, despite participants demonstrating that they understood the
effects of each card. Evans (1972) disagreed with Wason’s conclusion that this was a
focal bias or verification bias. Instead, Evans argued that it was a matching bias
(matching the surface terms used in the hypothesis). Evans found that when the
problem was presented “If E then not V”, participants chose the same cards as when
asked to test “If E then V” (the E and V cards). However, Ormerod, Manktelow, and
Jones (1993) found that by changing the instructions to E only if V enhanced
performance. Platt and Griggs (1993) improved participants’ performance by
instructing them to look for violations of the rule. Additionally, there have been many
studies providing contradictory evidence as to whether or not a realistic context
improves performance. (See Manktelow, 1999, for a review).
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Wason rule-discovery task studies. In the first study using the rule-discovery
paradigm, Wason (1960) asked participants to formulate and test a hypothesis or rule
to account for the data. In this paradigm participants are told that the series of numbers
2-4-6 follows a rule that the experimenter is thinking of. The participants are then
asked to determine the rule by testing other series of three numbers, hereafter triads,
by discovering whether they fit the rule or not. Participants are told to stop when they
are sure what the rule is.
Wason (1960) found that participants typically chose the rule of even
increasing numbers in sequence as their initial hypothesis. Participants usually then
proceeded to test their hypothesis by asking about triads that fit their focal rule,
following what has been called a “positive testing strategy” (Klayman & Ha, 1987).
Many studies have followed up this finding and have found that participants do not
understand the value of a falsification strategy (Kareev & Halberstadt, 1993). The
primary way researchers have found to improve participant performance is to ask
participants to consider or test more than one hypothesis simultaneously (Klayman &
Ha, 1989).
Classification studies. Classification studies are similar to rule discovery task
studies, in that they require participants to create questions to test hypotheses. These
studies ask participants to think up (presumably) diagnostic questions for classifying a
person or object. For example, when participants were testing whether “Bob is an
extrovert”, a typical question they used would be similar to, “Does Bob like to go to
parties where he does not know anyone?”
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If the participants are choosing rationally, they will ask questions that they
believe are diagnostic and whose diagnostic direction they know. Snyder and Swan
(1978) found participants favored questions that they expected to be answered by a yes
response if the focal hypothesis were true. Trope and Bassok (1982) disagreed, finding
that people preferred evidence that would be diagnostic to evidence that would be
highly probable if the hypothesis were true. Skov and Sherman (1986) found mixed
evidence on this point. They found that people preferred diagnostic questions but, to a
lesser extent, also preferred information that was likely given the hypothesis and
therefore expected to be confirmatory.
Covariation and causation studies. Whether judging covariation or causation,
participants have been shown to fail to consider all relevant data. Data have been
presented either serially or in a two-by-two table. Smedslund (1963) found that even
experts (nurses) fail to use all necessary information. He found the best predictor of
participants’ judgment of covariation to be the present-present cell (both predictor and
criterion present). Ward and Jenkins (1965), Shaklee and Tucker (1980), Shaklee and
Mims (1982), and Arkes and Harkness (1983), using different methodologies,
replicated the finding that the majority of participants’ judgments are based on the
present-present cell.
However, other studies have found evidence that participants use both
predictor-present cells. Shaklee and Goldston (1989) and Shaklee and Hall (1983)
both found that the most common strategy for participants was using only evidence
when the possible cause was present. In contrast, using a serial presentation, Jenkins
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and Ward (1965) found that participants based their judgments of contingency on the
present-present cell and the absent- absent cell.
Additional research has attempted to identify the variables relevant to
participant’s poor performance at judging covariation and causation. Evidence has
been found that performance improves with age in youth (Shaklee and Goldston,
1989). Poor performance has been found to be due to limited memory (Shaklee and
Mims, 1982), and sequential presentation (Ward & Jenkins, 1965). The sequential
method of presentation requires participants to store the evidence in working memory,
which has been found to be limited to at most seven (see Simon, 1986 for a review) or
as little as three (Broadbent, 1975) chunks of information. Thus this limitation of
memory is probably the cause of poor performance in sequential presentation.
Additionally, Jenkins and Ward (1965) found that their pre-training participants using
examples of contingent and non-contingent sequences with feedback failed to improve
in judgments of contingency.
Shaklee and Hall (1983) classified participants’ covariation strategies on the
basis of a) participants’ verbal descriptions, b) participants’ selections from a multiple
choice list of verbal descriptions, and c) the patterns of participants’ judgments. These
three different methods of classifying covariation strategies produced only somewhat
similar results (correlating between .45 and .58 with each other). Shaklee and Hall
found it useful to interpret these correlations as reflecting two different types of
participants, normative and non-normative. Participants who judged covariation
normatively were more able to identify their strategies accurately. However, the
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participants who judged covariation non-normatively were less able to identify their
strategies accurately.
Typically, these studies have presented subjects with all the information and
therefore have no search phase. Shaklee and Goldston (1989), however, had
participants choose which information to select and found that they did select
information from all four cells, but the authors did not report the patterns of selection.
Their analysis of participants’ judgments was limited to the binary direction of
contingency and was not analyzed in conjunction with the search phase data.
Dissonance theory studies. An entirely different paradigm with which to
approach confirmation bias is based on Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance
theory. Studies using this paradigm have examined the effects of a focal hypothesis on
information search, presumably resulting in search that minimized cognitive
dissonance (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Cognitive dissonance theory
predicts, among other things, that once a person accepts a position he or she will prefer
to be exposed to information consistent with that belief and avoid information that is
inconsistent with it, in order to avoid an experience of “cognitive dissonance”
(Festinger, 1957).
Many studies have been conducted using this method (Frey, Schulz-Hardt, &
Stahlberg, 1996; Frey, 1986). Typically, participants are presented with real world
problems and then their initial position is measured or manipulated. Next, participants
are given an opportunity to expose themselves to additional information relevant to the
correctness of their position. Participants choose additional information to read based
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on the titles that imply which side of the issue the information supports. Research
under this paradigm has consistently found that people select and read more
information that agrees with their existing beliefs (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, &
Thelen, 2001). Recent research in this paradigm has found the same bias in
information search prior to commitment, for alternatives that have emerged as
promising (Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996; Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997; Simon,
Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001)
As previously noted, this paper will use the term “predictor selection bias” to
refer to this phenomenon of search biased in favor of variables expected to be
confirmatory. (See page 4 for an explanation of this term). This bias has been
replicated in many dissonance theory studies, across a variety of topics, methods and
participants. Researchers have explored social stereotypes (Johnston, 1996), attitudes
(Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), negotiations (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995), selfimage (Frey, 1981), expert decision makers (bank managers) (Schulz-Hardt, Frey,
Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and motivated decision makers (Ditto & Lopez, 1992).
Consistent Findings Across Paradigms
Many of the findings are similar across these seven paradigms. This suggests
that the biases identified are not artifacts of the task or of the cover story, but reflect
general cognitive processes. These similar findings include: failure to use base rate
information, searching for less than maximally diagnostic information, searching for
information associated with the focal hypothesis, integration of non-diagnostic
information, and use of averaging integration strategies.
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Failure to use base rate information. Since, Kahneman and Tversky (1973)
reported base rate neglect, it has been repeatedly replicated both in the Bayesian
conditionals selection studies (Doherty, et al., 1979; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984) and
in studies specifically examining the size and condition of the effect (see Bar-Hillel &
Fischhoff, 1981 for a review). The opposite effect, of under-revising for evidence has
also been found in other circumstances and is called “conservatism” (Phillips and
Edwards (1966), see Slovic and Lichtenstien, 1971 for a review).
Searching for less than maximally diagnostic information. There are two
different ways that participants have sought less than maximally diagnostic
information: seeking wholly non-diagnostic information and seeking minimally
diagnostic information. The Bayesian conditionals selection studies have consistently
found that people choose pseudodiagnostic information during the search phase
(which is wholly non-diagnostic). Doherty, et al.’s (1979) finding of
pseudodiagnosticity has been replicated in all studies in the paradigm (Doherty, et al.,
1981; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Mynatt, et al., 1993). Similarly, most
evidence points to the same bias in the Wason (1966) selection task. Wason (1996),
and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) found that participants consistently chose the
non-diagnostic evidence of Q (when testing If P then Q). In the Wason rule discovery
task, participants repeatedly used a positive testing strategy, which seeks minimally
diagnostic information. In the classification studies, there is some support that people
preferred questions that would be answered yes if the focal hypothesis were true to
diagnostic questions (Snyder & Swan, 1978; Skov & Sherman 1986). These findings
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across paradigms indicate that participants do not grasp diagnosticity or its
importance.
Searching for information about or associated with the focal hypothesis.
Searching for information that is about or associated with the focal hypothesis is the
most consistent finding across paradigms. The Bayesian conditionals selection studies
have repeatedly found this effect in the form of hypothesis focus bias (preference for
information conditioned on the focal hypothesis) (Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et
al., 1981; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983; Mynatt et al., 1993). Similarly, Mynatt, et
al. (1991) found the same preference for focal information using the Bayesian data
sampling methodology. Research in the Wason selection task paradigm has often
found a hypothesis focus bias to different degrees in different circumstances
(preference for the P and Q cards when testing If P then Q) (Wason, 1966; Wason &
Johnson-Laird, 1970; Platt & Griggs 1993; Ormerod, Manktelow, & Jones 1993).
Studies under the Wason (1960) rule discovery task have been consistent in their
finding of a positive test strategy, testing new triads that are positive examples of their
current hypothetical rule (Klayman & Ha, 1987). In the covariation and causation
literature, most studies do not have a search phase, however Shaklee and Goldston
(1989) did. They found evidence of uneven searching, but did not report the direction
of the bias.
Integration of non-diagnostic information. Ofir, (1988) using the Bayesian
conditionals selection method found that participants often based their judgments on
the hit rate [p(D| H1)] without using the complementary false alarm rate [p(D| H2)]
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(i.e., showed pseudodiagnostic integration). Kemmelmeier (2004), using the Bayesian
data sampling method, found that the presence of non-diagnostic information had an
impact on the outcome of integration (the dilution effect, discussed earlier). While, it
is impossible to say whether pseudodiagnosticity was involved in the dilution effect,
diagnosticity was clearly not properly weighed. The covariation and causation
paradigm has consistently demonstrated participants’ reliance on insufficient data in
making judgments, for example, integrating data most commonly from only a single
row, column, or cell, instead of the entire table (Shaklee & Goldstone 1989).
Use of averaging integration strategies. The Bayesian conditionals selection
literature has found evidence that participants often use averaging strategies (Ofir,
1988; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984). Similarly, the Bayesian data sampling literature
has also found the use of averaging strategies (Troutman & Shanteau, 1977; Nisbett, et
al., 1981; Kemmelmeier, 2004).
Causes and Cure of Biases
Attention. Participants’ attention is the most widely researched cause of biases.
In all seven paradigms every study examined attention. It was not manipulated as an
independent variable but one hypothesis was assumed to be the focal hypothesis from
the script. Doherty, et al., (1979) is the single exception to this, they measured the
participants’ belief about which hypothesis was more likely, and assumed that this
hypothesis was now the focal hypothesis. The focusing of the participants’ attention
on one hypothesis is believed to be the primary cause of the search phase biases
outlined in the paragraphs above (Searching for less than maximally diagnostic
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information and Searching information that is about or associated with the focal
hypothesis).
Motivation. The dissonance theory paradigm is the only one to examine
motivation. These studies manipulated the potential level of cognitive dissonance,
which should in turn manipulate the participant’s motivation (see Frey, 1986, for a
review). These studies have consistently found that increased cognitive dissonance
causes increased predictor selection bias.
Timing-of-feedback. Covariation and causation is the only paradigm to
manipulate the timing (sequential vs. simultaneous) of feedback as an independent
variable. Ward and Jenkins (1965) found that simultaneous feedback caused less
frequent use of sub-optimal strategies.
Surprise. The possibility of a surprising result improving participants thinking
has been explored in the Bayesian conditional selection paradigm. Ofir (1988)
factorially manipulated the base rate, the hit rate and the false alarm rate. Ofir found
that participants used the false alarm rate when the hit rate and base rate were
seemingly inconsistent (which can be assumed to be surprising). Doherty, et al. (1981)
manipulated surprise as an independent variable by providing half the participants an
additional conditional probability that completed a matched pair of conditionals. The
pair was constructed so that it would be inconsistent (and therefore surprising) with
their assumed interpretation of the single conditional probability they already had. The
participants who received the extra surprising conditional probability performed better
(less pseudodiagnostic search) on later trials than those who did not receive it.
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Problems with Current Research.
Despite the areas of agreement outlined above, there remain three major
problems with the current research: a) the common practice across paradigms of
investigating only one phase of decision-making at a time; b) the lack of quantification
of any effect of confirmation bias (as defined here); and c) a lack of research exploring
predictor selection bias (with the exception of the Dissonance theory paradigm).
The first problem stems from the common practice of conducting studies that
explore only one decision making phase at a time (search or integration). Research on
“confirmation bias” (however defined) has commonly been conducted looking at only
one of these phases in a given study. This practice prevents examination of any
interaction between these phases, for example, asking whether information search
phase strategy influences integration phase strategy. Additionally, this practice
prevents following the effects of errors in the search phase to see whether they
actually result in what is here referred to as confirmation bias in the final judgments.
Table 6 lists the studies by paradigm and phases they examine.
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Table 6
Studies by Paradigm and Decision Phases Examined
Paradigm
Bayesian

Search Studies

Doherty, et al. (1979); Doherty, et al. (1981);
Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff (1983)

conditionals
selection

Mynatt, et al. (1993)

Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel (1984);
Ofir (1988)

Studies
Bayesian

Integration Studies

Mynatt, et al. (1991)

Phillips & Edwards (1966);

data

Trautman & Shanteau (1977);

sampling

Nisbett, et al. (1981);

studies

Kemmelmeier (2004)

Wason

Wason (1966); Wason & Johnson-Laird

selection task

(1970); Evans (1972); Ormerod, et al.

studies

(1993); Platt & Griggs (1993)

Wason rule

Wason (1960); Klayman & Ha (1987);

discovery

Klayman & Ha (1989); Kareev &

studies

Halberstadt (1993)

Classification Trope & Bassok (1982); Snyder & Swan
studies

(1978); Skov & Sherman (1986)
Shaklee & Goldston (1989)

Covariation
and causation

Smedslund (1963); Ward &

studies

Jenkins (1965); Jenkins & Ward
(1965); Shaklee & Tucker
(1980); Shaklee & Mims (1982);
Arkes & Harkness (1983);
Shaklee & Hall (1983)

Dissonance

Frey (1981); Frey (1986); Ditto & Lopez

theory

(1992); Pinkley, et al. (1995); Frey, et al.

studies

(1996); Johnston (1996); Russo, et al.
(1996); Luce, et al. (1997); Lundgren &
Prislin (1998); Schulz-Hardt, et al. (2000);
Simon, et al. (2001)
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In all seven paradigms, no study examines the effects of an individual’s search
strategy on his or her integration strategy or decision. In the seven paradigms, only
four articles even reported data on both phases. In one of these, Shaklee and Goldston
(1989), using the covariation and causation paradigm, reported data from both phases,
but the integration data were limited to group-level data, which in addition were only
binary. Group level data prevent the examination of any possible linkage between an
individual’s search strategy and his or her integration strategy and final judgment. The
other three articles reporting data on both phases used the Bayesian conditionals
selection paradigm. Doherty, et al. (1979) and Doherty, et al. (1981) were both
primarily studies on the search phase. In Doherty, et al. (1979), integration data were
collected only for the first preliminary step, which existed merely to demonstrate base
rate neglect and to measure the focal hypothesis. Doherty, et al. (1981) replicated this
first step of Doherty, et al. (1979) with minor changes. As with Shaklee and Goldston
(1989), only group-level (binary) integration data were collected, again preventing the
examination of any possible linkage between an individual’s search strategy and his or
her integration strategy and final judgment. Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff (1983)
examined both phases but only in separate experiments, once again preventing
examination of this possible linkage.
The practice of studying search and integration phases separately implies the
assumption that the search and integration phases are independent and can be
appropriately treated as separate systems. Using the definition of a system proposed by
Lendaris (1986), systems are composed of sub-units operating together to manifest
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emergent properties that are not apparent by examining the sub-units separately. In
these terms, the entire Bayesian revision process may constitute a system. Phase
interactions (for example search phase effects on integration strategy and search phase
effects on probability revision) would constitute the emergent properties required by
this definition of a system. The existence of phase interactions could be directly tested.
Any evidence of the existence of phase interaction would attack the appropriateness of
the view that search and integration are sub-units of a single belief-revision system.
The finding that people are better at using information that is presented to them than at
seeking it out suggests an interaction of this kind (Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983).
This common practice of studying the two phases of decision making
separately may contribute to the other common practice of using generic names that
are not specific to a phase.
The second problem in the research literature is the lack of quantification of
confirmation bias (as defined here). This lack of quantification could be caused by any
combination of the following three factors. (1) The practice of studying each phase
separately prevents the measurement of any confirmation bias caused by the search
phase. (2) The imprecise use of any term (especially “confirmation bias”) impedes its
quantification. Typically, the effects of biases are not actually measured in terms of
change in the final judgment or decision. (3) The seven paradigms either can not or
have not been structured to produce a precise correct normative answer on an interval
scale against which participants’ responses could be compared.
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The third problem in the literature is a lack of research exploring predictorselection bias. As stated before, predictor-selection bias is a form of search phase bias,
where participants choose to learn about predictors that they expect will have a
confirmatory impact on their focal hypothesis. In the real world, people often have
expectations as to the direction of diagnosticity of the predictors available. For
example, a person gathering information about buying a car would likely know, prior
to gathering the actual data, that safety information would more likely favor buying a
Volvo while cost information would more likely favor buying a Ford. The only
paradigm that has examined predictor-selection bias is the dissonance theory
paradigm. Dissonance theory research has consistently found that participants favor
information that agrees with beliefs to which they have committed (Jonas, SchulzHardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). However, this paradigm has not quantified the
confirmatory effect of this bias against a normatively correct standard, nor examined
interactions with the integration phase. Additionally, this paradigm confounds two
possible biases, a motivational one (from their commitment) and a cognitive one (from
the participants’ attention focus).
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The Present Study
The present study is designed to overcome the three weaknesses in the existing
research by a) investigating both phases of Bayesian revision, b) exploring predictor
selection bias, and c) quantifying confirmation bias from sources in each phase.
The first decision in the design of this study is the choice of which of the seven
paradigms to use. The Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm was chosen primarily
in order to create a situation with a normative outcome on an interval scale, so that the
combined effects of confirmation biases can be quantified. Of the seven paradigms,
four do not yield a normative answer on an interval scale (Dissonance theory studies,
Wason rule discovery task, Wason selection task, and classification studies). The
dissonance theory studies typically do not even require integration, much less quantify
the effects of new information. The Wason rule discovery task does not produce a
normative outcome; the participant can never eliminate all the possible alternative
rules with which the triads are consistent. While the Wason selection task produces a
normative outcome; it is binary; the rule is disproved or not. The classification studies
do not produce a normative outcome on an interval scale, because the diagnosticities
of the questions are never explicitly quantified.
Two other paradigms, the covariation and causation studies and the Bayesian
data sampling studies, do produce at least an interval-scale normative-outcome (the
correlation coefficient and the probability of a sample having been drawn from a
specific population, respectively). However, quantitative dependent measures suitable
for comparison with these normative outcomes are problematic, because numeric
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values are not typically employed by average people in corresponding real world
problems. (e.g., people do not normally quantify the effect on their beliefs upon
hearing that the clouds have been seeded two days, and it rained both days, and not
seeded two days and it rained once).
This leaves only the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm as an
appropriate paradigm for this research. An additional benefit of the Bayesian
conditionals selection paradigm is that the problem of seeking conditional probability
information is similar to that encountered in real world problems faced by ordinary
people. The use of a real world situation instead of a purely logical framework may
improve participants’ performance. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi (1972)
found a familiar real world context improved performance. However, later studies
have found mixed support for this. See Manktelow (1999) for a review of this topic.
This paradigm lends itself naturally to the study of both phases of decisionmaking. Both phases have actually been studied using this paradigm, though usually in
separate studies. This paradigm thus enables a researcher to follow Lendaris’ (1986)
advice and study properties of the entire system as well as each sub-unit
simultaneously.
Similarities to Doherty, et al. (1979). This study will use the same paradigm
and cover story (with minor modifications) as Doherty, et al. (1979) and Doherty, et
al. (1981), in order to facilitate direct comparisons with these experiments. The cover
story used by Doherty, et al. (1979) told participants about an archeologist finding an
urn between two islands and having to decide which island the urn came from.

Method 38
Differences from Doherty, et al. (1979). Although, the scripts in the present
study describe a similar hypothetical situation (determining the island of origin of an
urn), there are ten functional differences between these scripts and Doherty’s, four of
which have to do with four independent variables not manipulated by Doherty, et al.
(1979).
First, in Doherty’s scripts the focal hypothesis was measured for each subject,
while in the present scripts, focal hypothesis will be manipulated as an independent
variable “attention”. This variable has two levels: focused and balanced. Half of the
participants will receive instructions that focus their attention on a single hypothesis
and half will receive instructions that balance their attention. Doherty defined focal
hypothesis to be the island that the participant judged to be more likely the origin of
the urn after initial search and integration phases. In this study these initial search and
integration phases are eliminated and replaced with an independent variable attention
that has two levels, balanced and focused.
Second, these scripts manipulate motivation as an independent variable
“motivation”. This variable has two levels: motivated and not motivated. Half of the
participants will be provided a motivation for a preferred outcome and half not. This
variable enables the study of the effects of motivation on search and integration
strategies.
Third, these scripts manipulate timing as an independent variable “timing of
feedback”. Half of the participants will seek information sequentially and half
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simultaneously. This enables an examination of the effects of search phase
sequencing. (E.g., does early information affect subsequent search decisions?)
Fourth, these scripts manipulate the size of the conditional probabilities as an
independent variable “size-of-conditionals”. Half the participants will be in the high
conditionals condition. When these participants select probabilities conditioned on the
island favored by the hint, they will receive probabilities greater than 50%. (See the
next paragraph for an explanation of the hints.) The other half of the participants will
be in the low conditionals condition. When these participants select probabilities
conditioned on the island favored by the hint, they will receive probabilities less than
50%. This manipulation is intended to surprise the subjects in the low condition and
encourage them to think more carefully. This is similar to the effect found by Smith,
Schoben and Rips (1974).
Fifth, these scripts add hints in the form of vague non-numeric information
about the expected diagnostic direction of each of the conditional probabilities (i.e.,
“Characterizes the current clay pits of Shell Island”). These hints provide the basis for
any predictor selection bias. Similar to those in the dissonance theory paradigm
(Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001), this study’s hints accurately indicate the
direction of diagnosticity.
Sixth, these scripts provide participants with a choice of 4 out of 16 conditional
probabilities, where the 16 conditional probabilities form eight diagnostic pairs. Of
these eight pairs, four have hints that favor the focal island and four have hints that
favor the non-focal island. The 16 conditional probabilities can be classified by 2
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dimensions, the island they are conditioned on (the columns in Tables 7 and 8) and the
island the relevant hint favors (the rows). Therefore, each cell has four of the 16
conditional probabilities in it, each of which can form a diagnostic pair with a
conditional probability in the other cell in the same row.
Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the types of conditional probabilities that the
participants may choose in Doherty, et al. (1979), and in the present study,
respectively. (Note that these tables are not traditional covariation tables).

Table 7
The Types of Conditional Probabilities in Doherty, et al.’s (1979) Study
Hints

There are no hints to
distinguish the predictors

Conditional probabilities

Conditional probabilities

about focal Island

about non-focal island

6

6
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Table 8
The Types of Conditional Probabilities in the Present Study
Hints

Conditional probabilities

Conditional probabilities

about focal Island

about non-focal island

Predictors with hints

4

4

favoring focal island

(Quadrant 1)

(Quadrant 3)

Predictors with hints

4

4

(Quadrant 2)

(Quadrant 4)

favoring non-focal island

These changes (adding the hints and increasing the number of conditional
probabilities to 16) enable participants to demonstrate any number of the following
possible search phase patterns: a) cell bias, selecting all four conditional probabilities
from the same category (which demonstrates a form of pseudodiagnosticity,
hypothesis focus bias, and predictor selection bias); b) column bias, selecting all four
conditional probabilities from a single column (which demonstrates a form of
pseudodiagnosticity and hypothesis focus bias); c) pseudodiagnostic row bias,
selecting all four conditional probabilities from a single row without forming any
diagnostic pairs (which demonstrates a form of predictor selection bias and
pseudodiagnosticity); d) diagnostic row bias, selecting two diagnostic pairs from a
single row (which demonstrates a form of predictor selection bias despite being
Bayesian), or e) unbiased Bayesian, selecting one diagnostic pair from each row.
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Seventh, these scripts provide participants with conditional probabilities whose
diagnosticity is held at a constant 2:1 ratio. This was done to ensure the same
normatively correct outcome. (This is discussed further in the Methods Section).
Eighth, conditional probabilities and the base rate are presented as frequencies
instead of probabilities. This was done following the advice of Gigerenzer & Hoffrage
(1995) that participants perform better with frequencies. This step was taken to make
the problem easier for the participants, and thus to reduce random error. (Random
responding has been a problem in other cognitive studies conducted by the author
using the same participant pool).
Ninth, data will be collected and analyzed on both search and integration phase
decisions, and the interactions between these phases will be examined.
Tenth, manipulations in the original studies of the base rate and the diagnostic
direction of the conditional probabilities will be dropped. These changes were made to
simplify the study and to ensure the same normatively correct outcome. The inclusion
of both manipulations in the original study was to demonstrate base rate neglect, a
phenomena which is now widely accepted.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses are divided into research hypotheses and exploratory
hypotheses. The research hypotheses are significant extensions of prior research and
will be evaluated by independent statistical tests. The exploratory hypotheses are not
significant extension of prior research and/or can not be tested by independent
statistical tests. This distinction is made between research and exploratory hypotheses
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to preserve the study wide alpha level. Only research hypotheses will be included in
the study wide alpha level. Both research and exploratory hypotheses can be subdivided into experimental and non-experimental hypotheses, the difference being
whether an independent variable is included in the hypothesis.
Expected effects of independent variables. The independent variables
involved in the experimental hypotheses (both research and exploratory) are expected
to produce biasing and unbiasing effects on arriving at posterior probabilities. These
effects are expected to have consistent (biasing or unbiasing) effects across dependent
variables regarding the participants’ search strategies, integration strategies, and
posterior probabilities.
The independent variable attention is expected to create a focal hypothesis.
Research across the seven paradigms has suggested that participants who have a focal
hypothesis in mind are biased in both the search and integration phases.
The independent variable motivation is expected to create a motive to
determine that one of the hypotheses is more likely. Many dissonance theory studies
support the expectation that motivated participants will select more information
expected to support their existing beliefs.
The independent variable size-of-conditionals presents conditionals that are
either consistent with or violate participants’ expectations. In the low condition,
participants are expected to be surprised by probabilities below 50%, when on the
basis of the hint they were presumably expecting probabilities above 50%. Such an
effect would be consistent with Ofir’s (1988) finding that participants used the false
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alarm rate data [p(D| H2)] only if the base rate and the hit rate [p(D| H1)] were on
different sides of .5 and therefore psychologically inconsistent. Doherty, et al. (1981)
found a similar effect of surprise. Their study asked participants to choose two
conditional probabilities from four (all four probabilities would form a diagnostic
pairs). Participants who chose unmatched conditional probabilities were later given a
third conditional probability which completed a diagnostic pair. Participants who
received the third conditional probability changed their posterior probability estimate,
presumably because the new information contradicted their assumed previous
interpretation of unmatched conditional probabilities.
The independent variable timing of feedback has two levels: sequential and
simultaneous. The sequential condition enables participants to alter their search
strategy after having learning the results of earlier choices of conditional probabilities.
It is expected that the combination of low conditionals and sequential timing of
feedback will result in an unbiasing effect.
Thus the attention manipulation is expected to produce bias in the focused
condition; the motivation manipulation is expected to produce bias in the motivated
condition; and the interaction of timing of feedback and size of conditional in the
combination of sequential and low conditions is expected to reduce bias. However,
participants must be biased by attention and/or motivation in order to be unbiased by
the combination of sequential feedback and low conditionals. Those participants in
conditions expected to produce bias will be refereed to as biased participants (and the
remaining participants will be referred to as unbiased participants).
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Research hypotheses. The four research hypotheses are listed in Table 9 and
discussed in the section below. In Table 9 each hypothesis is listed by number in the
cells corresponding to the independent and dependent variables involved.
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Table 9
Research Hypotheses and their Associated Independent and Dependent Variables
Research Hypotheses – Experimental
IV1

IV2

IV3 Timing-

IV4 Size-of-

IV3 *

Attention

Motivation

of-Feedback

Conditionals

IV4

R1

R1

R1

R2

R2

R2

R3

R3

R3

Search Process DVs
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias
DV2 Predictor Selection Bias
DV3 Pairs Selected
DV4 Search Strategy
DV14 Search Surprise
Integration Process DVs
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus
Integration Bias
DV9 Predictor-Focus
Integration Bias
DV10 Pairs Used in
Integration
DV11 Integration Strategy
Posterior Result DVs
DV5 Confirmation Bias
DV6 Search Confirmation
Bias
DV12 Integration
Confirmation Bias
DV13 Sum-of-Phase-Biases
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals

Research Hypotheses – Non-Experimental
R4 Use of biased search strategies (DV4) will be positively correlated with use of biased integration
strategies (DV11).
Note: R1-R4 refer to the four research hypotheses and the IV DV combinations they examine. Many
empty cells in this table will be examined by exploratory hypotheses. See Table 10 for exploratory
hypotheses.
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The three experimental research hypotheses will be tested by planned
comparisons within an ANOVA framework.
Predictor selection bias. Participants in conditions expected to produce bias
will demonstrate predictor selection bias by selecting more conditional probabilities
from minerals that are hinted to favor Shell Island than minerals hinted to favor Coral
Island (the top row of Table 8). Predictor selection bias was found in a pilot study
(Borthwick and Anderson, 2001) using a personnel selection cover story under the
Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm. Additionally, predictor selection bias is
analogous to the finding in the dissonance theory research that participants choose
information that is expected to support their existing belief or leading choice.
However, as previously noted, the dissonance literature has not clarified whether
predictor selection bias was caused by motivation and/or attention focus, because
these two variables were always confounded.
Research Hypothesis #1. Biased Participants will select more conditional
probabilities from minerals that are hinted to favor Shell Island than minerals
hinted to favor Coral Island.
Biased Bayesian strategy in integration. The design of this study (specifically
the use of hints in the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm) creates the
opportunity for participants who search optimally (selected one pair hinted to favor
each hypothesis, as discussed under “Demonstration of the Optimal Search and
Integration Strategies” in the methods section), to show bias in integration by using
only one of the two pairs in integration (Biased Bayesians). (Biased Bayesians would
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use their pair from the top row but not their pair from the bottom row in Table 8).
Biased participants are expected to show this bias despite searching evenly and using
Bayes’ Theorem. This bias will result in a confirmatory effect in their posterior
probability, by being more likely to use information that has been hinted to favor Shell
Island in integration than information hinted to favor Coral Island.
This hypothesis extends the dissonance theory findings to the Bayesian
Conditionals paradigm. Confirmation bias in integration is expected to show up
despite unbiased search.
Research Hypothesis #2. Biased Participants who searched optimally will be
more likely in integration to use the selected pair favoring Shell than the pair
favoring Coral.
Confirmation bias. Participants will demonstrate confirmation bias by
producing a posterior probability that favors Shell Island. This extends prior findings
in all seven paradigms that participants can be biased in the search and integration
phases which will cause a bias in their resulting posterior probability (confirmation
bias as defined in this study).
Research Hypothesis #3. Biased Participants will produce posterior
probabilities more in favor Shell Island than Coral Island.
Non-independence of phases. A major problem in the literature (noted above
in Problems with Current Research) is that prior studies have examined the two phases
of decision making separately. The two phases functioning separately is an underlying
unstated and untested assumption. This assumption, on its face, appears false, since an
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individual’s search strategy determines the information available to integrate and
therefore must influence their integration. Additionally, past research has not
compared participants’ judgments against a normative standard interval scale
outcome. This study provides this standard and uses it to directly test the assumption
that the phases are independent. This study assumes this assumption to be false and
puts the assumption to a direct statistical test. If the assumption is true, an individual’s
choice of search phase strategy should be independent of their choice of integration
phase strategy.
Research Hypothesis #4. Participants who use search strategies that are
hypothesis focused will be more likely to use integration strategies that are
hypothesis focused.
Exploratory hypotheses. The exploratory hypotheses are listed in Table 10,
and described below. The exploratory hypotheses can be sub-divided into
experimental and non-experimental hypotheses, the difference being the inclusion of
an independent variable in the hypothesis.
The hypotheses are listed by number, in the cells corresponding to the
independent and dependent variables involved. Descriptions of each hypothesis
follow.
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Table 10
Exploratory Hypotheses and their Associated Independent and Dependent Variables
Exploratory Hypotheses – Experimental
IV1

IV2

IV3 Timing-

IV4 Size-of-

IV3 *

Attention

Motivation

of Feedback

Conditionals

IV4

DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias

E1, E4

E1, E4

E1

DV2 Predictor Selection Bias

R1, E5

R1, E5

R1

DV3 Pairs Selected

E2

E2

E2

DV4 Search Strategy

E3

E3

E3

DV14 Search Surprise

E15, E16

E15, E16

E15,

Search Process DVs

E16
Integration Process DVs
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus

E6

E6

E6

E7

E7

E7

DV10 Pairs Used in Integration

E8

E8

E8

DV11 Integration Strategy

R2, E9

R2, E9

R2,

Integration Bias
DV9 Predictor-Focus
Integration Bias

E9
Posterior Result DVs
DV5 Confirmation Bias

R3

R3

R3

DV6 Search Confirmation Bias

E10

E10

E10

DV12 Integration Confirmation

E11

E11

E11

Bias
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals

E14

Exploratory Hypotheses – Non-Experimental
R4 Correlation between bias search and integration strategies
E13a Bayesian integration predicts actual posteriors better when incorporating intuitive
conditionals.
E13b Bayesian integration predicts actual posteriors better than regression.
E12 The actual posterior will not be equal to the Sum-of-Phase-Biases.
Note: R1-R4 refer to research hypotheses and E1-E14 refer to exploratory hypotheses and the IV DV
combinations the hypotheses examine. See Table 9 for research hypotheses.
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Exploratory search process hypotheses.
Hypothesis focus bias. Research in five paradigms has shown that directed
attention causes a focal search bias (Bayesian conditionals selection studies, Bayesian
data sampling studies, Wason selection task studies, Wason rule discovery studies, and
covariation and causation studies; see paragraph “Searching information that is about
or associated with the focal hypothesis” above for details). (Hypothesis focus bias is
the disproportionate selection from the left column of Table 8). The following
hypothesis will replicate and extend these findings.
Exploratory Hypothesis #1. Participants in biasing conditions will select more
probabilities conditioned on Shell Island than will unbiased participants.
Pseudodiagnosticity. The effects of focal search bias (preference for selecting
probabilities conditioned on the focal island) should appear in two other search phase
dependent variables, pairs selected and search strategy. These hypotheses are related
to (and not independent of) Exploratory Hypothesis #1, but use different dependent
variables.
Participants’ focal search bias creates a mismatch between the number of
probabilities they chose conditioned on each island, and therefore interferes with their
chance of selecting matched pairs. The preference for unmatched conditionals in
biased participants has been found by research in the Bayesian conditionals paradigm
(Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Mynatt, et al., 1993; Beyth-Marom &
Fischhoff, 1983). (Participants who are pseudodiagnostic will select conditional
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probabilities without selecting the matching probability conditioned on the other
island. The two probabilities would be from the same row in Table 8).
Exploratory Hypothesis #2. Participants in biasing conditions will select fewer
diagnostic pairs than unbiased participants.
Focal search strategies. Similarly, the focal search bias should cause
participants to use search strategies focused on the focal island. The difference
between Exploratory Hypotheses 3 and 1 is the difference between participants’ search
strategy (which classifies only the consistent participants see Search Strategy in
methods section), rather than the just the result of that strategy (their actual search
selections).
Exploratory Hypothesis #3. Participants in biasing conditions would use more
hypothesis-focused search strategies and fewer control focused search
strategies than unbiased participants
Comparing the size of hypothesis focus and predictor selection biases. Both
the attention manipulation and the motivation manipulation are expected to produce
search phase effects on the number of probabilities; (a) conditioned on the focal
island, and, (b) on dimensions hinted to favor the focal island. However, the attention
manipulation is expected to have a stronger effect on the number of probabilities
conditioned on the focal island (hypothesis focus bias, disproportionately selecting
probabilities from the left column of Table 8), while the motivation manipulation is
expected to have a stronger effect on the number of conditionals selected on
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dimensions hinted to favor the focal island (predictor selection bias, disproportionately
selecting probabilities from the top row of Table 8).
Exploratory Hypothesis #4. The hypothesis focus bias caused by the attention
manipulation will be greater than the predictor selection bias caused by the
attention manipulation.
Exploratory Hypothesis #5. The predictor selection bias caused by the
motivation manipulation will be greater than hypothesis focus bias caused by
the motivation manipulation.
Exploratory integration process hypotheses.
Hypothesis-focus integration bias. Research across paradigms has shown that
participant use non-diagnostic information in integration. (See above paragraph
entitled Integration of non-diagnostic information.) There are three types of findings
that show the use of non-diagnostic information. First, Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff’s
(1983) finding that half of their participants reported that p(D| H2) was irrelevant.
Second, Ofir’s (1988) finding that p(D| H2) was used only when the hit rate and base
rate were psychologically inconsistent. Third, the majority of the covariation research
finding that participants used the either only the present-present cell (Ward & Jenkins,
1965; Shaklee & Tucker, 1980; Shaklee & Mims, 1982; Arkes & Harkness, 1983) or
both predictor present cells (Shaklee & Goldston, 1989; Shaklee & Hall, 1983) in
making their covariation judgments.
It is hypothesized biased participants will select more probabilities conditioned
on Shell Island (Hypotheses-Focus Bias, Exploratory Hypothesis #1), and therefore
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they will have more available for them to use in integration. Therefore, participants
will continue to be hypothesis-focused biased in the integration phase (HypothesesFocus Integration Bias).
Exploratory Hypothesis #6. Participants in biasing conditions will report using
more information conditioned on Shell Island than will unbiased participants.
Predictor-focus integration bias. As stated in Research Hypothesis #1,
Dissonance Theory research has found that participants chose information expected to
confirm their hypothesis (predictor selection bias). The finding is expected to continue
into the integration phase (as predictor-focus integration bias, i.e., use of more
information expected to confirm the focal hypothesis in their integration phase). Since
participants will select more information expected to confirm, and therefore the
information available to them during integration. (Predictor-focus integration bias
would be the disproportionate use of probabilities from the left column of Table 8)
Exploratory Hypothesis #7. Participants in biasing conditions will use in
integration more conditional probabilities hinted to favor Shell Island than will
unbiased participants.
Pairs used in integration. A similar extension of the search phase applies to the
integration of unmatched pairs. Since biased participants will have fewer pairs
available to use from their search (Exploratory Hypothesis #2) they will use fewer
pairs in integration. This expected finding is extensively supported by research in the
Bayesian conditionals paradigm (Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Mynatt,
et al., 1993; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983). This hypothesis is classified as
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exploratory despite the fact that it has extensive support because it is not independent
of Research Hypothesis #1. As noted before, in order for subjects to have a hypothesis
focus bias (Research Hypothesis #1) they must also be pseudodiagnostic.
Exploratory Hypothesis #8. Participants in biasing conditions will use in
integration fewer diagnostic pairs than unbiased participants.
Use of biased integration strategies. As stated in Exploratory Hypothesis #4,
participants are expected to use search strategies that focus on the focal hypotheses.
This pattern is expected to continue into the integration phase, where participants are
expected to use integration strategies that focus on the focal hypothesis. This in part
will be caused by the disproportionate amount of information available to them in the
integration phase about the focal island. This effect is similar to (and not independent
of) Exploratory Hypothesis #6 (hypothesis-focus integration bias). However, this
hypothesis uses a different dependent variable, (integration strategy), which uses
information in addition to the conditionals participants stated they used (which is the
sole basis of hypothesis-focus integration bias).
Exploratory Hypothesis #9. Participants in biasing conditions will use more
integration strategies that focus on the focal island than unbiased participants.
Phase biases. As stated in Research Hypothesis #4, participants are expected to
produce confirmation bias in posterior probabilities. The confirmatory effect of
participants’ strategies (in terms of posterior probability) can be measured for both
phases separately (by combining their actual strategies in one phase with optimal
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strategies in the other phase). It is expected that biased participants’ will produce
greater confirmatory bias in both their search strategies and their integration strategies.
Exploratory Hypothesis #10. Participants in biasing conditions will have a
higher posterior probability produced from optimal integration and their actual
search than unbiased participants.
Exploratory Hypothesis #11. Participants in biasing conditions will have a
higher posterior probability produced from optimal search and their actual
integration than unbiased participants.
A major problem in the literature (noted above in Problems with Current
Research) is that prior studies have examined the two phases of decision making
separately. The two phases functioning separately is an underlying unstated and
untested assumption. This study assumes this assumption to be false and puts the
assumption to two direct statistical tests. First, if the assumption is true, an
individual’s choice of a search phase strategy should be independent of that
individuals’ choice of integration phase strategy. This was tested as research
hypothesis #4. Second, if the assumption were true, then the total confirmatory effect
of the two phases should be equal to the sum of the individual phase confirmatory
effects. However, Edwards (1968) found that people under adjust (conservatism) and
therefore it is expected that participants will show less bias in their posteriors than the
sum of their phase biases.
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Exploratory Hypothesis #12. Participants’ actual confirmation bias will be less
than the sum of their search confirmation bias and their integration
confirmation bias.
Intuitive conditionals. Gigerenzer engaged in a debate with the research team
of Kahneman and Tversky for over a decade over the extent and cause of cognitive
biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996, Gigerenzer, 1996). An ongoing issue between
them was why participants perform better in some situations than others (including the
use of frequencies rather than conditional probabilities, and in familiar situations as
opposed to abstract ones) (Gigerenzer, 1991). One possible explanation for the
conflicting findings is that participants make assumptions about the problems, and
these unexamined assumptions affect their decisions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996,
Nickerson, 1996).
One of the assumption participants could make about a problem is the size of
the unknown (in this study unchosen) conditional probabilities (intuitive conditionals).
Intuitive conditional probabilities could have an impact on participants’ posterior
probabilities. If intuitive conditional probabilities are used by participants, they could
offer a partial explanation as to why participants sometimes perform better in
situations they are familiar. In familiar situations participants might have more
accurate intuitive conditionals or use them in different ways. Different models will be
explored examining whether participants used intuitive conditionals in the integration
phase, and whether participants’ intuitive conditionals are affected by the size of the
actual conditionals.
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Exploratory Hypothesis #13a. Models using intuitive conditionals predict
participants’ posterior probabilities better than models that exclude them.
Exploratory Hypothesis #13b. Models using intuitive conditionals predict
participants’ posterior probabilities better when combined by Bayes’ Theorem
than when combined by regression.
Exploratory Hypothesis #14. The size of intuitive conditionals will be affected
by the size of the actual conditionals.
Surprise hypotheses. These two hypotheses continue the logic of the previous
hypotheses, that surprise will induce deeper and less biased thinking. For participants
who are in the sequential condition, if are surprised by the feedback they have an
opportunity to use a less biased search strategy. Therefore, participants who
experience some form of surprise will exhibit less hypothesis focus bias and predictor
selection bias.
Exploratory Hypothesis #15. For participants searching sequentially and in the
focused and/or motivated conditions, and if they reported being surprised it is
expected that they would select less information conditioned on Shell Island
than those not surprised.
Exploratory Hypothesis #16. For participants searching sequentially and in the
focused and/or motivated conditions, and if they reported being surprised it is
expected that they would select less information hinted to favor Shell Island
than those not surprised.

Method 59
Method
Study Overview
Task overview. All participants were presented with the problem of estimating
the probability as to which of two islands an urn was made. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two levels of each of four independent variables:
attention, motivation, timing-of-feedback and size-of-conditionals. Attention had two
levels: balanced, where the two islands were treated equally, and focused, where one
island was mentioned more frequently and earlier. Motivation had two levels:
motivated, where participants were provided a motivation reason for preferring Shell
Island, and not motivated, where there was no motivational reason for preferring either
island. Timing-of-feedback had two levels: sequential, where participants received the
results of each of their conditional probabilities before selecting later conditional
probabilities, and simultaneous, where participants received all four conditional
probabilities at the same time. Size-of-conditionals had two levels: low, where the
conditional probabilities all were below 50%, and high, where some of the conditional
probabilities were above 50%.
Participants were given an even base rate (the two islands were initially
equally likely) and they were offered their choice of four (out of sixteen) conditional
probabilities to assist them in estimating the probability that the urn originated on each
island. These sixteen conditional probabilities formed eight matching pairs (two
conditional probabilities on the same dimension each conditioned on one of the two
islands). Half of the eight matching pairs were hinted to favor each island as the
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source of the urn. Participants were asked to make an estimate of the probability the
urn came from each island. Lastly participants were asked about the conditional
probabilities they did not choose, about their integration methods, and demographic
information.
Measures overview. Measurements primarily targeted participants’ decision
making processes. They included examining their search choices, their integration
method (both information used and combination strategy) and decision results. These
measures can be sub-divided into those taken during the decision process (concurrent)
and those taken after the fact (retrospective and demographic). The retrospective
measures were taken after the fact, because if taken during the process they might
have altered participant behavior. Those measures taken during the decision process
(concurrent measures) can be further subdivided in search phase and integration phase
measurements. (See Appendix A for a copy of the script).
Concurrent search phase measurements. Participants were asked to choose
any four of 16 conditional probabilities. These 16 conditional probabilities formed
eight matching pairs (two conditional probabilities on the same dimension each
conditioned on one of the two islands). Of the eight dimensions four were hinted to
favor each island as the source of the urn.
Concurrent integration phase measurements. Participants were asked to
estimate the probability that the urn came from each island.
Retrospective measurements. Participants were also asked about which
information they used in making their decision and the mathematical processes (if
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any) they used in combining the information. Participants were asked if they were
surprised by any of the conditional probabilities they received in the search phase, and
to estimate the value of the 12 conditional probabilities that they did not choose.
Demographic measurements. Demographic questions were asked at the end of
the script.
Participants
Demographics. A total of 324 undergraduate psychology students enrolled at
an urban university in the Portland metropolitan area were recruited to participate in
this study. Participants were recruited primarily through their undergraduate classes,
and most received extra credit for their participation. Participants approximated
Portland’s racial makeup with 3.4% African American, 69.1% Caucasian, 3.7% Latino
/ Hispanic, 13.0% Asian / Pacific Islander and 7.7% other. A small number of
participants refused to state their race (3.1%). Participants approximated the gender
balance of the psychology classes from which participants were recruited from with
68.8% female. A small number of participants refused to state their gender (2.8%).
This sample was chosen largely for convenience, although it may roughly represent
the general population of all people who attend college.
Missing data. All participants completed the study. However, some
participants did not follow some of the instructions correctly, and were therefore
dropped from all analyses that involved data collected at or after their deviation. On
this basis, nine participants (out of the original 324) were dropped from all analyses,
because they chose more than the four requested conditional probabilities. Similarly,
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one additional participant was dropped from the integration-phase analyses, because
that participant did not provide a posterior probability. Similarly, 72 participants were
dropped from the intuitive conditionals analyses, because they did not provide all 12
requested intuitive conditionals.
Experimental Design
Structural design. This study employed a 2*2*2*2 (attention, motivation,
timing of feedback, size-of-conditionals) factorial between-subjects design. The
between subjects design was used because order effects would have been a severe
problem using a within-subject design.
Design features used to ensure a single optimal search and integration
strategy. This study had four design features to create a situation where there is both a
single optimal search strategy and, assuming Bayesian revision, a single optimal
posterior probability for all 16 conditions. There are four such design features. (1)
The base rate was in all cases even (.50). (2) All participants were instructed to choose
four conditional probabilities. (3) An equal number of dimensions were hinted to favor
each island. (4) All matched pairs had the same diagnostic ratios.
Given (1), (2), and (3), the optimal search strategy is to select one diagnostic
pair hinted to favor each island. A demonstration of the optimal of the search strategy
is given in the section entitled “Demonstration of the Optimal Search and Integration
Strategies”.
Theoretical definitions of independent variables. There are four independent
variables in this study (attention, motivation, timing-of-feedback and size-of-
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conditionals). Additionally, different conditions of these four independent variables
are expected to produce various confirmatory biases in participants while other
conditions are expected to have no biasing impact.
The first independent variable attention is defined as whether the situation
focuses participants’ attention on one hypothesis or balances participants’ attention
between the two hypotheses.
The second independent variable motivation is defined as whether the situation
provides the participants with a reason to prefer one hypothesis over the other or
provides the participants no reason to prefer either hypothesis.
The third independent variable timing-of-feedback is defined as whether
participants receive the results of their search choices before making the remaining
choices or not.
The fourth independent variable size-of-conditionals is defined as whether the
probabilities conditioned on the hypothesis that is hinted to be favored for that
dimension are above or below 50%.
Biasing conditions are conditions where the situations encourage participants
to be biased and additionally are not conditions that both surprise the participants and
provide them an opportunity to change their search strategies after such surprise. All
other conditions are unbiased. (See section entitled “Biased and Unbiased
Conditions” for a discussion).
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Theoretical definitions of dependent variables. Hypothesis-Focus bias
(dependent variable 1) is the tendency to prefer evidence about the focal hypothesis to
evidence about the alternative hypothesis.
Predictor-Selection bias (dependent variable 2) is the tendency to prefer
evidence expected to support the focal hypothesis to evidence expected to support the
alternative hypothesis.
Pairs selected (dependent variable 3) is the frequency of selecting matching
pairs of conditional probabilities as opposed to unmatched conditional probabilities
(pseudodiagnostic search).
Search strategy (dependent variable 4) is a classification of participants’ search
strategies. Search strategies are categorized by their use of matched pairs and from
which of the four quadrants a participant selects conditional probabilities.
Confirmation bias (dependent variable 5) is the size and direction of
participants’ probability estimates’ deviation from the normatively correct probability
estimate.
Search confirmation bias (dependent variable 6) is the size of the confirmation
bias (dependent variable 5) caused by the participants’ search.
Biased usage of hints (dependent variable 7) is the preference to use hints that
favor the focal hypothesis as opposed to hints that favor the alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis-Focus integration bias (dependent variable 8) is the preference to
use in the integration phase evidence about the focal hypothesis to evidence about the
alternative hypothesis.
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Predictor-Focus integration bias (dependent variable 9) is the preference to use
in the integration phase evidence expected to support the focal hypothesis to evidence
expected to support the alternative hypothesis.
Pairs used in integration (dependent variable 10) is the tendency to use
matched pairs of conditionals in integration (diagnostic integration) as opposed to
unmatched pairs (pseudodiagnostic integration).
Integration strategy (dependent variable 11) is a classification of participants’
integration strategies. These strategies are categorized by their use of mathematical
operations and from which of the four quadrants conditional probabilities are used.
Integration confirmation bias (dependent variable 12) is the size of the
confirmation bias (dependent variable 5) caused by the participants’ integration
method.
Sum-of-Phase-Biases (dependent variable 13) is the sum of search
confirmation bias (dependent variable 6) and integration confirmation bias (dependent
variable 12). This reflects the confirmation bias caused by the two phases if they did
not have any interactive effects.
Search surprise (dependent variable 14) is the degree that participants are
surprised by the size of the conditional probabilities.
Intuitive conditionals (dependent variable 15) are participants’ estimates of the
unchosen conditional probabilities.

Method 66
Bayesian intuitive posterior (dependent variable 15a) is the posterior
probability estimate a participant would have produced if they used all intuitive and
selected conditional probabilities and combined them using Bayesian integration.
Bayesian matching posterior (dependent variable 15b) is the posterior
probability estimate a participant would have produced if they used all selected
conditional probabilities and any intuitive conditionals necessary to make matching
diagnostic pairs and combined them using Bayesian integration.
Regression intuitive posterior (dependent variable 15c) is the posterior
probability estimate a participant would have produced if they used all intuitive and
selected conditional probabilities and combined them using the regression weights
from a regression equation of all participants posteriors and conditional probabilities
(both intuitive and selected).
Cell sizes. The numbers of participants, both original and final, in the various
experimental conditions are provided in Table 11.
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Table 11
Participants Completing each Phase in each Condition.
Condition

Total

Search

Integration

Retrospective

Phase

Phase

Measures

1 Balanced, Not Motivated, Sequential, Low

21

20

20

13

2 Balanced, Not Motivated, Sequential, High

20

20

20

17

3 Balanced, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, Low

20

19

19

14

4 Balanced, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, High

20

18

18

15

5 Balanced, Motivated, Sequential, Low

21

21

21

18

6 Balanced, Motivated, Sequential, High

20

20

20

18

7 Balanced, Motivated, Simultaneous, Low

21

20

20

18

8 Balanced, Motivated, Simultaneous, High

21

20

20

12

9 Focused, Not Motivated, Sequential, Low

21

21

21

17

10 Focused, Not Motivated, Sequential, High

20

20

20

16

11 Focused, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, Low

21

21

21

16

12 Focused, Not Motivated, Simultaneous, High

20

20

20

12

13 Focused, Motivated, Sequential, Low

20

19

19

12

14 Focused, Motivated, Sequential, High

19

19

19

14

15 Focused, Motivated, Simultaneous, Low

19

18

18

15

16 Focused, Motivated, Simultaneous, High

20

19

18

16

Total

324

315

314

243

Total Sequential Conditions Only

162

160

160

125
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Operational definitions of independent variables
All four independent variables had two levels and were manipulated in a
factorial design.
IV1 Attention operational definition. The attention manipulation has two
levels, balanced and focused. The two levels were differentiated by three sections on
the first page of the script (See appendix A for copy of the script). The focus of
participants’ attention was manipulated using four techniques, over the three parts of
the attention manipulation, to restrict participants’ attention in the treatment condition.
First, attention was restricted by delaying the first mention of Coral Island (the
alternative not mentioned until the third part). The delay in informing the subjects of
the existence of and the evidence favoring Coral Island made use of the primacy effect
(Jahnke, 1965) to strengthen the impact of the pro-Shell Island information. Second,
attention was restricted by delaying the mention of a uniform base rate. Third,
attention was restricted by reducing the frequency with which Coral Island was
mentioned. Fourth, attention was restricted by altering the form in which the
information was presented, prose or table (In the balanced condition a table is
presented in part two, in the focal condition all the information is provided in prose in
parts two and three). Because Ward and Jenkins (1965) had found that information
that is presented in a table encourages participants to examine data relevant to both
hypotheses, it is believed that use of a table will incline subjects towards diagnostic,
instead of pseudodiagnostic, strategies and thus against the experimenter’s hypotheses.
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In the focused condition the first two script sections were (the third section was
omitted for the focused condition):
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your
research has led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed
and was created on either Shell Island or nearby Coral Island, two islands that
share a unique culture. You have found this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean
floor between Shell and Coral Islands.
Of the 10 urns that have previously been found at this spot on the ocean floor,
5 have been determined to have been made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral
Island. Since there are no other islands with the same culture as Shell and
Coral, no other island of origin is possible.

You need to make a determination as to the island on which the urn was more
probably made. Your first step is to analyze the mineral content of the Urn of
Zor. You find that the Urn of Zor has high content of the 8 minerals listed in
the table below. Your second step is to determine the content of these minerals
in the clay pits now in use on the two islands. The table below displays the
results of the mineral content of the Urn of Zor and that of the current clay pits
on the two islands:
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Mineral found to be in

Island whose current clay pits are

abundance in the Urn of

characterized by an abundance of this

Zor

mineral

Aluminum

Shell Island

Calcium

Shell Island

Chromium

Shell Island

Copper

Shell Island

Iron

Coral Island

Magnesium

Coral Island

Nickel

Coral Island

Zinc

Coral Island

Unfortunately, the islanders have migrated around the islands over the years
and have changed the clay pits they use. While the mineral content of the
current clay pits is probably similar to the mineral content of those clay pits
used in ancient times to make the Urn of Zor, it is certainly not identical.
Therefore you will need an additional step in your analysis.
At this point what is the probability the urn came from:
Shell Island

_______?

Coral Island

_______?
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In the focused condition the three script sections were:
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your
research has led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed.
While conducting underwater excavations, from your research facility on Shell
Island, you have found this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean floor.

When you return to your research facility on Shell Island, your first thought is
to analyze the mineral content of the Urn of Zor. The results indicate that the
Urn of Zor has a high content of eight minerals (Aluminum, Calcium,
Chromium, Copper, Iron, Magnesium, Nickel and Zinc). Four (Aluminum,
Calcium, Chromium and Copper) of these high content minerals are
characteristic of the clay pits in current use on Shell Island. When you tell your
research team the results, one of your co-workers states that some of these
minerals remind him of the current clay pit on the side of Shell Island he has
been working on. A second co-worker states that some of these minerals
remind her of the current clay pit on another side of Shell Island on which she
has been working. This sets off a furious debate among your research team as
to the side of Shell Island on which the Urn was more probably made.
Unfortunately, the evidence is not conclusive because, the islanders have
migrated around the islands over the years and have changed the clay pits they
use. While the mineral content of the current clay pits is probably similar to the
mineral content of those clay pits used in ancient times to make the Urn of Zor,
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it is certainly not identical. Therefore you will need an additional step in your
analysis.
At this point what is the probability the Urn came from anywhere on Shell
Island ________?

You announce the finding of the Urn of Zor and your intention to give it to the
Shell Island National Museum, which you believe to be the most appropriate
representative of the rightful owners. Coral Island, which has the same culture
as Shell Island, quickly requests that you investigate the possibility that the
Urn might have been made on their island, and requests that you not give the
Urn to the Shell Island National Museum until you confirm that the Urn came
from Shell Island.
Coral Island argues that of the 10 urns that have previously been found at the
spot on the ocean floor where the Urn of Zor was found, 5 have been
determined to have been made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral Island. Since
there are no other islands with the same culture as Shell and Coral, no other
island of origin is possible.
Additionally, they argue that despite the fact that four of the minerals
(Aluminum, Calcium, Chromium and Copper) characterize the current clay
pits of Shell Island, the other four minerals (Iron, Magnesium, Nickel and
Zinc) characterize the current clay pits of Coral Island.
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IV2 Motivation operational definition. The motivation manipulation has two
levels, not motivated and motivated. The two levels were differentiated by two
sections of the script on the first page. The primary different was the inclusion in the
motivated condition of a mention of a career incentive to determine that the urn came
from Shell Island. In the not motivated condition the script section was (the second
section was omitted for the motivated condition):
The Urn of Zor is believed to have been created soon after the first settlements
on the islands. Finding the Urn provides new information about the early
colonization of the islands and will trigger new interest and research
opportunities for you and your fellow South Sea archeologists and greatly
enhance your prestige. This is especially important to you, since you are
coming up for promotion and tenure next year.

In the motivated condition the two script sections were:
If it could be established that this urn had come from Shell Island, this would
dispute the legend that Shell Island was the last island in the South Sea area to
be settled. This would provide abundant research opportunities for you and
your fellow South Sea archeologists and greatly enhance your prestige. This is
especially important to you, since you are coming up for promotion and tenure
next year.
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Would it be good for your career if the probability were higher or lower, that
the Urn came from Shell Island?
IV3 Timing-of-feedback operational definition. The timing-of-feedback
manipulation has two levels, sequential and simultaneous. The two levels were
differentiated by the instructions at the top of the third page of the script. In both
conditions the script read: “Choose 4 of the following 16 tests to perform, as the most
efficient way to determine the origin of the Urn of Zor, following the instructions
below.” In the simultaneous condition, participants were instructed to choose their
conditional probabilities all at once before receiving feedback. In the sequential
condition, participants were instructed to choose their conditional probabilities one at
a time with feedback after each selection, thus enabling them to choose their later
selections on the basis of the results of earlier choices.
Having participants in the Simultaneous Condition determine the order of
importance of their selections, despite this not being essential to their task, was
intended to balance the cognitive load between the two conditions of timing of
feedback. This additionally provided a sense of relative importance of the four
conditional probabilities. Having a measure of order in both conditions also made
possible additional comparisons between conditions (especially for effects of IV3
timing-of-feedback). This added task (numbering the choices) should increase
cognitive load, which might, in turn, encourage the use of simple heuristics. Biggs,
Bedard, Gaber and Linsmeier (1985) found an effect of cognitive load, while Payne
(1976) did not. Such an effect, if it exists, would work in the opposite direction of the
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possible effect from the use of tables, which is biasing towards proper use of
diagnostic information.
In the sequential condition the script was:
Put the number 1 next to the first test you would like to perform, and then
remove the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
Next choose your second test, put the number 2 next to that test and then
remove the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
Next choose your third test, put the number 3 next to that test and then remove
the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
Finally, choose your fourth test, put the number 4 next to that test and then
remove the corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
In the simultaneous condition the script was:
Put a number (1 to 4) next to the four tests you would like to perform in the
order of importance to you (1 being top priority, 4 being lowest). Then remove
the four corresponding stickers to reveal the four test results.
IV4 Size-of-conditionals operational definition. The size-of-conditionals
manipulation has two levels, low and high. The two levels were differentiated by the
size of the conditional probabilities the participants learn on the third page. In the low
condition the conditional probabilities were 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% for the
probabilities conditioned on the island favored by the hint, and the corresponding
conditional probabilities were 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% for the probabilities
conditioned on the island not favored by the hint. In the high condition the conditional
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probabilities were 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% for the probabilities conditioned on the
island favored by the hint, and the corresponding conditional probabilities were 30%,
35%, 40%, and 45% for the probabilities conditioned on the island not favored by the
hint.
These conditional probabilities [p(D|H1) and p(D|H2)] were designed with
three features. First, they were diagnostically consistent with the hints, to preserve the
participants’ faith in the value of the hints (especially for those in the Sequential
Condition). Second, all conditional probability pairs had a diagnosticity ratio of 2:1
(discussed further below in Demonstration of the Optimal Search and Integration
Strategies). For Bayesian participants, the 2:1 ratio would eliminate error variance due
to random choice among the four diagnostic pairs hinted to favor the same island.
Third, the sizes of the conditional probabilities within a category presented to any one
subject were all either above or below 50%. For participants who use a non-Bayesian
integration strategy, this third feature would reduce random error due to selection of
conditional probabilities within a quadrant.
The variation that remained among the conditional probabilities in each
quadrant provided two benefits. First, it helped hide the fact that all the diagnostic
pairs had the same diagnostic ratio. Because participants could pick only four
conditional probabilities, they were not able to discover that the ratios were the same
until they had picked their fourth and last conditional probability. Second, it limited
the ability of non-Bayesians to accurately predict or make any assumption about the
size of the non-chosen conditional probabilities (that is to use “intuitive conditionals”).
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Biasing conditions operational definition. The four independent variables
(attention, motivation, timing-of-feedback and size-of-conditionals) were expected in
different combinations to produce both biasing and unbiasing effects (see Expected
Effects of Independent Variables for a discussion and Table 22 for a list of research
hypotheses). The focal condition (attention IV) and the motivated condition
(motivation IV) were each expected to cause participants to be biased in search and
integration. The combination of sequential (timing-of-feedback IV) and low
conditionals (size-of-conditionals IV) was expected to undo both of these biasing
effects of both the focal and motivated conditions. Therefore, experimental conditions
were considered biasing if they involved one or more of the biasing conditions
(focused or motivated) and did not involve the unbiasing combination (sequential
feedback and low conditionals). The biasing effects were expected to be consistent
(biasing or unbiasing) across dependent variables regarding the participants’ search
strategies, integration strategies, and posterior probabilities. This classification of the
16 conditions into biasing or non-biasing was treated as a dichotomous independent
variable.
Operational Definitions of Direct Dependent Variables
Operational definitions of direct dependent search phase variables. Three
search phase dependent variables (DV1-DV3) were directly based on the participants’
four choices of conditional probabilities selected from the sixteen available
conditional probabilities. Each of the sixteen available conditionals was classified on
the basis of whether it was conditioned on Shell Island or Coral Island and whether the
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mineral was hinted to be more abundant on Shell Island or on Coral Island. These two
dimensions produce four quadrants, each of which has four conditional probabilities in
it. The four conditionals in each quadrant differ in the mineral they provide frequency
information about. The four quadrants are labeled as 1 through 4 as in Table 12.

Table 12
Description of the Four Quadrants of Conditional Probabilities
Direction of

p Conditioned on Shell Island

p Conditioned on Coral Island

Hint Favors

Quadrant 1 (4 conditional

Quadrant 3 (4 conditional

Shell Island

probabilities)

probabilities)

Hint Favors

Quadrant 2 (4 conditional

Quadrant 4 (4 conditional

Coral Island

probabilities)

probabilities)

Hint

Participants’ search phase choices of these four types of conditional
probabilities were entered into two classification systems. The first system is limited
to the four conditionals selected, while the second system includes all 16 available
conditionals from which the four choices were made. In the first system (Quadrant
System), each of the four choices was classified as to which of the four quadrants it
fell into and whether or not it completed a diagnostic pair. In the second system
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(Conditional System), what was recorded, separately for each of the possible 16
choices, was whether that conditional was selected or, if not selected, what frequency
the participant estimated for that unchosen conditional probability. (So as not to
introduce any bias into the primary task of producing a posterior estimate, this
estimated frequency was obtained only after the completion of the posterior estimate.)
Search phase dependent variables were derived either directly or indirectly
from the variables of the Quadrant and Conditional systems. Many of the dependent
variables that were created indirectly are based on frequency totals. From the Quadrant
System data, Quadrant totals were summed over the four choices (e.g. if a participant
choose 2 matching pairs that were hinted to favor Shell island, then these choices were
described as 2 choices in quadrant 1 and 2 choices in quadrant 3, see Table 12). All
coding except for integration search strategies was done by if / then logic commands
in excel.
DV1: Hypothesis focus bias. Hypothesis focus bias was created by summing
the total number of conditional probabilities selected from quadrants 1 and 2. It has a
possible range from 4, in which every choice is conditioned on the focal island (Shell),
to 0, in which every choice is conditioned on the non-focal island (Coral). Possible
values are 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 (See Table 13 for Coding).
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Table 13
Coding for Hypothesis Focus Bias
Direction of Hint

p Conditioned on

p Conditioned on

Shell Island

Coral Island

Hint Favors Shell Island

+1

0

Hint Favors Coral Island

+1

0

DV2: Predictor selection bias. Predictor selection bias was created by summing
the total number of conditional probabilities selected from quadrants 1 and 3. It has a
possible range from 4, in which every choice was hinted to favor the focal island
(Shell Island), to 0, in which every choice was hinted to favor the non-focal island
(Coral Island). Possible values are 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 (See Table 14 for Coding).

Table 14
Coding for Predictor Selection Bias.
Direction of Hint

p Conditioned

p Conditioned

on Shell Island

on Coral Island

Hint Favors Shell Island

+1

+1

Hint Favors Coral Island

0

0
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DV3: Pairs selected. This variable was the total number of diagnostic pairs
selected by each participant (A diagnostic pair is a pair of conditional probabilities
about the same mineral, one conditioned on each island). This total was calculated
from the pair-completed data in the Quadrant System data. The total number of pairs
was summed (using the MS Excel if / then command), creating a range from 0 to 2
pairs (resulting from the four conditional probability choices). Values include 0
(completely non-diagnostic search), 1, and 2 (completely diagnostic search). (For
reference purpose, random selection would result in an average of .4 pairs).
Operational definitions of direct dependent integration phase variables.
DV5: Confirmation bias. Confirmation bias was derived from participants
responses to the three questions at the bottom of the third page designed to elicit their
revised probability that the Urn came from Shell Island:
Which Island do you now believe the Urn of Zor is more likely to have come
from?
What do you now believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from that
island?
What do you believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from the other
island?”
Confirmation bias was calculated by subtracting the normative revised
probability estimate that the Urn had been created on Shell Island (.50 in this scenario)
from the participants’ revised probability estimates. Because the subtraction of .50 is a
linear transformation, it does not alter the statistical properties of the variable.
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However, it does make it easier to interpret and to compare to the other dependent
variables that measure bias. For example, if a participant thought that the probability
that the Urn came from Shell Island was = .9, then his or her confirmation bias score
would be .4 (the revised estimate of .9 - the normative probability of .5).
The resulting variable ranges from +.50, meaning the participant’s revised
estimate favored Shell Island .50 more than normative (maximum confirmatory bias),
to –.50, meaning the participant’s revised estimate favored Coral Island .50 more than
normative (maximum disconfirmatory bias).
The participant’s answer to the first question determined which island the
second and third questions were referring too. The participant’s answer to the question
referring to Shell Island was accepted as the participants’ posterior estimate of the
probability that the Urn was made on Shell Island. The revised probability data were
obtained in three parts in order to be as non-biasing as possible. This question format
did however make the assumption that the participants’ revised estimates of the
probability of the Urn originating on Shell Island and originating on Coral Island add
to 1. While probability judgments involving many categories have been commonly
shown to violate additivity, judgments of two categories have been commonly found
to be additive (Wright & Whalles, 1983). The third question about the probability of
the less likely island provides a check on additivity. As long as a participant's answers
to the two questions add up to 100% there has been no violation of additivity. If the
departures from additivity seem to warrant it, then Departures from Additivity can be
examined as a moderator variable.
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When subjects who found probability estimation difficult asked for assistance,
the experimenter used the bi-section method to assist subjects in determining this
probability (Torgerson, 1958; Pfanzagl, 1968; Seaver, von Winterfeldt, & Edwards,
1978) This method asks the participant a series of questions all of the same form, do
you think the probability is above or below X, where X is chosen to be the point
halfway between the ends of the range of possible values. (Thus, the first question will
be is the probability above or below .50, if they answer it is above, the second question
will be is the probability above or below .75 etc.).
Information usage dependent variables. The fourth page asked participants
what information they used to make their revised probability estimates. The
information used need not correspond to the information selected, because participants
were free a) to ignore information they selected and b) to use information (the hints
and base rate) they did not select but were provided. They were asked in closed ended
format: “What information did you use in making this estimate of the probability of
the island of origin? Put a check on the right next to all the pieces of information
below that you used.”
Participants were then presented with a list of possibilities that included the
base rate, the hints, and the particular conditional probabilities that they had selected.
Additionally, a blank space was provided, in case a participant used any additional
information not presented in closed-ended format. The responses to the closed-ended
questions were used directly to create four dependent variables (DV7-DV10), and
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indirectly to assist in the classification of participants’ integration strategies. (See
Classification of Participants Integration Strategies).
DV7: Biased usage of hints. Each hint that participants indicated that they had
used was coded for the island that the hint favored, +1 for focal (Shell Island) and –1
for non-focal (Coral Island). (A hint favored an island by stating that that Island’s
current clay pits are characterized by an abundance of this mineral). This produced the
seventh dependent variable (DV7) biased usage of hints, with a range from +4, in
which every hint favoring Shell Island and no hints favoring Coral Island were used to
–4, in which every hint favoring Coral Island and no hints favoring Shell Island were
used. Possible values are all integers between +4 and -4, because participants could
decide to use as many or as few of these hints as they wished. This variable reflects
solely usage in integration strategies (not selection in search), since all subjects were
presented with all the hints (See Table 15 for Coding).

Table 15
Coding for Biased Usage of Hints
Direction of Hint

Code

Hint Favors Shell Island

+1

Hint Favors Coral Island

-1

DV8: Hypothesis-focus integration bias. Each conditional probability that
participants indicated that they had used was coded for the island on which it was
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conditioned, +1 for focal (Shell Island) and –1 for non-focal (Coral Island). This
produced the eighth dependent variable (DV8) hypothesis-focus integration bias, with
a range from +4, in which every probability used in integration was conditioned on the
focal island to –4, in which every choice was conditioned on the non-focal island.
Possible values are all integers between +4 and -4. This variable reflects the combined
effects of participants’ integration and search strategies, since the conditional
probability must first be selected in the search phase prior to its use in the integration
phase (See Table 16 for Coding).

Table 16
Coding for Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias
Direction of Hint

p Conditioned

p Conditioned

on Shell Island

on Coral Island

Hint Favors Shell Island

+1

-1

Hint Favors Coral Island

+1

-1

DV9: Predictor-focus integration bias. Each conditional probability that
participants indicated that they had used was coded for the island that the subject
mineral was hinted to favor, +1 for focal (Shell Island) and –1 for non-focal (Coral
Island). This produced the ninth dependent variable (DV9) predictor-focus integration
bias, with a range from +4, in which every choice was of a conditional probability that
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was hinted to favor the focal island to –4, in which every choice was hinted to favor
the non-focal island. Possible values are all integers between +4 and -4. This variable
reflects the combined effects of participants’ integration and search strategies, since
the conditional probability must first be selected in the search phase prior to its use in
the integration phase (See Table 17 for Coding).

Table 17
Coding for Predictor-Focus Integration Bias.
Direction of Hint

p Conditioned

p Conditioned

on Shell Island

on Coral Island

Hint Favors Shell Island

+1

+1

Hint Favors Coral Island

-1

-1

DV10: Pairs used in integration. The conditional probabilities that each
participant indicated having used (0 to 4 of the 4 conditional probabilities they
previously selected) were recoded for the number of diagnostic pairs they constituted.
The number of pairs used constitutes the tenth dependent variable (DV10)
pseudodiagnostic integration, with possible values of 0, 1, and 2. This variable reflects
the combined effects of participants’ search and integration strategies, since a
conditional probability must first be selected in the search phase prior to its use in the
integration phase.
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DV14: Surprise. Surprise was based on a question on the fifth page of the
script: “Did you find the results of any of the tests on the old urns surprising? (Yes /
No)”. The measurement of this variable is vulnerable to hindsight bias (Fischhoff &
Beyth-Marom, 1975). Unfortunately, it must be asked after the fact, because to ask it
before the results of information search are revealed would bias both search and
integration strategies. This variable additionally serves as a manipulation check on
IV4: size-of-conditionals, since low conditional probabilities are expected to be
surprising.
Operational Definitions of Derived Dependent Variables
Several dependent measures were calculated and rated on the basis on
participants responses. The processes used to create these variables are described
below.
Operational definition of DV4: search strategy. Each participant’s search
strategy (DV4) was derived by Excel if/then statements from their conditional
probabilities selections. Figure 1 divides the possible strategies by the number of cells
(or quadrants) selected, then by the different patterns these strategies can have, and
lastly by whether or not the strategy is Bayesian (includes two matching pairs). First,
participants were divided into Bayesians and non-Bayesians (fifth row in Figure 1).
Participants who selected two diagnostic pairs (the maximum) with their four
selections of conditional probabilities were considered Bayesians, all other
participants, whether they select one pair or no pairs, were considered non-Bayesians.
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For Bayesians, there are three possible strategies for selecting two diagnostic
pairs from two categories (here, pairs favoring Shell or pairs favoring Coral), when
selection order and specific selection within a category are not considered: two
favoring Shell Island (in the second strategy group from left in the bottom of Figure
1), two favoring Coral Island (in the second strategy group from left in the bottom of
Figure 1), or one favoring each island (in the second strategy group from right in the
bottom of Figure 1).

Figure 1. Classification of search strategies by the number of cells used and the use of matched pairs.
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For non-Bayesian participants, there are 35 possible strategies for selecting
four conditional probabilities from the four quadrants with four members each, when
selection order, specific selection within a category, and number of diagnostic pairs
are not considered. These categories are defined in terms of the island on which the
probability was conditioned and the island that was favored by the hint. Of these 35
strategies, the following 11 are of interest: a) selecting all four choices from one
category (Cell Bias, 4 strategies, the left most strategy group in the bottom of Figure
1), b) selecting two choices each from two categories (Column, Row or Diagonal Bias,
all 2-2 strategies, 6 strategies, the third through fifth strategy groups from the left in
the bottom of Figure 1), and c) selecting one choice from each of the four categories
(Table Focus, unbiased, 1 strategy, the right most strategy group in the bottom of
Figure 1).
The remaining 24 non-Bayesian strategies would not seem to be of interest,
because they do not provide a clear indication about the intent of the participant. These
are a) selecting three choices from one category and one choice from another category
(3-1 class of strategies, 12 strategies, third from the right strategy group in the bottom
of Figure 1), and b) selecting two choices from one category and one choice each of
two other categories (2-1-1 class of strategies, 12 strategies, fourth from the right
strategy group in the bottom of Figure 1). These 24 strategies would not seem to be of
interest for two reasons: participant reliability and generalizability of strategy. First,
these 24 strategies provide less evidence of participant reliability. A strategy is
deemed to be one that is reliably used by the participant if either all the categories
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involved are selected at least twice, or if diagnostic pairs are selected at least twice.
All the strategies of interest meet this criterion, except the Table Focus, which was
included because it represents the only unbiased non-Bayesian strategy (and it is also
the only strategy with no redundancy). On the basis of this criterion alone, one could
eliminate the 24 strategies deemed not of interest. Second, these same strategies would
be eliminated by another criterion: They cannot be defined by a simple rule that can be
easily generalized to other situations. For example, when picking eight of 32
conditional probabilities, it is clear that a one-category strategy (4-0-0-0) would pick
all eight conditional probabilities from the same category (8-0-0-0); however, it is
unclear whether someone using the 2-1-1-0 strategy would choose a 3-3-2-0, 4-2-2-0,
5-1-1-1, or a 6-1-1-0 strategy.
There are thus 14 identified search strategies, and one default category that
were coded. These can be grouped into five classes: Bayesian, One-Category, TwoCategory, Four-Category, and Unclassifiable (2-1-1 and 3-1).
Bayesian strategies.
1

Bayesian unbiased (Optimal): Two pairs, one pair hinted to be in each
direction.

2

Bayesian Confirmatory Predictor Bias: Two pairs, both hinted to favor Shell
Island (a row bias pattern).

3

Bayesian Disconfirmatory Predictor Bias: Two pairs, both hinted to favor
Coral Island (a row bias pattern).
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Non-Bayesian one-category strategies (cell bias).
4

Shell Island both Focal and Motivated: Four conditional probabilities hinted to
favor Shell Island and conditioned on Shell Island.

5

Shell Island Focal and Coral Island Motivated: Four conditional probabilities
hinted to favor Coral Island but conditioned on Shell Island.

6

Coral Island Focal and Shell Island Motivated: Four conditional probabilities
hinted to favor Shell Island but conditioned on Coral Island.

7

Coral Island both Focal and Motivated: Four conditional probabilities hinted to
favor Coral Island and conditioned on Coral Island.
Non-Bayesian two-category strategies (column, row or diagonal bias).

8

Shell Island Column Focal: Four probabilities conditioned on Shell Island,
with two hinted to favor Shell Island and two hinted to favor Coral Island
(Column Bias).

9

Coral Island Column Focal: Four probabilities conditioned on Coral Island,
with two hinted to favor Shell Island and two hinted to favor Coral Island
(Column Bias).

10

Shell Island Row Motivated: Four probabilities conditionals hinted to favor
Shell Island, with two conditioned on Shell Island and two conditioned on
Coral Island (Row Bias).

11

Coral Island Row Motivated: Four probabilities conditionals hinted to favor
Coral Island, with two conditioned on Shell and two conditioned on Coral
Island (Row Bias).

12
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Consistent Diagonal: Two conditional probabilities both hinted to favor Shell
Island and conditioned on Shell Island, and two conditional probabilities both
hinted to favor Coral Island and conditioned on Coral Island.

13

Inconsistent Diagonal: Two conditional probabilities hinted to favor Shell
Island but conditioned on Coral Island, and two conditional probabilities hinted
to favor Coral Island but conditioned on Shell Island.
Non-Bayesian four-category strategy (table focus, unbiased).

14

Sampling Strategy: One selected from each category.
Unclassifiable strategies.

15

Unclassifiable Strategies. This includes the 12 three-category strategies (2-11), and the 12 uneven two-category strategies (3-1).
Classification of search strategies as focal and predictor biased. These

strategies can be further coded as focal, neutral or anti-focal. Strategies that include all
four probabilities conditioned on Shell were coded as focal (+1). Strategies that
include all four probabilities conditioned on Coral were coded as anti-focal (-1). All
other strategies were coded as neutral (0). Similarly, these strategies can be further
coded as and as predictor biased, neutral or anti-predictor biased. Strategies that
include all four conditional probabilities on dimensions hinted to favor Shell were
coded as predictor-biased (+1). Strategies that include all four conditional probabilities
on dimensions hinted to favor Coral were coded as anti-predictor biased (-1). All other
strategies were coded as neutral (0). These two codes were summed and trichotomized
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(+, 0, -) into an overall bias, neutral unbiased search strategies (See Table 18 for a list
of search strategies with their focal and predictor codes).
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Table 18
Coding of Search Strategies as Focal and Predictor Biased
Strategy Class

Focal

Predictor

Code

Code

Bayesian Unbiased

0

0

Bayesian Confirmatory Predictor Bias

0

+1

Bayesian Disconfirmatory Predictor Bias

0

-1

Non-Bayesian One-

Shell Island both Focal and Motivated

+1

+1

Category Strategies

Shell Island Focal and Coral Island

+1

-1

-1

+1

Coral Island both Focal and Motivated

-1

-1

Non-Bayesian Two-

Shell Island Column Focal

+1

0

Category Strategies

Coral Island Column Focal

-1

0

Shell Island Row Motivated

0

+1

Coral Island Row Motivated

0

-1

Consistent Diagonal

0

0

Inconsistent Diagonal

0

0

Sampling Strategy

0

0

Unclassifiable Strategies

Not

Not

Coded

Coded

Bayesian Strategies

Strategy

Motivated
Coral Island Focal and Shell Island
Motivated

Non-Bayesian FourCategory Strategy
Unclassifiable
Strategies
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Operational definition of DV11: integration strategy. The strategies in this
classification system were selected to achieve the goals of classifying participants by
the conditional probabilities they used and by the identifiable mathematical formula (if
any) they used to calculate their posterior probabilities. The strategies in the initial
version of the classification system came from three sources: a) the integration
strategies found in a pilot study (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001, Appendix E); b)
strategies of participants in the current study who wrote out their strategies
mathematically; c) several additional, non-mathematical strategies the author felt
possible. In a test of the classification system was performed on a small sample of the
current participants, the non-mathematical strategies were found to be difficult to
classify reliably. Therefore, these non-mathematical strategies were collapsed into 3
strategies, producing the final classification system of 14 strategies (11 mathematical
and 3 non-mathematical). All strategies are defined below.
The final classification system was used by two raters who independently
classified each participant into one of the fourteen integration strategies (seven of
which are subdivided by which island they focus on). In cases where the two raters
disagreed, they discussed and determined the appropriate rating jointly. The joint
decision of the raters then became the eleventh dependent variable (DV11) Integration
Strategy.
Two measures were used to assess inter-rater reliability. The first is the
percentage of agreement, which will be measured as a percentage of all ratings that are
in agreement (72.8%). The second is Cohen’s (1960) Kappa, which has the desirable
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property that it takes into account the effects of chance agreement (Kappa = .687,
Standard Error = .029).
To classify participants’ integration strategies, the two raters used the
following information, listed in decreasing order of importance: a) posterior
probability, b) information search selections (both the values of the conditional
probabilities and the availability of Bayesian matched pairs), c) mathematical
computations (if any), d) verbal descriptions of integration strategies (question 1 on
page 5), e) indications of information used (DV7 through DV10) in calculating the final
probability estimate, and f) the mathematical operations indicated as having been used
(question 2 on page 5).
The first of these items that the raters used was whether each participant
selected in the search phase at least one diagnostic pair (Bayesian) or no diagnostic
pairs (Non-Bayesian). The second of these items was whether an identifiable
mathematical formula could be specified. All the above information was used to
determine a mathematical formula that could account for the participant’s revised
probability estimate given the information available to him or her.
There were two items of information that could have been used, but were
generally not used, to classify a participant’s integration strategy. The first of these
was which, if any, boxes a participant checked to indicate the dimensional hints (the
abundance of each mineral in the modern clay pits of the two islands) used in
integration. While the hints were designed to bias the selection of information, they
were ignored here (in integration) for two reasons. First, any use of these hints should
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have had no effect on integration, because the hints are non-numeric and balanced.
Second, there is reason to believe that some participants who indicated that they had
used the hints in integration actually were indicating that they had used the hints in
selection. (The reason for the latter belief is that what each hint provides information
about is the values of the two conditional probabilities on a single dimension. Many of
the participants who indicated that they had used a dimensional hint in integration
already knew the exact value of both of the dimension’s conditional probabilities. In
this case, knowledge of the value of the conditional probabilities makes the hint
superfluous in integration).
The second item of information generally not used was whether participants
indicated having used the base rate. This item of information was not usually
considered because the base rate was even and therefore likely to be ignored by most
participants and, if not ignored, unlikely to have had an impact on the posterior
probability. However, if a participant provided multiple indications of having used a
non-Bayesian integration strategy that included the base rate as a critical part, then the
fact that a participant indicated having used the base rate was taken into account.
There were only two such strategies: a) base rate + largest conditional, and b) base
rate.
The fourteen strategies are listed below (see Figure 2) and described in
sections: Mathematical Two-Island Bayesian Strategies, Mathematical Two-Island
Non-Bayesian Strategies, Mathematical One-Island Strategies, Mathematical ZeroIsland Strategy, and Non-Mathematical Strategies. These strategies are categorized
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into those with an identifiable mathematical formula (11 strategies) and those with no
identifiable mathematical formula (3 strategies). Although the distinction between
mathematical and non-mathematical is useful in categorizing these strategies, the first
step towards categorizing participants was determining whether their search strategies
did or did not provide diagnostic pairs (that is, whether they searched diagnostically),
as required by Bayes’ Theorem. The determination of Bayesian search comes first,
because there are three integration strategies used exclusively by participants who
searched diagnostically, two of which are mathematical (Bayesian, Biased Bayesian)
and one non-mathematical (Diagnostic Search with Default Integration).
To summarize, the entire classification process was as follows: First, an
attempt was made to match participants to a Mathematical Bayesian Strategy; failing
that, an attempt was made to match them to a Mathematical Non-Bayesian Strategy;
failing both, participants were matched to one of the three Non-Mathematical
Strategies.

Figure 2. Categorization of integration strategies by the information and math used.
2-Island
Strategies

0-Island or
Unclassif iable
Strategies

1-Island
Strategies

Integration
Strategy

Mathematical
Strategies

Mathematical
2-Island
Strategies

Mathematical
1-Island
Strategies

Mathematical
0-Island
Strategies

Mathematical
2-Island
Non-Bay esian
Strategies

Mathematical
2-Island
Bay esian
Strategies

Biased
Bay esian
n=32

Non-Mathematical
Strategies

Bay esian
n=56

Ratio of
Conditionals
n=35

Double Ratio
n=1

Av erage of
1-Island's
Conditionals
n=13

Extreme
Conditional
n=12

Sum of 1Island's
Frequencies
n=1

Base Rate +
Largest
Conditional
n=1

Sum of 1Island's
Conditionals
n=9

NonMathematical
1-Island
n=55

Non-Diagnostic
Search with
Unclassif iable
Integration
n=67

Diagnostic
Search with
Unclassif iable
Integration
n=33

Method 100

Fav oring
Ratio
n=3

Base Rate
n=6

Method 101
The eleven mathematical strategies are sub-divided according to whether the
formula uses probabilities conditioned on one or both islands or uses no conditional
probabilities. Subjects were classified as showing one of the 11 mathematical
strategies if they met two main criteria. The primary criterion was that participants
must have produced a posterior probability within a range of +/- 5% of the posterior
produced by using the conditional probabilities available to them and the formula of
the relevant mathematical strategy. This criterion was modified in two cases.
The first case where the primary criterion was modified was the two
mathematical Bayesian strategies. The requirement that the posterior fall within a + / 5% range centered on the correct posterior was changed to the requirement that it fall
within a rounded range (the centered range rounded to the nearest 5%). In this case,
the change was made to facilitate rater comprehension. This change was practical for
Bayesian strategies and only Bayesian strategies, since they are the only strategies that
(because of the fixed 2:1 diagnostic ratio) permit only a very limited number of correct
outcomes (three outcomes and their complements). This made it possible to calculate
all the possible posteriors before conditional probabilities had been selected. (The
three possible correct rounded ranges are as follows. 1) If the participant had selected
and used in integration two pairs favoring the same island, the correct Bayesian
posterior would be 80% (20% for the other island) and the rounded range would be
75-85%. 2) If the participant had selected one or two pairs and used one pair in
integration, the correct Bayesian posterior would be 66.66% (33.33% for the other
island) and the rounded range would be 60-70%. 3) If the participant had selected two
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pairs favoring different islands and used both, the correct Bayesian posterior would be
50%, and the rounded range was 45-55%.]
The second case where the primary criterion was modified was the base rate
strategy. The primary criterion (allowing a +/- 5% range) was changed to require a
posterior of exactly 50%, for two reasons. First, because many strategies can result in
a revised probability of approximately 50%, the range of 45%-55% would not be very
diagnostic. Second, because this strategy requires no calculating, there is no reason to
allow for errors in calculation.
The secondary criterion (for classifying integration strategies) was some verbal
or mathematical evidence of having used the strategy. This criterion required only
minimal mathematical or verbal indication supporting the participant’s use of the
strategy. This criterion was modified in four cases.
The first case where the secondary criterion was modified was when
participants estimated a posterior of exactly 50%. In this case the minimal standard
was made more stringent (because a 50% posterior can result from many strategies).
In this case, the second criterion was changed to require that the participant have either
written out the complete mathematical formula or have made an explicit verbal
statement of the strategy.
The second case where the secondary criterion was modified was for the two
Bayesian strategies. Because the formula is complex and hard to distinguish if not
completely spelled out, the secondary criterion was changed to require the participants
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either to spell out the formula completely or at least not to specify any computation
inconsistent with Bayes’ formula.
The third case where the secondary criterion was modified was for the base
rate strategy. The secondary criterion was tightened to require that the participants
must not have shown any indication of having used any conditional probabilities (no
checks on boxes corresponding to conditional probability evidence or mathematical
writings including the values of conditional probabilities), and they must have either
checked the box indicating that they used the base rate or mentioned using the base
rate in their verbal description.
The fourth case where the secondary criterion was modified was for the double
ratio and sum of frequencies strategies. Because these strategies were unexpected, the
secondary criterion was tightened to require that participants must have produced
mathematical writings calculating this formula. (These strategies were used by only
one subject each, but they were included because those two subjects were very
specific and clear in stating their mathematical calculations used.)
All the modifications from the two main criteria are noted in Table 19 below as
well as in the relevant strategy descriptions.
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Table 19
Exceptions to the Two Main Criteria for Classification to an Integration Strategy
Mathematical Strategy

Bayesian

Exception to Primary

Exception to Secondary

Criterion (posterior

Criterion (evidence of

within +/- 5%)

having used the strategy)

Rounded Range

More explicit or not
inconsistent

Biased Bayesian

Rounded Range

More explicit or not
inconsistent

Ratio of Conditionals
Favoring Ratio
Double Ratio

Must show math

Sum of One-Island's Conditionals
Sum of One-Island's Frequencies

Must show math

Average of One-Island’s
Conditionals
Extreme Conditional
Base Rate + Largest Conditional
Base Rate

Exact Posterior

Indicate base rate and not
conditional probabilities

All Strategies when participants
estimate a posterior of 50%

More explicit or math
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There are five mathematical two-island strategies. These are sub-divided into
two Bayesian and three Non-Bayesian strategies.
Mathematical two-island Bayesian strategies (2 strategies). The two Bayesian
mathematical strategies (Biased Bayesian and Bayesian) will be described together.
These both require that participants have first searched diagnostically (selecting one or
two diagnostic pairs in the search phase) in order to be considered for classification.
Both of the two main criteria were modified for these strategies as discussed above.
For both participants must have produced a posterior within a rounded range of the
correct posterior (criterion #1) using at least one diagnostic pair and must either have
written out Bayes formula or at least made no indications contrary to Bayes formula
(criterion #2).
In order to distinguish between Biased Bayesian and Bayesian it is clearer to
describe the more specific strategy first (Biased Bayesian). There are three different
ways to search for one or two diagnostic pairs in this scenario: one pair, two pairs
favoring the same island, or two pairs with one hinted to favor each island (optimal
search as demonstrated above under “Demonstration of the Optimal Search and
Integration Strategies”). Biased Bayesian participants were those who searched
optimally but used in integration only one of the two available pairs correctly (that is a
posterior within a rounded range, criterion #1) and who met the requirements of the
second criterion. Biased Bayesian participants were further distinguished by which of
the two islands they were biased towards.
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Participants who did not qualify for Biased Bayesian would be classified as
Bayesian if they fulfilled three criteria: 1) They produced one or two diagnostic pairs
in the search phase. 2) They produced a posterior probability within the rounded range
(criterion #1) of the correct posterior for using one or both of the pairs available to
them. 3) They met the requirements of the second criterion.
There are two differences between the two Bayesian integration strategies. The
first difference is in the search phase requirements. Bayesian integration requires that
the participant obtain at least one pair in integration, so that they can integrate at least
one pair using Bayes’ theorem. Biased Bayesian integration requires that participants
have searched optimally (two pairs with one hinted to favor each island). This is the
only way to search that enables participants both to integrate using Bayes Theorem
and yet to show a bias through their choice of which of the two pairs to use in
integration. Second, although both Bayesian integration strategies require the posterior
be within a rounded range, in Biased Bayesian integration the range is built around
the correct use of only one pair, while in Bayesian integration the range is built around
correctly using either one or two pairs.
Example used to illustrate all mathematical strategies. All remaining
mathematical strategies will be illustrated by means of the example below. Under each
mathematical strategy the correct mathematical formula used to compute the posterior
probability (assuming the results of search shown in Table 20) is provided as an
illustration. This would be the posterior that the participant would have to come within
5% of in order to satisfy the first criterion for being classified with that strategy. In this
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example the hypothetical participant selected one conditional probability from each
quadrant.

Table 20.
Example used for all Mathematical Strategies
Direction of Hint

p Conditioned on Shell

p Conditioned on Coral

Island

Island

Hint Favors Shell Island

80% or 16 Frequency

40% or 8 Frequency

Hint Favors Coral Island

30% or 6 Frequency

60% or 12 frequency

This example would result in a 50% posterior using Bayesian integration if the four
conditional probabilities formed either two or no matching pairs.
Mathematical Two-Island Non-Bayesian Strategies (3 Strategies). There
were three identifiable mathematical non-Bayesian strategies that use evidence from
both islands in the classification system. All three use all available information, are
unbiased in their computation, and are symmetric regarding the two islands, making
the island on which the calculation is based on irrelevant. However, while the
computation is unbiased, bias can be introduced in the search phase. The mathematical
formulas for the three Mathematical Two-Island Non-Bayesian Strategies follow, each
in their own section.
Ratio of conditionals. The formula for ratio of conditionals is:
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∑ (probabilities conditioned on one island) / ∑ (all conditional probabilities).
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80%+30%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) =
52.38%.
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (40%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) =
47.62%.
Favoring ratio. The formula for favoring ratio is:
∑ (conditional probabilities hinted to favor one island) / ∑ (all conditional
probabilities).
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80%+40%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) =
57.14%
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (30%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) =
42.86%.
Double ratio. The formula for double ratio is:
[∑ (probabilities conditioned on Shell) / ∑ (all conditional probabilities)] +
[∑ (probabilities hinted to favor Shell) / ∑ (all conditional probabilities)]/2.
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = [(80%+30%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) +
(80%+40%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%)] / 2 = 54.76%
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = [(40%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%) +
(30%+60%) / (80%+30%+40%+60%)] / 2 = 45.23%
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This strategy can be thought of as the average of the other two mathematical
two-island non-Bayesian strategies. The secondary criterion was tightened for this
strategy as noted above.
Mathematical one-island strategies (5 strategies). There were five
identifiable mathematical strategies using evidence from only one island in the
classification system. These strategies are not symmetric, in that it matters which
island the participant focuses the computation on. Therefore, all five of these strategies
were further subdivided into whether the computation used probabilities conditioned
on Shell or Coral. The mathematical formulas for the five Mathematical One-Island
Strategies follow, each in their own section.
Sum of one-island's conditionals. The formula for sum of one-island's
conditionals is:
∑ (probabilities conditioned on one of the islands)
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80%+40%) = 120%.
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (30%+60%) = 90%.
Sum of one-island's frequencies. The formula for sum of one-island's
frequencies is:
∑ (frequencies about one of the islands). This number is then treated as a
probability.
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (16+8) = 24, which was treated as 24%.
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Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (6+12) = 18, which was treated as 18%.
The secondary criterion was tightened for this strategy as noted above.
Average of one-island’s conditionals. The formula for average of one-island’s
conditionals is:
∑ (probabilities conditioned on one of the islands) / n
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80% + 30%) / 2 = 55%.
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = (40% + 60%) / 2 = 50%.
Extreme conditional. The formula for extreme conditional is: The value of the
single most extreme conditional.
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = 80%
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = not possible in the example case because
the most extreme probability is conditioned on Shell.
Base rate + largest conditional. The formula for base rate plus largest
conditional is:
Base Rate + Largest Conditional Probability
Using the example above, the calculation would be:
Posterior probability if calculated on Shell = (80% + 50%) = 130%. This was treated
as 100%.
Posterior probability if calculated on Coral = not possible in the example case because
the largest probability is conditioned on Shell.
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Mathematical zero-island strategy (1 strategy). There was only one
integration strategy that used an identifiable mathematical formula in the classification
system. It used just the base rate, but no conditional probability evidence.
Base rate. The formula for base rate is: The base rate (50% in this study).
For example, if the available conditional probabilities were: 80% conditioned
and hinted to favor Shell, 60% conditioned on Shell and hinted to favor Coral, 40%
conditioned on Coral but hinted to favor Shell, and 30% conditioned on and hinted to
favor Coral. Then the calculation would be:
Base Rate = 50%
Because a 50% posterior can be produced in many ways, the criteria for the
base rate strategy were more stringent than the others. The primary criterion was
tightened to require that the posterior equal the base rate (50%) exactly (as discussed
above under Mathematical Strategies). The secondary criterion was tightened to
require that the participants must not have shown any indication of having used any
conditional probabilities (no checks on boxes corresponding to conditional probability
evidence or mathematical writings including the values of conditional probabilities),
and they must have either checked the box indicating that they used the base rate or
mentioned using the base rate in their verbal description.
Non-mathematical strategies (3 strategies). All participants who did not have
an identifiable mathematical strategy were classified as having one of three nonmathematical strategies (described below). Where possible, the conditional
probabilities the participant used in integration were identified. Any minimal
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indication as to the island on which probabilities they used were conditioned was
taken as a basis to classify them as using information from that island. Acceptable
indications included: a) any checkmark indicating a conditional probability used; b)
any written number corresponding (in either probability or frequency form) to any
conditional probability they received; and / or, c) any verbal description implying the
use of a conditional probability. This minimal standard was used for all nonmathematical strategies.
Non-mathematical one-island. If a non-diagnostic participant did not have a
mathematical strategy but did produce an indication (see above) of having used one or
more probabilities all conditioned on the same island, then they were classified as nonmathematical one-island. This strategy was subdivided according to which of the two
islands the data used was conditioned on (identical to the one-island mathematical
strategies).
Non-diagnostic search with unknown integration. This was the default
category for all participants who searched non-diagnostically. These participants did
not have a mathematical strategy, and did not clearly indicate having used
probabilities all conditioned on the same island.
Diagnostic search with unknown integration. This was the default category for
all participants who searched diagnostically. Because these participants were
diagnostic in their search, it was assumed in the absence of any clear indication to the
contrary, that they at least used probabilities conditioned on both islands in their
integration.
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Classification of integration strategies as focal and predictor biased. These
integration strategies can be further coded as focal, neutral or anti-focal. Strategies that
include probabilities conditioned only on Shell were coded as focal (+1). Strategies
that include only probabilities conditioned only on Coral were coded as anti-focal (-1).
All other strategies were coded as neutral (0). Similarly, these strategies can be further
coded as and as predictor biased, neutral or anti-predictor biased. Strategies that
include conditional probabilities only on dimensions hinted to favor Shell were coded
as predictor-biased (+1). Strategies that include conditional probabilities only on
dimensions hinted to favor Coral were coded as anti-predictor biased (-1). All other
strategies were coded as neutral (0). These two codes were summed and
trichotomized (+, 0, -) into an overall bias, neutral unbiased integration strategies (See
Table 21 for a list of integration strategies with their focal and predictor codes).
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Table 21
Coding of Integration Strategies as Focal and Predictor Biased
Strategy Class

Strategy

Focal Code

Predictor

(Shell /

Code (Shell

Coral) *

/ Coral) *

Mathematical

Biased Bayesian

(0/0)

(+1/-1)

2-Island

Bayesian

0

0

Ratio of Conditionals

0

0

Favoring Ratio

0

0

Double Ratio

0

0

Mathematical

Sum of One-Island's Conditionals

(1/-1)

(0/0)

1-Island

Sum of One-Island's Frequencies

(1/-1)

(0/0)

Average of One-Island’s Conditionals

(1/-1)

(0/0)

Extreme Conditional

(1/-1)

(1/-1)

Base Rate + Largest Conditional

(1/-1)

(1/-1)

Base Rate

0

0

Non-

Non-Mathematical One-Island

(1/-1)

(1/-1)

Mathematical

Non-Diagnostic Search with Unknown

Not Coded

Not Coded

Not Coded

Not Coded

Mathematical
0-Island

Integration
Diagnostic Search with Unknown
Integration
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* Note: Six strategies were defined by whether the probabilities used were conditioned on Shell or
Coral and the Biased Bayesian Strategy was defined by whether the bias favored Shell or Coral. For
these seven strategies the coding is split into the codes for the Shell or Coral version of that strategy.

Operational definition of DV6: search confirmation bias. Search
confirmation bias was calculated by subtracting the normative revised probability
estimate that the Urn had been created on Shell Island (.50 in this scenario) from the
revised probability applying Bayes’ Theorem to the conditional probabilities actually
selected by each participant. This compares two normative posteriors, one based on a
normative search and one based on the actual pairs (if any) selected by the participant.
Each pair chosen was coded +1 if it favored Shell Island (that is, the corresponding
hint stated that the current clay pits on Shell Island are characterized by an abundance
of this mineral), and –1 if it favored Coral Island, producing a sum with the possible
values of +2, +1, 0, -1, and –2. For each of these five sums, the application of Bayes’
Theorem produces the corresponding following five posterior probabilities .8, .667, .5,
.333, and .2, respectively. Since all pairs have the same diagnostic ratio (2:1) it does
not matter which of the four pairs in a particular direction a participant chose. If
participants chose one in each direction the net effect would cancel out.
Next, the optimal revised probability estimate (.50) was subtracted from the
five posterior probabilities listed above, producing the five possible values for search
confirmation bias (+.3, +.167, 0, -.167, -.3). For example, if Bayes’ Theorem were
applied to the conditional probabilities selected by a participant and this produced a
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revised estimate of.8, then his or her search confirmation bias score would be .3 (.8 .5 = .3). These values are the bias caused by the participant’s search phase when
integration is unbiased.
For most participants, the revised probability created from each participant’s
actual search using Bayes’ theorem was the same as the base rate, because most
(n=219) people searched pseudodiagnostically (as first demonstrated by Doherty, et
al., 1979). (If the search phase is pseudodiagnostic, then there will be no pairs for use
in Bayes theorem, and therefore no revision). Therefore, search confirmation bias is
the difference between the base rate and the normative revised probability, except
when participants do not select one or more pairs. In this specific situation participants
with non-Bayesian searches will have no search confirmation bias.
Once again the subtraction of .50 (the normative revised probability) is a linear
transformation, that does not alter the statistical properties of the variable, but does
make it easier to interpret and compare to the other bias dependent variables.
Operational definition of DV12: integration confirmation bias. Integration
confirmation bias was calculated by subtracting a) the optimal revised probability (.50
in this scenario) from b) the revised probability that would result from combining the
optimal search strategy with the participant’s integration strategy as classified by
DV11: integration strategy. This compares two posteriors, both of which are based on
optimal search (one diagnostic pair in each diagnostic direction), where one of the
posteriors is based on Bayesian integration and the other posterior is based on the
participant’s inferred integration strategy (DV11 integration strategy).
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Calculating integration confirmation bias involved three steps. First, the results
of an optimal search had to be determined. Because the optimal search produces two
diagnostic pairs (one in each diagnostic direction), it yields four conditional
probabilities, one from each of the four categories. Thus, any of the four conditional
probabilities in each category has an equal chance of being selected. For this reason,
the average conditional probability in each category was used to represent the result of
the optimal search. This both preserves the diagnostic ratio (2:1) for Bayesians, while
providing a value for use by non-Bayesians. This average conditional probability
depended on the level of IV4 size-of-conditionals. In the high condition, the average
value was .75 for probabilities conditioned on the island favored by the hint and .375
for probabilities conditioned on the island not favored by the hint, and in the Low
Condition the averages were .25 and .125, respectively.
Second, each integration strategy as classified by DV11: integration strategy
was applied to these average conditional probabilities to yield a posterior. This
posterior is a continuous variable with a range of possible values from 0 to 1.0. Any
resulting posterior outside this possible range was treated as a 0 or 1.0 (See Table 22
for a list of these calculated posteriors). DV12: integration confirmation bias is the
posterior resulting from combining the optimal search strategy with the participant’s
actual integration strategy.
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Table 22
Posterior Produced by Optimal Search and Each Integration Strategy
Integration Strategy

High Conditionals

Low Conditionals

66.67%

66.67%

Bayes

50%

50%

Ratio of Conditionals

50%

50%

Favoring Ratio

50%

50%

Double Ratio

50%

50%

Sum of Conditionals

100%

37.5%

Sum of Frequencies

22.5%

7.5%

Average of Conditionals

56.25%

18.75%

Extreme Conditional

75%

87.5%

Base Rate + Conditional

100%

75%

Base Rate

50%

50%

n/a

n/a

Biased Bayes

Non-Mathematical

Finally, a difference score was computed by subtracting the optimal revised
probability estimate (.50) from the posterior calculated above, producing DV12:
Integration Confirmation Bias. This dependent variable has a range from +.50,
meaning the participant’s integration strategy favored Shell Island .50 more than
optimal (confirmatory bias), to –.50, meaning the participant’s integration strategy
favored Coral Island .50 more than optimal (disconfirmatory bias).
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Integration confirmation bias represents the bias caused by the participant’s
integration strategy alone. However, this dependent variable is not completely
independent of the participant’s prior search strategy. This prior search strategy is
expected to limit the choice of integration strategies in two ways, a) by ruling out
integration strategies that require information that is not available, and b) by possibly
leading to the rejection of strategies that yield posterior probabilities that are outside
the range (0-1.0) or otherwise not believable. (For example, subjects who selected all
four conditionals favoring and conditioned on the same island, would receive
conditional probabilities of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% if they were in the low
conditionals level of IV4 size-of-conditionals. If these subjects then chose to add the
four conditionals together in integration they would produce a believable result 100%.
However, if subjects with the same search strategy and integration strategy were in the
high conditionals level of IV4 size-of-conditionals, then they would have received
conditional probabilities of 60%, 70%, 80% and 90% which if added together would
be 300%, presumably forcing the subject to use a different integration strategy).
Operational definition of DV13: sum-of-phase-biases.
Sum-of-Phase-Biases is calculated as the sum of the two specific phase biases
(DV6 search confirmation bias and DV12 integration confirmation bias). This produces
a continuous variable with a range of +.8 to -.8. Where +.8 is interpreted to mean the
participant’s actual search phase integrated by Bayes’ Theorem (DV6 search
confirmation bias) and their actual integration strategy applied to the results of optimal
search (DV12 integration confirmation bias) sum to a +.8 bias towards making Shell
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Island more likely as the island of origin of the Urn. If the two phase biases are
additive, then this variable should equal DV4: Confirmation Bias. This would lead to
the conclusion that search and integration are separate systems, completely
independent of each other (system defined by Lendaris, 1986). Significant departures
from additivity are expected and will be discussed.
Operational definition of DV15: intuitive conditionals. Participants were
asked on the fifth page “Please go back to page three again and, without removing any
more stickers, write down on the stickers what you think the value of the tests would
be that you did not choose to perform.” These values were recorded as their intuitive
conditionals (DV15), and were taken to examine if and how they would be used by
participants in their integration process and posterior calculation. Similar to Surprise
(DV14), the measurement of this variable was vulnerable to hindsight bias (Fischhoff
& Beyth-Marom, 1975). Unfortunately, it must be asked after the fact, because to ask
it before the results of information search are revealed would bias both search and
integration strategies.
These intuitive conditionals were also used to derived Bayesian intuitive
posterior (DV15a), Bayesian matching posterior (DV15b), and regression intuitive
posterior (DV15c). These three dependent variables represent posterior probabilities
that would be produced using integration strategies that take into account the intuitive
conditionals in various ways. Because intuitive conditionals could be used in an
infinite number of ways, in order to simplify the analysis, the number of possible
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participant strategies for which combination of intuitive conditionals that they could
use was limited to three levels.
First, participants may not use intuitive conditionals at all. (In this case,
participants would use only the four selected conditional probabilities, which could
form between 0 and 2 pairs. These chosen conditional probabilities were combined
using Bayesian integration produce DV6 search phase confirmation bias plus .50 (DV6
was expressed as the bias from the normative posterior .50). Second, participants may
use intuitive conditionals only to complete diagnostic pairs with selected conditional
probabilities. (In this case, participants would use the four selected conditional
probabilities and between 0 and 4 intuitive conditionals, which could form between 2
and 4 diagnostic pairs). This set of conditional probabilities combined using Bayesian
integration produces Bayesian matching posterior (DV15b). Third, participants may use
intuitive conditionals for every non-selected conditional probability. (In this case,
participants would use the four selected conditional probabilities and 12 intuitive
conditionals, to form 8 diagnostic pairs). This set of conditional probabilities
combined using Bayesian integration produces Bayesian intuitive posterior (DV15a).
Additionally, linear regression was used to produce regression weights for the
importance participants placed on the conditional probabilities in each of the four
quadrants.
The linear regression was performed on the participants who had all 16
probabilities (the four selected and all twelve of the intuitive conditional probabilities)
and predicted the participants’ actual posteriors. The conditional probabilities (chosen
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and intuitive were treated as equivalent) were averaged in each quadrant (to reduce the
effects of random fluctuations within each quadrant). The four quadrant averages
were used to predict the participants’ actual posteriors. The resulting regression
weights were then applied to each participant’s average conditional probability in each
quadrant to produce regression intuitive posterior (DV15c). This represents the
posterior produces given the participants’ chosen and intuitive conditional
probabilities and combined using the regression weights.
Because regression is applied across participants, while Bayes’ Theorem is
applied by subject, regression requires that all participants have the same information
(while Bayes’ Theorem does not). This requirement is met when all 16 selected and
intuitive conditionals are used, but is not met with the other two sets of intuitive
probabilities. This prevents similar regression dependent variables from being created
using only chosen conditional probabilities or for chosen conditional probabilities and
matching intuitive conditionals.
Procedure
Recruitment and experimental setting. Student participants were recruited
from psychology classed and at that time they either signed up for appointments or did
the experiment in class. Student participants who came to appointments were run in
groups that ranged from 1 to approximately 20, with the majority of participants run in
groups of approximately 8. Participants who performed the experiment in class were
run in a group of 69. The procedure for both the in-class and the appointment subjects
was the same, and no differences were detected between administration settings.
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Instructions to the participants. Participants initially received brief oral
instructions as follows (Appendix B): to read and sign the informed consent form
(Appendix D), what to do to receive extra credit in their psychology class, to remain
silent, not to look at their neighbors’ papers, and to raise their hands if they had any
questions or problems. No participant chose to withdraw from the experiment at his
time.
The task itself took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Participants were
told to raise their hands when done, at which time they were told individually that they
could leave.
Assignment to conditions. Once they had completed the informed consent
form they were given one of sixteen scripts (Appendix A) that varied according to the
respective levels on the four independent variables (attention, motivation, timing of
feedback, size-of-conditionals). The sixteen scripts were each assigned a random
number. The rank order of these random numbers determined the order in which each
set of 16 scripts was assigned to 16 participants. This process was repeated until all
participants were assigned a script.
Experimental control: double blind. This study utilized a double-blind
design; both the participant and the experimenter were unaware of which condition the
participant received. The only exception to this was in the rare cases of a participant
question that required the experimenter to read their script in order to answer their
question.
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Materials
There were 16 scripts, one for each (2*2*2*2 = 16) experimental condition.
All the scripts present the participants with the goal of determining the island of origin
of an urn that has been found in the sea between two islands. The cover story was
similar to that in Doherty’s groundbreaking work (Doherty et al., 1979). The names of
the two islands were not counterbalanced, because Doherty et al. (1979) found that
counterbalancing had no effect.
The story presented participants with a probability revision problem, asking
them to estimate, after they have learned four relevant conditional probabilities, the
probability that the urn had been created on one of the islands rather than the other
(Table 23 presents the independent variables and their levels. Table 8 presents the
types of conditional probabilities participants can select.)
Table 23
Levels of the Four Independent Variables
Independent Variables

Level 1 (Control:

Level 2 (Treatment:

Expected to decrease

Expected to increase

biases)

biases)

Balanced

Focused

Not Motivated

Motivated

IV3 Timing-of-feedback

Sequential

Simultaneous

IV4 Size-of-conditionals

Low p(D|H)

High p(D|H)

IV1 Attention
IV2 Motivation
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Decision problem introduction. The first two pages of the script included the
beginning of the cover story, the hints about the direction and diagnosticy of the
conditional probabilities, and the manipulation of the first two independent variables,
attention and motivation.
The attention and motivation manipulations structure. The attention (A)
manipulation consisted of three parts and the motivation (M) manipulation consisted
of two parts. These five parts occur in an AMAMA order. (See IV Operations
definitions for more details of these sections.) (Table 24 presents the order of the five
parts of these two manipulations, not the full factorial design.)
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Table 24
Order of Parts of Manipulation of Attention and Motivation Independent Variables
Order

Independent

Level 1 (control)

Level 2 (treatment)

Both hypotheses equal

Alternate not mentioned

Variables
1

IV1 Attention

and base rate provided
2

IV2

No motivation

Career motivation

Table, all hints, data,

Sequential presentation, hints

and manipulation

favoring focal island, data, and

check that asks for the

manipulation check that asks

probability for both

for the probability for focal

islands

island

Nothing

Manipulation Check

Nothing

Hints favoring alternative and

Motivation
3

4

IV1 Attention

IV2
Motivation

5

IV1 Attention

base rate

The attention manipulation. The attention (IV1) manipulation consistent
primarily of delaying information about Coral Island. The material was the same for
all conditions, though presented in different orders and forms. This material included:
the information that the urn had high content in each of eight minerals, hints stating
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the island whose current clay pits are characterized by an abundance of each of these
eight minerals, and a paragraph calling into question the value of these hints. (See IV1
Attention operational definition for more details and script quotes.)
The motivation manipulation. The Motivation (IV2) manipulation consisted
primarily of changes in the second paragraph of the first page of the script. The not
motivated condition used island-neutral language, while in contrast, the motivated
condition consists of the additional mention of a career incentive to determine that the
urn came from Shell Island and a manipulation check and reinforcement question
later. (See IV2 Motivation operational definition for more details and script quotes.)
Use of frequency form of data. The base rate information and the later
conditional probability information are presented in the form of frequencies instead of
probabilities, because Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) found that people understand
and use frequency information better.
Direction and diagnosticity of hints. The second half of the first page
introduced eight dimensions of potentially diagnostic information (the eight minerals
found to be in abundance in the Urn), and a hint for each dimension as to the island
that that dimension would favor (specifically, the island whose current clay pits are
characterized by an abundance of this mineral). The hints were deliberately ambiguous
as to their strength as evidence and as to whether the “evidence” was diagnostic or
pseudodiagnostic. Their purpose was to provide a basis for biased information search
without introducing any integration bias when using a Bayesian strategy. The hints
were balanced, four favoring each island. Because of this balance, they would have no
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effect on a Bayesian probability revision at this point. Additionally, these hints
provide pseudodiagnostic participants with a basis for expectations regarding the nonchosen conditional probability, by providing them a basis for an expected value for the
diagnostically complementary conditional probability (“intuitive conditionals”) (Alloy
& Tabachnik, 1984). (The participant assumes the probability conditioned on the
island the hint favors is greater than the probability conditioned on the island the hint
does not favor).
However, for non-Bayesians, balanced information has been found to have a
dilution effect in integration, the presence of non-diagnostic information having been
found to diminish the impact of diagnostic information (Nisbett, Zucker & Lemley,
1981; Troutman & Shanteau 1977). In this case, the dilution effect would bias the
participants against confirmation of their hypothesis, and would thus bias the
experiment against several of the experimenter’s hypotheses.
Information search phase structure. The third page of the script presented
the information search phase. On the third page all participants received the same
cover story indicating that they could learn any four out of the 16 conditional
probabilities. Each conditional probability was specific to one of the two hypotheses
(islands) and to one of the eight minerals. Each mineral had been hinted in page one of
the scripts as favoring Shell Island or favoring Coral Island. Participants numbered
their top four requests for conditional probabilities and then removed opaque stickers
to reveal the probabilities they had chosen.
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The change to four out of 16 conditional probabilities from the Doherty, et al.
(1979) original study, which used six out of 12, was deliberate. The number of
conditional probabilities chosen had to be a multiple of four in order to provide
participants the opportunity to choose optimally (two matching pairs, with one pair in
each diagnostic direction, as inferred from the hints). (This will be demonstrated to be
the optimal search strategy later, in the section on Demonstration of the Optimal
Search and Integration Strategies). Additionally, the number of possible conditional
probabilities had to be four times the number chosen so that participants had the
ability to choose all four of their conditional probabilities from any one of the four
categories created by the following two independent dimensions: a) probabilities
conditioned on the focal or alternate island, and b) probabilities about minerals
favoring the focal or alternate island according to the hints.
The first paragraph on the third page of the script suggested that participants
pursue, “the most efficient way to determine the origin”, in order to encourage the
thought that some of this information was not relevant or less relevant. At this point
the last two independent variables were manipulated.
Timing-of-feedback manipulation. The second paragraph on the third page
created the third independent variable (timing-of-feedback). In the simultaneous
condition, participants were instructed to choose their conditional probabilities all at
once before receiving feedback. In the sequential condition, participants were
instructed to choose their conditional probabilities one at a time with feedback after
each selection, thus enabling them to choose their later selections on the basis of the

Method 130
results of earlier choices. (See IV3 Timing-of-feedback operational definition for more
details and script quotes.)
Size-of-conditionals manipulation. All participants received the feedback (the
size of the conditional probabilities) that they had requested as described above (under
IV3: timing-of-feedback). The size of the conditional probabilities was the fourth
independent variable. (See IV4 Size-of-conditionals operational definition for more
details and script quotes.)
Information search data collection. In the middle of the third page of the
script participants were provided with 16 conditional probabilities from which to
choose four. (As described in IV3 Timing-of-feedback operational definition for more
details and script quotes.) Three search phase dependent variables DV1: hypothesisfocus bias, DV2: predictor-selection bias and DV3: pairs selected were derived from
participants’ responses to: “Choose 4 of the following 16 tests to perform, as the most
efficient way to determine the origin of the Urn of Zor, following the instructions
below.”
Integration phase. At the bottom of the third page participants were asked
three questions designed to elicit their revised probability that the Urn came from
Shell Island and determine the size of their confirmation bias:
Which Island do you now believe the Urn of Zor is more likely to have come from?
What do you now believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from that island?
What do you believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from the other
island?”
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Post hoc questions.
Information usage dependent variables. The fourth page asked participants
what information they used to make their revised probability estimates. They were
asked in closed ended format: “What information did you use in making this estimate
of the probability of the island of origin? Put a check on the right next to all the pieces
of information below that you used.”
Participants were then presented with a list of possibilities that included the
base rate, the hints, and the particular conditional probabilities that they had selected.
Additionally, a blank space was provided, in case a participant used any additional
information not presented in closed-ended format. The responses to the closed-ended
questions were used directly to create four dependent variables (DV7-DV10), and
indirectly to assist in the classification of participants’ integration strategies. (See
Classification of Participants Integration Strategies).
Questions for inferring integration strategy. The fifth page asked the
following questions designed to help classify participants on the basis of their
integration strategies (See discussion of classification of integration strategies in
Operational definition of DV11: integration strategy).
1) Tell me how you went about making your estimate of the probability that
the Urn came from the island you chose. You can use a verbal description or a
formula to describe the method you used.
2) Place a check next to all the mathematical processes you used? (Check all
that apply)
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Type of Method

Mathematical Example using two pieces of evidence

_____ Addition

(evidence #1 + evidence #2)

_____ Subtraction

(evidence #1 - evidence #2)

_____ Multiplication (evidence #1 * evidence #2)
_____ Division

(evidence #1 / evidence #2)

_____ Averaging

(evidence #1 + evidence #2)/ 2

_____ Other
Surprise questions. The fifth page asked the following closed-ended questions
designed to determine whether participants were surprised by the values of the
conditional probabilities:
3) Did you find the results of any of the tests on the old urns surprising?
(Yes / No)
4) If yes, indicate which ones and whether they were higher or lower than
expected. (Please look back to see your four selections and then circle higher
or lower below).
First Choice Surprising

higher

lower

Second Choice Surprising

higher

lower

Third Choice Surprising

higher

lower

Fourth Choice Surprising

higher

lower

These questions were designed to explore the effects of expectations on search
and integration.
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Intuitive conditionals question. The fifth question on page 5 asked
participants to: “Please go back to page three again and, without removing any more
stickers, write down on the stickers what you think the value of the tests would be that
you did not choose to perform.”
Demographic variables. Four demographic questions were asked on page 6 of
the script (Race, Gender, Number of College Statistics Classes Taken and G.P.A.).
There are no hypotheses for these variables but they will be explored on a post hoc
basis, and for the purpose of describing the sample.
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Before proceeding with the testing of research and exploratory hypothesis,
several preliminary analyses had to be conducted. These include examination of the
demographics, manipulation checks, participants’ coherence in their posterior
probability estimates, the adequacy of the random assignment, and the nature of the
interaction effect between the independent variables attention and motivation. In
addition, the results of the classification of participants’ search and integration
strategies were examined, since this information is required for the analysis of one of
the research hypotheses.
Demographics. In order to determine how to proceed with the analysis, the
data were examined for demographic effects (school of participant, gender, race, GPA,
and number of college statistics classes taken). Since no significant zero order
correlations were found between any of the demographic variables and any of the
dependent variables, the data were collapsed across the demographic variables.
Manipulation checks. Participants who failed the manipulation checks, in the
motivated condition of the motivation IV (n = 13) and the balanced condition of the
attention IV (n = 12) were not dropped. They were not dropped because not all
participants received the same number of manipulation checks. Participants whose
complementary posterior probabilities failed to sum to one (n = 23) were also not
dropped because failure of additivity has been found in many situations. Their

Results 135
responses were rescaled to sum to one. The rescaling was examined in post hoc tests
and found to have no impact on the results.
Coherence checks. Participants’ complementary posterior probabilities (the
probability the urn came from Shell and the probability the urn came from Coral) that
failed to sum to one (23/324 = 7.1%) were rescaled to sum to one. These participants
were not dropped, because lack of coherence in posterior probability judgments has
been found in many situations. The rescaling was examined in post hoc tests and
found to have no impact on the results.
Problem with random assignment. In the simultaneous conditions, there was
no possibility of size-of-conditionals affecting search phase selections, since the
conditionals were not presented until after the search-phase selections had been made.
Nevertheless, significant differences were found between the two levels of
size-of-conditionals for simultaneous participants’ use of motivated search strategies,
t(143) = 2.12, p = .04, d = .35. Because search-phase selections preceded the receipt of
size-of-conditionals information, such a difference cannot be causal and can be
attributed only to a problem with random assignment. For this reason, all participants
in the simultaneous conditions were dropped. This prevents examination of the timing
of feedback independent variable (since the remaining subjects are all in the sequential
feedback condition).
Over-biasing. This study predicted a specific monotonic interaction (subadditive) between the attention and motivation manipulations, whereby focal condition
and the motivated condition would not be additive (non-additive effect). Specifically,
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it was expected that either biasing condition would be sufficient to cause bias and that
the combinations of biasing conditions would result in no more and no less bias than
either biasing condition alone (see Expected Effects of Independent Variables for a
discussion).
However, for some dependent variables, non-monotonic interactions (often
crossover effects) were found (called here an over-biasing effect). Specifically this
over-biasing effect was that participants who received either biasing condition alone
demonstrated bias, but participant who received both biasing conditions demonstrated
less bias or no bias. This result is similar to research conducted by Gaeth and Shanteau
(1984) where drawing attention to the biasing information reduce the effect of the
bias. Therefore, all analyses involving attention and motivation were modified to
examine the over-biasing interaction as three post-hoc orthogonal t-tests whenever the
interaction between attention and motivation or either main effect was significant or
nearly significant. These t-tests compared the control condition (balanced and not
motivated) against the other three conditions (balanced and motivated, focus and not
motivated, focus and motivated), in order to determine whether the effects of attention
and motivation were additive, non-additive (as originally hypotheses) or over-biasing.
Search and integration strategy classification results. All participants’ search
and integration strategies were classified into categories (as described in DV4: search
strategy and DV11: integration strategy). A large number of participants chose at least
one pair (115 out of 324 participants) in the search phase. Similarly, a large number of
participants used a Bayesian integration strategy (88 participants) or the ratio of
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conditionals strategy which is the most similar non-Bayesian strategy (35
participants). Unfortunately many of the non-Bayesian participants ended up classified
as default search (53 participants) or integration strategy (100 participants). This
clearly demonstrates how hard it is understand and classify non-Bayesian participants’
processes (See Tables 25 and 26).
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Table 25
Frequency of Search Strategies
Strategy Class

Strategy

n

Bayesian Strategies

Bayesian Unbiased

84

Bayesian Confirmatory Predictor Bias

15

Bayesian Disconfirmatory Predictor Bias

6

Non-Bayesian One-

Shell Island both Focal and Motivated

21

Category Strategies

Shell Island Focal and Coral Island Motivated

6

Coral Island Focal and Shell Island Motivated

5

Coral Island both Focal and Motivated

1

Non-Bayesian Two-

Shell Island Column Focal

30

Category Strategies

Coral Island Column Focal

0

Shell Island Row Motivated

0

Coral Island Row Motivated

2

Consistent Diagonal

38

Inconsistent Diagonal

10

Sampling Strategy

53

Unclassifiable Strategies

53

Non-Bayesian FourCategory Strategy
Unclassifiable Strategies
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Table 26
Frequency of Integration Strategies
Strategy Class

Strategy

n (Shell / Coral) *

Mathematical 2-Island

Biased Bayesian

32 (18/14)

Bayesian

56

Ratio of Conditionals

35

Favoring Ratio

3

Double Ratio

1

Mathematical 1-Island

Sum of One-Island's Conditionals 9 (5/4)
Sum of One-Island's Frequencies

1 (0/1)

Average of One-Island’s

13 (8/5)

Conditionals
Extreme Conditional

12 (8/4)

Base Rate + Largest Conditional

1 (1/0)

Mathematical 0-Island

Base Rate

6

Non-Mathematical

Non-Mathematical One-Island

55 (44/11)

Non-Diagnostic Search with

67

Unknown Integration
Diagnostic Search with Unknown 33
Integration
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* Note: Seven strategies were defined by whether the information used was focused on Shell or Coral.
For these seven strategies the sample was broken down into the number of participants classified as the
Shell or Coral version of that strategy.

Research Hypotheses
Overall testing strategy for research hypotheses. The experimental research
hypotheses were tested by independent sample t-tests comparing the participants in
biasing vs. non-biasing conditions. The research hypotheses were tested using onetailed t-tests, because they were directional hypotheses consistent with prior research.
These t-test were followed up with three-way ANOVAs (Attention * Motivation *
Size-of-Conditionals), to test for any interactions among the three remaining
independent variables, (the timing of feedback independent variable was lost to
selection effects). Because many dependent variables in this study did not satisfy
parametric assumptions (especially, normality), the Mann-Whitney U-test was also
performed as a backup. However, the results of the Mann-Whitney U-tests did not
differ from parametric tests. The process for the exploratory experimental hypotheses
will be the same as described above except that the initial t-tests were omitted, because
of the exploratory nature of the hypotheses.
Bonferroni adjustment. In order to provide Bonferroni control for the
experiment-wide .05 alpha level, this alpha level was divided into four .0125 alpha
levels for the four research hypotheses. For the exploratory hypotheses and post hoc
tests, no Bonferroni adjustment was made, and therefore the conclusions drawn from
such tests should be considered preliminary. For all these other tests a .05 alpha level
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was set. In the tables that follow, significant and nearly significant findings are
indicated by the following symbols: *** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10.
Research hypotheses results. The research hypotheses are tabulated in Table
27. (Note: Table 27 differs from Table 9, in adding the results for each of the
hypotheses, and the simplification of the design because of the selection differences.)
The hypotheses are listed by number, in the row and column corresponding to the IV
and DV involved. The choice of these hypotheses has been described in the methods
section, the descriptions of each hypothesis and the results of the tests follow.
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Table 27
Research Hypotheses Results: Independent and Dependent Variables Involved
Research Hypotheses – Experimental
IV1

IV2

IV4 Size-of-

Attention

Motivation

Conditionals

R1

R1

R1

Ns, p = .67

R2

R2

R2

Ns, p = .48

R3

R3

R3

Ns, p = .41

p

Search Process DVs
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias
DV2 Predictor Selection Bias
DV3 Pairs Selected
DV4 Search Strategy
DV14 Search Surprise
Integration Process DVs
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias
DV9 Predictor-Focus Integration Bias
DV10 Pairs Used in Integration
DV11 Integration Strategy
Posterior Result DVs
DV5 Confirmation Bias
DV6 Search Confirmation Bias
DV12 Integration Confirmation Bias
DV15 Intuitive Conditionals

Research Hypotheses – Non-Experimental
R4 Use of focal search strategies (DV4) was positively correlated (r = .81) with use

p<.001,

of focal integration strategies (DV11)

***

Note: R refers to research hypotheses for that IV DV combination. Due to selection difference
participants in the simultaneous conditions were dropped. This resulted in dropping IV3 and the IV3 *
IV4 Interaction. The hypothesized unbiasing effects of this interaction are now tested as a main effect of
IV4. Many empty cells will be examined by exploratory hypotheses.
(*** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10 )
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Predictor selection bias. Research Hypothesis #1 was that participants in
biased conditions would select more conditional probabilities from minerals that are
hinted to favor Shell Island than from minerals hinted to favor Coral Island than would
participants in unbiased conditions.
The difference between conditions can be seen as the effect of the biasing
conditions of the independent variables. This difference was assessed using an
independent samples t-test. The results indicates that the biased conditions
participants’ mean number of conditional probabilities selected about minerals that are
hinted to favor Shell Island (M = 2.17, SD = .75 ) were not significantly different than
the participants in unbiased conditions (M = 2.30, SD = .89 ), t(158) = .93, p = .67.
The standardized effect size index was d = .15, indicating a small difference in the
opposite direction from that expected.
The follow-up three-way ANOVA (Attention * Motivation * Size-ofConditionals) was not significant, F(7, 152) = .38, p = .91, partial η2 = .02.
Inconsistent with Research Hypothesis #1 all three main effects and the Attention *
Motivation interaction were non-significant (see Table 28). Interestingly, the planned
curative low conditionals (M = 2.33, SD = .91) instead non-significantly increased bias
compared to high conditionals (M = 2.16, SD = .76).
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Table 28
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Predictor Selection Bias
Effect

F(1, 152)

P

partial η2

Attention

.05

.83

<.01

Motivation

<.01

.96

<.01

Size-of-Conditionals

1.62

.21

= .01

Attention*Motivation

.20

.65

<.01

Biased Bayesian strategy in integration. In order to avoid non-independence
of hypotheses, Hypotheses #2 and #3 were tested on different participants. Research
Hypothesis #2 was that participants in biasing conditions who searched optimally
(chose two pairs, with one pair expected to favor each island) would be more likely in
integration to use the selected pair favoring shell than the pair favoring coral (Biased
Bayesian Integration Strategy) than would participants in the non-biasing conditions.
The difference between conditions can be seen as the effect of the biasing conditions
of the independent variables. This difference was assessed using an independent
samples t-test. The results indicates that participants in biased conditions were more
likely to use the biased Bayesian strategy favoring Shell Island (M = .21, SD = .59),
but not significantly more than the participants in unbiased conditions (M = .20, SD =
.41), t(37) = .05, p = .48. The standardized effect size index was d = .02, indicating a
very small effect that was in the expected direction.
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The follow-up three-way ANOVA (Attention * Motivation * Size-ofConditionals) was not significant, F(7, 31) = 1.87, p = .11, partial η2 = .30.
Inconsistent with Research Hypothesis #2, all three main effects and the Attention *
Motivation Interaction were non-significant (see Table 28).

Table 29
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Biased Bayesian Strategy
Effect

F(1, 31)

P

partial η2

Attention

.04

.84

<.01

Motivation

.46

.50

= .02

Size-of-Conditionals

.68

.41

= .02

Attention*Motivation

3.58

.07

= .10

Attention*Size

3.04

.09

= .09

However, two two-way interactions were nearly significant: Attention*
Motivation, and Attention* Size-of-Conditionals. The first interaction was the overbiasing effect discussed earlier and was explored by the three post hoc orthogonal ttests (see Figure 3). The three post-hoc comparisons were all non-significant but the
simple main effect of motivation when attention was balanced was nearly significant
(with a very small sample size and a large effect size, see Table 30). The second
interaction was low conditionals causing bias towards the focal hypothesis when
people were not focused (see Figure 4).
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Table 30
Post Hoc Orthogonal Contrasts Exploring Over-Biasing Effect on use of Biased
Bayesian Strategies
Contrast Balanced and Not

t

P

d

Balanced and motivated

t(16) = 1.60

= .13

.90

Focused and not motivated

t(21) = .97

= .34

.72

Focused and motivated

t(14) = .18

= .86

.50

Motivated to:

Figure 3. Attention by motivation interaction on use of biased Bayesian integration

Net Percent Biased
Bayesian Strategy

strategies.

40%
30%
20%

Not Motivated

10%

Motivated

0%
-10%
Balanced Focused
Attention
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Figure 4. Attention by size-of-conditionals interaction on use of biased Bayesian
integration strategies.

Net Percent Biased
Bayesian Strategy

40%
30%
20%

Low
High

10%
0%
-10%
Balanced

Focused

Attention

Confirmation bias. In order to avoid non-independence of hypotheses,
Hypotheses 2 and 3 were tested on different participants. Research Hypothesis #3 was
that participants in biasing conditions who did not search optimally (chose two pairs,
with one pair expected to favor each island) would produce posterior probabilities
more in favor of Shell Island than Coral Island than would participants in unbiased
conditions. The difference between conditions can be seen as the effect of the biasing
conditions of the independent variables. This difference was assessed using an
independent samples t-test.
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The results indicates that participants in biased conditions were more likely to
use the biased Bayesian strategy favoring Shell Island (M = 5.87, SD = 16.34) but this
was not significantly more than the participants in unbiased conditions (M = 3.96, SD
= 19.36), t(119) = .58, p = .28. The standardized effect size index was d = .10,
indicating a small effect which was in the expected direction.
The follow-up three-way ANOVA (Attention * Motivation * Size-ofConditionals) was not significant, F(7, 113) = .54, p = .81, partial η2 = .03.
Inconsistent with Research Hypothesis #3, all three main effects and the Attention *
Motivation Interaction were non-significant (see Table 31).

Table 31
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Confirmation Bias
Effect

F(1, 31)

P

partial η2

Attention

.15

.70

<.01

Motivation

.81

.37

= .01

Size-of-Conditionals

.55

.46

= .01

Attention*Motivation

1.22

.27

= .01

Non-independence of search and integration strategies. Research Hypothesis
#4 was that participants who use search strategies that are hypothesis focused will be
more likely to use integration strategies that are hypothesis focused. Consistent with
Research Hypothesis #4 the Pearson’s r coefficient was significant, indicating that the
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use of focal search strategies predicted the use of focal integration strategies, r(125) =
.81, p>.001. (See Table 32 for cross-tabulation).

Table 32
Cross Tabulation of Search and Integration Strategies by Focal Island
Shell Focused

Balanced

Coral Focused

Total

Search

Search

Search

Shell Focused Integration

26

19

Not Possible

45

Balanced Integration

0

103

0

103

Coral Focused Integration

Not Possible

9

3

12

Total

3

131

26

160

An alternative way to examine this hypothesis would be to exclude the 29
participants who choose four probabilities focused on a single island (because they are
restricted from integrating in the opposite focal direction), and instead focus on the
other participants who were not prevented from integrating in either focal way. In
order to do this, participants who chose either three or one probabilities conditioned on
the Shell Island would be treated as Shell focused and Coral focused respectively. (In
the prior analysis such participants were dropped since their search strategy was
considered unclassifiable because they were not consistent). For these participants, the
Pearson’s r coefficient was not significant r(128) = .02, p = .83. This indicates no
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relationship between the focus of search selections and focal integration strategies for
participants who did not choose all four probabilities conditioned on the same island.

Table 33
Cross Tabulation of Search and Integration Strategies by Conditionals Selected

Shell Focused

3 probabilities

2 probabilities

1 probabilities

Total

conditioned on

conditioned on

conditioned on

Shell

Shell

Shell

0

5

1

6

12

100

3

115

0

6

1

7

12

111

5

128

Integration
Balanced
Integration
Coral Focused
Integration
Total

These analyses indicate that participants who searched for information
conditioned exclusively one hypothesis chose to use focal integration strategies
despite non-focal ones being available to them (base rate or non-mathematical).
However, for participants who are focal but not exclusive (one or three probabilities
conditioned on Shell) or participants who use a balanced search strategy their choice
of focal or non-focal integration strategies appears random. This supports the idea that
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the two phases are primarily (but not completely) independent, because even the
participants who used the most biased search strategy (four probabilities conditioned
on the same island) utilized different focal integration strategies. For example, among
the 16 participants who used the most common Shell focal search strategy (Shell
island column focal) and a focal integration strategy, there were four different focal
integration strategies employed: Sum of one islands conditionals (n = 1), extreme
conditional (n = 2), average of one-island conditionals (n = 1), and non-mathematical
one-island (n = 12). These integration strategies produce very different posteriors (in
fact the last strategy is a catch-all for participants who mention using conditionals
from only one-island but do not specify how they use them), resulting in a wide range
of posteriors. The 16 participants had posteriors ranging from 20% to 100% (M =
16.5, SD = 22.15).
Exploratory Hypotheses
These hypotheses are less central to the study and therefore were not included
in the Bonferroni adjustment. Therefore, conclusions drawn from them should be
considered preliminary. As with the experimental research hypotheses, the overbiasing
effect will be examined any time Attention or Motivation or their interaction is at least
nearly significant.
The hypotheses are tabulated below. The hypotheses are listed by number
(research hypotheses R1, R2 … and exploratory hypotheses H1, H2 …). Significant
and nearly significant results appear in the column corresponding to the IV, and in the
row corresponding to the DV involved. Descriptions of each exploratory hypothesis

Results 152
follow. (Note: Table 34 is a slight refinement of Table 10, adding the results of the test
and showing the changes described in Exploratory Follow-Up to the Research
Hypotheses.)

Table 34
Exploratory Hypotheses Results: Independent and Dependent Variables Involved
Exploratory Hypotheses – Experimental
Hypo-

IV1

IV2

IV4 Size-of-

theses

Attention

Motivation

Conditionals

E1

p = .07 ^

p = .07 ^

E4

p = .09 ^

Post-hoc

Search Process DVs
DV1 Hypothesis Focus Bias

DV2 Predictor Selection

R1 ns

Bias

E5 ns

DV3 Pairs Selected

E2 ns

DV4 Search Strategy

E3

DV14 Search Surprise

E15 ns

p = .04 *

p = .04 *

R2

p = .09 ^

p = .07 ^

E9

p = .08 ^

Additive

p = .05 *

Additive

E16 ns

Integration Process
DVs
DV8 Hypothesis-Focus

E6 ns

Integration Bias
DV9 Predictor-Focus

E7 ns

Integration Bias
DV10 Pairs Used in

E8 ns

Integration
DV11 Integration Strategy

Overbias
SubAdditive

Results 153
Posterior Result DVs
DV5 Confirmation Bias

R3 ns

DV6 Search Confirmation

E10 ns

Bias
DV12 Integration

E11

p = .03 *

p = .08 ^

Sub-

Confirmation Bias

Additive

DV15 Intuitive Conditionals

E14

P<.001 ***

Exploratory Hypotheses – Non-Experimental
R4 Correlation between bias search and integration strategies (r = .81, p>.001) ***
E13a Model with intuitive conditionals approximates posterior not significantly better than
model without intuitive conditionals, but had the strongest correlation r(120) = .37, p<.001 ***
E13b Bayesian Integration approximates posterior better than regression (ns)
E12 Difference between posterior and Sum-of-Phase-Biases (ns)
Note: The Rs represent the research hypotheses and Es represent exploratory hypotheses.
(*** p<.001, **p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10 )

Exploratory search process hypotheses. All these hypotheses involve
dependent variables about participants’ search phase selection decisions.
Hypothesis focus bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #1, as has been demonstrated
elsewhere, was that participants in biasing conditions would select more probabilities
conditioned on Shell Island than conditioned on Coral Island than would participants
in unbiased conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals)
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = 1.486, p = .176, partial
η2 = .06. Partially supportive of Exploratory Hypothesis #1 the main effects of both
attention and motivation were nearly significant (see Table 35).
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Table 35
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Hypothesis Focus Bias
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

3.35

.07

.02

Motivation

3.41

.07

.02

Size-of-Conditionals

.32

.57

<.01

Attention*Motivation

.01

.91

<.01

Because attention and motivation were nearly significant, the over-biasing
effect was explored by the three post hoc orthogonal t-tests. The two simple main
effects post-hoc comparisons were both non-significant. In contrast the comparison
balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated was significant. This
provides mixed evidence that attention and motivation have weak and additive effects
on predictor selection bias (see Tables 36 and 37 and Figure 5).

Table 36
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Hypothesis Focus Bias
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to:

t

p

d

Balanced and motivated

t(79) = 1.33

= .19

.29

Focused and not motivated

t(79) = 1.26

= .21

.28

Focused and motivated

t(76) = 2.28

= .03

.50
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Table 37
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Hypothesis Focus Bias
Attention and Motivation Conditions:

M

SD

Balanced and not motivated

2.13

.91

Balanced and motivated

2.37

.70

Focused and not motivated

2.37

.80

Focused and motivated

2.63

1.05

Probabilities
Conditioned on Shell

Figure 5. Attention by motivation interaction on hypothesis focus bias.

2.8
2.6
Not Motivated

2.4

Motivated

2.2
2
Balanced

Focused

Attention

Pseudodiagnosticity. Exploratory Hypothesis #2, as demonstrated elsewhere,
was that participants in biasing conditions would select fewer diagnostic pairs than
would participants in unbiased conditions. The three-way (Attention * Motivation *
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Size-of-Conditionals) ANOVA was not significant, F(7, 152) = .86, p = .54 partial η2
= .04. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #2 all main effects and interactions
were not significant (see Table 38). In contrast to Doherty et al. (1979), it should be
noted that participants performance (.75 pairs selected on average) was statistically
[t(159) = 5.03, p<.001] better than chance (.40 pairs).

Table 38
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Pseudodiagnosticity
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

.126

.72

<.01

Motivation

1.44

.23

.01

Size-of-Conditionals

.66

.42

<.01

Attention*Motivation

.79

.37

<.01

Focal search strategies. Exploratory Hypothesis #3 was that participants in
biasing conditions would use more hypothesis-focused search strategies and fewer
control focused search strategies than would participants in unbiased conditions. Due
to their lack of a consistent search strategy, 35 participants were dropped from this
analysis. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) ANOVA was
performed and was nearly significant, F(7, 117) = 1.97, p = .07 partial η2 = .11 (see
Table 39).
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Table 39
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Focal Search Strategies
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

4.38

.04

.04

Motivation

4.29

.04

.04

Size-of-Conditionals

.70

.40

.01

Attention*Motivation

.03

.70

<.01

Attention*Size

3.96

.05

.03

Consistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #3, both the attention and motivation
variables led to significant differences. Because attention and motivation were
significant, the over-biasing effect was explored by three post hoc orthogonal t-tests.
The two simple main effects post-hoc comparisons were both non-significant. In
contrast, the comparison of balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated
was significant. These post hoc tests provide evidence that in the case of predictor
selection bias attention and motivation have additive effects. (See Tables 40 and 41
and Figure 6).
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Table 40
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Focal Search Strategies
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to:

t

p

d

Balanced and motivated

t(79) = 1.33

= .25

.30

Focused and not motivated

t(79) = 1.26

= .21

.32

Focused and motivated

t(76) = 2.41

= .02

.59

Table 41
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Focal Search Strategies
Attention and Motivation Conditions:

M

SD

Balanced and not motivated

.04

.44

Balanced and motivated

.16

.37

Focused and not motivated

.17

.38

Focused and motivated

.35

.55
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Percent Using Focal
Strategies

Figure 6. Attention by motivation interaction on use of focal search strategies.

0.4
0.3
Not Motivated

0.2

Motivated

0.1
0
Balanced

Focused

Attention

Additionally, the two-way interaction between attention and size-ofconditionals was significant, where the biasing affect of attention only works with low
conditional probabilities. This provides further evidence that the expected curative
effect of surprise did not work (see Figure 7).
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Percent Using Focal
Strategies

Figure 7. Attention by size-of-conditionals interaction on use of focal search
strategies.

0.4
0.3
0.2

Small

0.1

Large

0
-0.1
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Focused
Attention

Comparing the size of hypothesis focus and predictor selection biases.
Exploratory Hypotheses #4 and #5 compared the effects of attention and motivation,
respectively, on hypothesis focus bias and predictor selection bias. This is possible
because these two dependent variables are on the same scale 0-4 selections made on
the 8 possible selections favoring one island.
Exploratory Hypothesis #4 was that the focal condition would have a bigger
impact on hypothesis focus bias than on predictor selection bias. This difference was
assessed using a paired samples t-test. The results indicates that the focused conditions
caused greater hypothesis focus bias (M = 2.49, SD = .93) than predictor selection bias
(M = 2.27, SD = .82). This difference was found to be nearly significant, T(78) =
1.706, p = .09, d = .19.
Exploratory Hypothesis #5 was that the motivated condition would have a
bigger impact on predictor selection bias than on hypothesis focus bias. This

Results 161
difference was assessed using a paired samples t-test. However, the results indicates
that the motivated conditions caused greater hypothesis focus bias (M = 2.49, SD =
.89) than predictor selection bias (M = 2.25, SD = .82). This difference was found to
be nearly significant, T(78) = 1.706, p = .09, d = .20.
Exploratory integration process hypotheses. These hypotheses test the
participants’ use in integration of the information they selected. Because the
information available to each participant at this point is different, these results are a
reflection of the combination of both the participants’ search phase and integration
phase. Additionally, because participants do not have to use all the conditional
probabilities made available to them, these hypotheses are tested against difference
scores (e.g. focal - non-focal).
Hypothesis-focus integration bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #6 was that
participants in biasing conditions would report a greater difference in the usage of
information conditioned on Shell Island and Coral Island than would participants in
non-biasing conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals)
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .88, p = .52, partial η2 =
.04. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #6 both attention, motivation and their
interaction were not significant (see Table 42).
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Table 42
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

1.23

.27

.01

Motivation

.41

.52

<.01

Size-of-Conditionals

.94

.33

.01

Attention*Motivation

.91

.34

.01

Predictor-focus integration bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #7 was that
participants in biasing conditions would report a greater difference in the usage of
information hinted to favor Shell Island and Coral Island than would participants in
unbiased conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals)
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .67, p = .70, partial η2 =
.03. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #7 both attention, motivation and their
interaction were not significant (see Table 43).
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Table 43
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Predictor-Focus Integration Bias
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

.07

.79

<.01

Motivation

.19

.66

<.01

Size-of-Conditionals

1.50

.22

.01

Attention*Motivation

.722

.40

.01

Pairs used in integration. Exploratory Hypothesis #8 was that participants in
biasing conditions report lesser usage of diagnostic pairs than would participants in
unbiased conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals)
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .71, p = .66, partial η2 =
.03. Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #7 both attention, motivation and their
interaction were not significant (see Table 44).
Table 44
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Pairs Used in Integration
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

.02

.90

<.01

Motivation

.08

.77

<.01

Size-of-Conditionals

<.01

.98

<.01

Attention*Motivation

.60

.44

<.01
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Use of biased integration strategies. Exploratory Hypothesis #9 was that
participants in biasing conditions would be more likely to be classified as using biased
integration strategies than would participants in unbiased conditions. The three-way
ANOVA was not significant, F(7, 152) = .92, p = .50, partial η2 = .03. Inconsistent
with Exploratory Hypothesis #9 attention was nearly significant [F(1, 152) = 3.080, p
= .081], while motivation [F(1, 152) = .836, p = .362] and their interaction [F(1, 152)
= .935, p = .335] were not significant (see Table 45).

Table 45
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Use of Biased Integration Strategies
Effect

F(1, 152)

p

partial η2

Attention

3.08

.08

.02

Motivation

.84

.36

.01

Size-of-Conditionals

.03

.85

<.01

Attention*Motivation

.94

.33

.01

Because attention was nearly significant, the over-biasing effect was explored
by the three post hoc orthogonal t-tests. The simple main effect comparison for
attention was significant while the comparison for motivation was not. The
comparison of balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated was nearly
significant. These post hoc tests provide weak evidence that in the case of the use of
biased integration strategies attention and motivation have sub-additive effects
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(attention and motivation in combination produce approximately the same bias as each
alone). (See Tables 46 and 47).

Tables 46
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Use of Biased Integration Strategies
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to:

T

p

d

Balanced and motivated

t(79) = 1.41

= .16

.31

Focused and not motivated

t(79) = 2.03

= .05

.44

Focused and motivated

t(76) = 1.72

= .09

.37

Table 47
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Use of Biased Integration Strategies
Attention and Motivation Conditions:

M

SD

Balanced and not motivated

.03

.58

Balanced and motivated

.20

.51

Focused and not motivated

.27

.50

Focused and motivated

.26

.64

Phase biases. Exploratory Hypotheses #10 and #11 examine the effects of the
independent variables on the search and integration strategies confirmatory effects
(confirmation bias as defined by this study). These effects were measured in terms of
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the bias of the posterior probability that was caused by their biased strategies in each
phase individually.
Search confirmation bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #10 was that participants in
biasing conditions would have a higher posterior probability produced from optimal
integration and their actual search than would participants in balanced conditions. A
three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals) ANOVA was performed
and was not significant, F(7, 152) = .44, p = .88 partial η2 = .02. Inconsistent with
Exploratory Hypothesis #10, attention, motivation and their interaction were not
significant (see Table 48).

Table 48
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Search Confirmation Bias
Effect

F(1, 152)

P

partial η2

Attention

1.28

.26

.01

Motivation

.03

.86

<.01

Size-of-Conditionals

.02

.88

<.01

.29

.01

Attention*Motivation 1.11

Integration confirmation bias. Exploratory Hypothesis #11 was that
participants in biasing conditions would have a higher posterior probability produced
from optimal search and their actual integration strategy than would participants in
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balanced conditions. A three-way (Attention * Motivation * Size-of-Conditionals)
ANOVA was performed and was not significant, F(7, 152) = 1.51, p = .17, partial η2 =
.07. The main effect of attention was significant and the interaction of motivation and
attention was nearly significant. In contrast, motivation was not significant (see Table
49).

Table 49
The Effects of the Independent Variables on Integration Confirmation Bias
Effect

F(1, 152)

P

partial η2

Attention

4.66

.03

.03

Motivation

.69

.41

<.01

Size-of-Conditionals

.19

.66

<.01

Attention*Motivation

3.11

.08

.02

Because attention was a significant factor and the Attention * Motivation
interaction was nearly significant, the over-biasing effect was explored by three post
hoc orthogonal t-tests. All three comparisons were significant (balanced and not
motivated versus balanced and motivated, balanced and not motivated versus focused
and not motivated and balanced and not motivated versus focused and motivated). The
relative equality of the effects provides evidence that attention and motivation have
sub-additive effects on integration confirmation bias (See Tables 50 and 51 and Figure
8).
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Table 50
Orthogonal Contrasts on Over-Biasing Effect on Integration Confirmation Bias
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to

T

p

d

Balanced and motivated

t(79) = 2.06

= .04

.45

Focus and not motivated

t(79) = 2.55

= .01

.55

Focus and motivated

t(76) = 2.26

= .03

.50

Table 51
Descriptive Statistics on Over-Biasing Effect on Integration Confirmation Bias
Contrast Balanced and Not Motivated to

M

SD

Balanced and not motivated

-1.35

7.45

Balanced and motivated

1.93

6.88

Focus and not motivated

3.58

9.75

Focus and motivated

2.41

7.23
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Integration Confirmation Bias

Figure 8. Motivation by attention on integration confirmation bias.
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Additivity of phase biases. Exploratory Hypothesis #12 was that participants
confirmation bias (DV5) would be less than their Sum-of-Phase-Biases (DV13).
Inconsistent with Hypothesis #12, the paired samples t-test (pairing the confirmation
bias of each participant with the sum of their phase biases) was not significant, t(159)
= .028, p = .978.
Intuitive conditionals.
Intuitive conditionals are the estimates participants have of the unchosen
conditional probabilities. These hypotheses examine how participants estimate these
values and if and how they use intuitive conditional probabilities in their posterior
calculations. These analyses were limited to the 120 participants in the sequential
conditions who provided every intuitive conditional.
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Estimating the use of intuitive conditionals. Exploratory Hypothesis #13a
examined the probabilities used in calculating posteriors. This hypothesis was that
Bayesian integration using the selected conditionals and intuitive conditionals would
be better at predicting participants’ posterior probabilities than Bayesian integration
using only the selected conditionals. The model using the selected conditionals and the
intuitive conditionals that completed a diagnostic pair of the selected conditionals
predicted the actual posteriors the best, r(120) = .37, p<.001. The model using all
selected and intuitive conditionals predicted the actual posteriors second best, r(120) =
.26, p = .005. The model using only the selected pairs predicted the actual posteriors
the worst, r(120) = .19, p = .04 (see Table 52).
To compare the accuracy of these three models in predicting participants’
posterior probabilities, the absolute value of the differences between the posteriors
computed using each model and the participants’ actual posteriors were calculated.
These difference scores were compared using the Wilcoxan signed ranks test where
the assumption of symmetry appeared to be satisfied, and the sign test where that
assumption appeared to be violated. The model using only matching intuitive
conditionals was better than the model using all intuitive conditionals (sign test),
Z(120) = 4.69, p<.001. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 13a, the model using only the real
conditionals was significantly better than the model using the matching conditionals
(signed ranks test), Z(120) = 2.36, p = .02.
There is an apparent contradiction between these two sets of results, that use of
intuitive conditionals and Bayesian Integration produces stronger correlations with,
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and yet greater mean error from, the actual posterior. This contradiction can be
resolved by examining the standard deviations of the models’ posteriors. Models using
intuitive conditionals have more diagnostic pairs to integrate, and therefore produce
greater variation from the midpoint. This can be seen in their higher standard
deviations. In this study’s situation, where most participants (77 out of these 120)
provided a posterior between 40% and 60%, a model that adjusts less will be more
accurate in terms of difference between the model’s posterior and the actual posterior.
The model using all the intuitive conditionals and Bayesian integration had the
strongest correlation, indicating that it predicts the correct order of the participants’
posteriors well.
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Table 52
Comparison Accuracy of Models in Predicting Actual Posterior Estimates
Intuitive
Probabilities Used
by Model

Model’s Posteriors

Absolute Value of the

Model

Correlation to

Difference between the

Posterior

Actual Posteriors

Model’s Posterior and the

(Integration

Actual Posterior

Method)
r(120)

P

M

SD

SD

All (Bayesian)

.26

.005

22.44

20.12

29.81

Forming Matching

.37

<.001

16.4

18.29

25.11

None (Bayesian)

.19

.04

12.14

12.19

10.09

All (Regression)

.29

.001

11.82

9.68

4.64

Pairs (Bayesian)

Estimating the combining rule. Exploratory Hypothesis #13b examined the
combining rule used in calculating posteriors. In order to determine which integration
strategy is a better overall predictor of actual posteriors, a regression using the average
conditional (all intuitive and all selected) in each quadrant was used to predict the
actual posterior. This regression equation was significant, F(4,115) = 2.68, p = .04,
and was used to estimate the posterior probabilities.
Exploratory Hypothesis #13b was that the regression equation would predict
participants’ actual posterior probabilities better than Bayesian integration. Similar to
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13a, the regression equation created posterior was compared to the Bayesian created
posterior (both used all selected and intuitive conditionals). Consistent with hypothesis
13b the regression equation predicted the actual posteriors significantly better (sign
test), Z(120) = 2.83, p = .005, than did the model using Bayesian integration.
Interesting to note, that the posteriors made by regression did not correlate as
strongly as to the actual posterior, r(120) = .290, p = .001, as did the model using
Bayesian integration applied to the matched conditionals (see Table 46).
Unfortunately, a direct comparison between these two models is not possible due to
their use of different numbers of conditionals.
Predicting the size of intuitive conditionals. Exploratory Hypothesis #14 was
that the size of intuitive conditionals will be larger for participants in the high
conditionals conditions than the low conditionals conditions. Consistent with
Exploratory Hypothesis #14 participants in the high conditionals conditions (M =
49.68, SD = 14.34) estimated higher intuitive conditionals than participants in the low
conditionals condition (M = 26.73, SD = 19.14), t(120) = 7.51, p<.001, d = 1.13. This
strongly indicates that participants use the size of actual conditionals in estimating
intuitive conditionals.
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Surprise hypotheses. These hypotheses examined the idea that surprise leads
to deeper and less biased thinking. This was a critical component of the assumption
that the combination of low conditional (the surprise) combined with sequential
feedback (an opportunity to change search strategies) would result in lower bias.
Exploratory Hypothesis #15. Exploratory Hypothesis #15 was that participants
who were in the focused and/or motivated conditions and reported being surprised
would select less information conditioned on Shell Island than those not surprised.
Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #15 the t-test was not significant, t(118) =
.40, p = .69, d = .08 (see Table 53).
Exploratory Hypothesis #16. Exploratory Hypothesis #16 was that participants
who were in the focused and/or motivated conditions and reported being surprised
would select less information hinted to favor Shell Island than those not surprised.
Inconsistent with Exploratory Hypothesis #16 the t-test was not significant, t(118) =
.35, p = .73, d = .06 (see Table 53).
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Table 53
Descriptive Statistics for Surprised and Not-Surprised Participants in Motivated and /
or Focused Conditions
Surprised (n)

Hypothesis Focus Bias

Predictor Selection Bias

M

SD

M

SD

Surprised (47)

2.49

.80

2.30

.78

Not Surprised (73)

2.42

.90

2.25

.80

The failure of these surprise hypotheses to predict search biases, demonstrates
why the low conditionals condition failed to “cure” biases. The low conditionals were
supposed to reduce bias by surprising participants, but surprise did not reduce bias.

Discussion 176
Discussion
Primary Goals
The primary goals of this study were to address four problems in the literature:
the imprecise and multiple definitions of terms relating to confirmation bias, the lack
of any quantification of the confirmatory effect against a normative interval scale
outcome, the absence of studies that examine phase interactions, and the absence of
research on predictor selection bias (outside dissonance theory research).
In reviewing the literature, a series of definitions was proposed to increase the
precision of the terms used in this area, in order to achieve the first goal. This study
has taken the first small step towards its second goal, measuring the size of
confirmation bias with reference to a normative interval scale outcome. This goal was
hindered by the way in which the study was designed, in which efforts to establish
controls rendered the manipulations less effective. (See below Limitations of internal
validity from manipulation problems). Nevertheless, if the proposed terms are
accepted by the research community and research follows this example of using a
normative interval scale outcome, then results will, in the future be more comparable
across studies. This in turn should increase communication among researchers
working across the seven related paradigms. Additionally, achievement of the first two
goals in combination would assist in determining the relative importance of the
various forms of confirmation bias, which, in turn, would inform the prescriptive
research as to which biases are the most important to be on guard for.
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This study has also taken the first steps towards its third goal, examining phase
interactions by studying both search and integration phases in the same experiment.
First, this study directly tested the common unstated assumption in the literature that
the phases are either completely independent or completely dependent, and therefore
can be examined separately. The strong correlation (r=.81) between the use of focal
search and focal integration strategies is powerful evidence that these two processes
are interrelated and eliminates the possibility of complete phase independence. Despite
this extremely high correlation, the phases are not completely dependent, either, for
five reasons. First, because this correlation was between categories of strategies (focal,
unbiased, and anti-focal), there was a lot of variation within these categories. For
example, there were three different search strategies that were classified as focal and
six different integration strategies that were classified as focal. The 18 combinations of
these strategies produce vastly different posteriors. Second, the correlation between
focal search and focal integration approaches randomness (r=.02) when participants
who selected probabilities conditioned exclusively on one island (and therefore cannot
be focal in integration on the other island) were excluded. Third, the change in the
attention-by-motivation interaction between phases (see over-biasing effect below)
indicates a reduction in participants’ focus in the integration phase. Fourth, the finding
of hypothesis-focus bias in the search phase but not finding the parallel hypothesisfocus integration bias in the integration phase again indicates a reduction in
participants’ focus in the integration phase. Fifth, many of the participants searched
optimally but used the Biased Bayesian integration strategy. Since the phases are not
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completely independent or dependent, then prior research examining only one of the
two phases while making claims about confirmation bias results needs to be critically
re-examined.
The fourth goal, that of examining predictor selection bias, was both less
ambitious than the others and yet turned out to be more difficult. Although dissonance
theory research has extensively examined predictor selection bias, conditional
selection paradigm research has never attempted to examine it in the integration phase.
This oversight may be due to lack of interest, or due to the difficulty in establishing
hints as to the direction of the diagnosticity of the dimensions without making these
hints normatively relevant in the integration phase.
This study attempted to overcome this difficulty by creating a situation where
the hints were clear as to their direction but were not a normative factor in integration.
There are three reasons why they are not normative factors. First, the hints were
balanced (four favoring each of the two hypotheses) and therefore, as a set, nondiagnostic. Second, anyone following a normative search strategy would select
conditionals evenly from those hinted to favor each hypothesis thus preserving this
balance. Third the hints were deliberatively vague as to whether they were diagnostic
or pseudodiagnostic (“…characterizes the current clay pits of…”).
No results met the .05 level on predictor selection bias or related biases.
However, since previously found biases were not replicated, it is concluded that this
was due to a weak manipulation, we therefore, cannot rule predictor selection bias out.
There was one new finding in this area of predictor preference: the use of the Biased
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Bayesian integration strategy (the use of only the pair favoring the focal island in
integration by participants who had searched optimally). Both attention and motivation
had nearly significant effects on the use of this Biased Bayesian strategy. This form of
predictor-focus integration bias has never been considered before, and if established in
subsequent research, would show a new way that participants who are unbiased in one
phase (search) can be powerfully biased in another (integration).
Results Summary
The results indicate that the attention manipulation had both focal and
motivational effects in both the search and integration processes, but these did not
produce an effect on the resulting posterior probability. In contrast, the motivation
manipulation had only focal search effects. Additionally attention and motivation
manipulations appear to interact, but only in the integration phase.
This study’s unique design of providing hints as to the direction of
diagnosticity of a dimension and of examining both search and integration phases
provided the ability to examine more combinations of search and integration
strategies. This study surprisingly found that participants were rarely using singlequadrant search strategies (33) and were frequently using information about both
islands in integration (127). Additionally, there was some evidence for the use of the
Biased Bayesian integration strategy.
Finally, this study is the first to examined participants’ intuitive conditionals.
Strong evidence was found that participants estimate of the size of the unchosen
conditional probabilities was affected by the size of the chosen conditionals (positive
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relationship). Additionally, it appears that participants’ intuitive conditionals affect
their estimate of the posterior probability.
Results Categorized by Independent Variable
The following six sections discuss the results by focusing in turn on each of the
four independent variables, the interaction between attention and motivation, and a
comparison of the size of the effects of the attention and motivation manipulations.
For ease of understanding main effects will be presented before interaction effects.
Attention main effects. The attention manipulation was found to increase
significantly the use of focal search strategies (p=.04; exploratory hypothesis #3) and
integration confirmation bias (p=.03; exploratory hypothesis #11). Attention was
found to nearly significantly increase hypothesis focus bias (p=.07; exploratory
hypothesis #1), focal integration strategies (p=.08; exploratory hypothesis #9), and the
use of the Bias Bayesian integration strategy (p=.09; research hypothesis #2).
However, attention was found to be not significant in affecting predictor
selection bias (research hypothesis #1) or its integration phase equivalent, predictorfocus integration bias (exploratory hypothesis #7). These findings were smaller in size
and narrower in scope than expected (see Interval Validity Section for a discussion).
Additionally, this study failed to replicate prior findings of pseudodiagnosticity
(exploratory hypothesis #2), as well corresponding integration phase biases of
Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias and pseudodiagnostic integration (exploratory
hypotheses #6 and 8) (Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Beyth-Marom &
Fischhoff, 1983; Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Ofir, 1988; Mynatt, et al., 1993).
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Motivation main effects. The motivated manipulation was found to increase
significantly the use of focal search strategies (p=.04; exploratory hypothesis #3) and
nearly significantly increase hypothesis focus bias (p=.07; exploratory hypothesis #1)
and the use of the Bias Bayesian integration strategy (p=.07; research hypothesis #2).
Motivation was found to be non-significant in affecting most search phase variables,
including: predictor selection bias (research hypothesis #1), pseudodiagnosticity
(exploratory hypothesis #2), and search confirmation bias (exploratory hypothesis
#10). Similarly, motivation was found to be non-significant in affecting most
integration phase variables, including hypothesis-focus integration bias (exploratory
hypothesis #6), predictor-focus integration bias (exploratory hypothesis #7), and pairs
used in integration (exploratory hypothesis #8).
These findings were smaller in size and narrower in scope than expected (see
Limitations of internal validity from manipulation problems for a discussion) as the
consistent effects found in the dissonance theory paradigm (Frey, 1981, 1986; Ditto &
Lopez, 1992; Pinkley, et al., 1995; Frey, et al., 1996; Johnston, 1996; Russo, et al.,
1996; Luce, et al., 1997; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Schulz-Hardt, et al., 2000; Simon,
et al., 2001), despite the parallel situations. This failed to extend dissonance theory
paradigm to the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm.
Motivation and attention interaction. The attention and motivation
manipulations were expected to be sub-additive by producing similar levels of bias
regardless of whether a participant was assigned a focal condition, a motivated
condition, or both (see Expected effects of independent variables). However, this sub-
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additive interaction was not consistently found in this study. Interestingly, a pattern
was found for this interaction. In the two search phase dependent variables where
significant or nearly significant results were obtained (hypothesis focus bias and
search strategy), these independent variables appeared to have additive effects. In
contrast, in the two integration phase dependent variables where significant or nearly
significant results were obtained (integration confirmation bias and integration
strategy), these independent variables appeared to have sub-additive or even
overbiasing effects. Participants appear to grow more cautious or less biased (perhaps
because they become aware of the manipulations) as they reached the integration
phase of this study.
Motivation and attention comparison. The study compared the sizes of the
effects of these two sources of bias (attention focus and motivation bias). Despite the
weak manipulations (and the inherent problems in comparing the strength of
manipulations of different variables), this study found the effect of attention to be
greater than the effect of motivation on hypothesis focus bias (p=.09; exploratory
hypothesis #4). In contrast, motivation was no found to be significantly greater in
effect on predictor selection bias than attention (exploratory hypothesis #5).
Timing of feedback. Due to the failure of random assignment, all sequential
participants were dropped from analyses, and therefore it was not possible to examine
the effects of this variable (see the Interval Validity Section for a discussion).
Size-of-conditionals. This independent variable was included to examine two
possibilities. The first possibility was that a combination of low size-of-conditionals
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and sequential search would be unbiasing. Because of the selection differences in the
timing of feedback variable this possibility could not be examined. The second
possibility was that size-of-conditionals affected participants’ intuitive conditionals.
This relationship was highly significant (p<.001; exploratory hypothesis #14) and in
the expected positive direction.
Results Categorized By Dependent Variable
The following five sections discuss the results, each focusing on one of five
categories of dependent variables in turn: search phase, integration phase, surprise,
intuitive conditionals, and search and integration strategies.
Search phase. Focal attention and the motivated conditioned produced their
expected increase in hypothesis focus bias and the use of focal search strategies (as
discussed under main effects). Additionally, the small conditionals condition
surprisingly increased the biasing effect of focal attention. Unfortunately, the study
failed to replicate many prior findings of the effect of attention on pseudodiagnosticity
(Doherty, et al., 1979; Doherty, et al., 1981; Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff, 1983;
Fischhoff & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Ofir, 1988; Mynatt, et al., 1993).
One notable finding was that a surprisingly large proportion of the participants
searched for at least one diagnostic pair (133 out of 324) and approximated the use of
Bayes’ theorem in integration (88 of 324). These participants selected significantly
more pairs than chance, while in contrast, Doherty, et al. found participants selecting
significantly fewer pairs than chance. It is impossible to know whether this is a cohort
effect, a sampling effect, or an effect of the difference in the scripts.
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Integration phase. Fewer significant results were found in the integration
phase than the search phase. Attention was found to increase significantly integration
phase confirmation bias (p=.03). Additionally, attention and motivation had a nearly
significant overbiasing interaction on the use of the Biased Bayesian integration
strategy. (The overbiasing interaction was participants both focal attention and
motivated conditions demonstrating less bias to those participants in either one biasing
condition alone). In contrast attention and motivation had a sub-additive affect on
integration confirmation bias. (The sub-additive interaction was participants both focal
attention and motivated conditions demonstrating equal bias to those participants in
either one biasing condition alone).
Surprise. Similarly, two critical assumptions of this study were that the low
conditionals would prove surprising, and that surprised participants would be “cured”
of the biasing effects of the focal and motivated conditions. Unfortunately, both of
these assumptions were not supported in this study. First, low conditionals did not
prove to be very surprising. Only 39% of participants in the low conditional
probabilities condition reported being surprised by the size of the conditional
probabilities (in contrast to 33% of the high conditionals participants). Second, those
who reported being surprised were more, rather than less, biased (although not
significantly), in terms of both hypothesis focus bias and predictor selection bias
(exploratory hypotheses #15 and16). These two unexpected findings regarding
surprise combined to virtually eliminate any significant finding regarding size-ofconditionals. This failed to extend Doherty’s (Doherty, et al., 1979) and Ofir’s (1988)
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findings that providing disconfirming diagnostic feedback helped participants search
diagnostically. This goal was not achieved since there was only one significant
interaction between the size-of-conditionals and attention or motivation.
Intuitive conditionals. One of this study’s strongest findings was that the size
of the selected conditional probabilities had a positive relationship with the size of the
participants’ intuitive conditionals. This demonstrates that participants are estimating
these values and are influenced by what they do know about the situation.
Another interesting finding was that the model using the actual conditionals
plus their complementary paired intuitive conditionals (given Bayesian integration)
provided the strongest correlation to the actual posteriors (r=.37). In contrast, the nonparametric tests indicated the opposite, that regression was better than Bayes’
Theorem. These conflicting results between the correlation method (which indicated
that the intuitive conditionals combined with Bayes’ theorem was the best) and the
non-parametric methods (which indicated that regression was better than Bayes’
theorem and that using no intuitive conditional probabilities was better than using any)
may be explained by the difference in the criteria. The regression model had lower
variation (than the Bayesian models) and therefore resulted in more posteriors close to
50%. In this situation, anything close to 50% predicted well, since most participants
stayed near 50%. However, the models using Bayesian integration and including some
or all intuitive conditionals had higher correlation coefficients to the actual posteriors,
indicating that they better captured the variation of participants’ posteriors. The
regression model may reflect participants using the anchoring and adjusting heuristic
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proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) (anchoring on the 50% base rate and
adjusting from there) and the small size of the adjustment. The Bayesian model
(Bayesian integration applied to all the intuitive conditionals) may better reflect how
people adjust from the anchor, but may overstate the size of the adjustment. In
situations where the anchor is not so fixed (due to non-50% base rate and consistent
diagnosticity of the conditional probabilities) the intuitive conditionals model with
Bayesian integration might predict even better.
This provides additional evidence for participants using Bayesian or QuasiBayesian thinking. This support is limited due to the contrasting findings (as to
whether regression or Bayes predicted posteriors better), and the fact that these are
between-subjects group-level findings, and therefore it is hard to draw individual-level
conclusions from them.
Additionally, these results provide mixed evidence that the intuitive
conditionals were somehow involved in the integration process and that people are
semi-Bayesian in their integration. Unfortunately, these intuitive conditional results
need to be taken cautiously, since the data were collected after the posterior judgments
had been made and may reflect some hindsight bias.
Participants’ use of intuitive conditionals could provide an explanation for
participants’ poor performance in many decision making tasks. When making real
decisions, people often are familiar with the situation. This familiarity could help them
in at least three ways. First, familiarity would provide a hint to the direction of the
diagnostic effect of each datum (i.e. the hints in this study that this mineral would
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favor Shell or Coral). Second, familiarity would help people to estimate the size of
conditional probabilities that they do not have exact figures for (i.e. the diagnostic
ratio of unchosen conditionals in this study). Third, familiarity would guide them to
the importance and diagnostic direction of the value of each conditional probability
(i.e. the diagnostic impact of a high or low conditional probability would have on their
posterior probability). The artificial and abstract tasks of most laboratory studies in
this field may cause some of the participants’ poor performance, by denying them
their usual familiarity with the task and situation.
Search and integration strategies. This study created a taxonomy of all
possible search strategies and measured their relative frequency of use. Of interest is
the rarity (only 33 participants) of participants who choose information all from the
same quadrant (all probabilities conditioned on a single island and hinted to favor a
single island) indicating that for the vast majority of participants information from
more than one quadrant was relevant. Similarly, this study created a list of integration
strategies and a classification system that proved acceptably reliable. Of great interest
among the integration strategies was the large number of participants who used the
Biased Bayesian (32), Bayesian (56), and ratio of conditionals strategies (35). These
three strategies all use information from both islands in ways that are at least close to
Bayes' Theorem. This study found a larger proportion of Bayesian participants than
did Doherty, et al. (1979) although direct comparisons are difficult due to differences
in the task and script.
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Limitations
This study suffers from several limitations that limit the scope and both the
internal and external validity of the study.
Limitations from the scope of the study. Several potential research questions
were left outside the scope of this study. Most importantly, despite being the first
study to examine the interactions between the search and integration phases, this study
avoided examining interactions between this and other parts of the decision making
process. Hall (1989) outlined eight steps in the systems methodology for decision
making (problem definition, value system design, systems synthesis, systems analysis,
optimization, decision making, planning for action, and building and maintenance
functions). In the decision making literature these same steps are commonly referred
to as problem definition, identification of values, identification of alternatives,
evaluation of impacts, maximizing individual alternatives, choice among alternatives,
and implementation (merging the last two systems methodology steps).
Of these, only two were involved in this study, systems analysis (the search
and integration of information) and to a lesser extent decision making (the final
decision). The first four of Hall’s steps were not examined, because participants were
simply provided at the outset what would have been the results of Hall’s first four
steps (problem definition, value system design, systems synthesis, and optimization).
Similarly, Hall’s last two steps (planning for action and maintenance functions) were
ignored completely. An obvious limitation of this research (and an area for future
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research) was any interaction between the excluded six phases of Hall’s decision
making process and the two phases studied.
Limitations of internal validity from manipulation problems. The failure of
the attention and motivation manipulations to produce their expected effects interfered
with several of this study’s goals (with the notable exceptions of significant results on
search strategies and integration confirmation bias). There are eleven possible
explanations to this failure to replicate both the pilot study and many prior research
findings.
First, the length and complexity of the script and the number of process
questions could have deceased participants’ interest, motivation, and effort, leading to
random responses and/or 50% posterior estimates. (93 participants gave exactly 50%
as their posterior and 15 more were within 1%).
Second, two features of this study encouraged balanced attention and may have
undermined the attention manipulation (the pilot study and most other studies used
non-equal base rates). The even base rate (required for the unique optimal search
strategy) encourages participants to treat both islands equally. Similarly, use of the
table format when making search selections, again, treats both islands equally and has
been found to promote balanced thinking (Ward & Jenkins, 1965).
Third, the balanced conditionals (again required for the unique optimal search
strategy) could have led many non-Bayesian integration strategies to result close to
50%. In fact, in the situation presented in this study both the participants who use the
normative search and integration strategies (balanced Bayesian search and Bayesian
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integration) and the most unmotivated (“I don’t know”, therefore 50%) might be
expected to produce the same posterior. The balanced conditionals themselves may
cause an expectancy effect, where participants realize that the experimenter is looking
for bias and that 50% is the fair or even or correct answer.
Fourth, the lack of conflict among the base rate, the conditional probabilities,
and the hints may encourage less deep thinking and a 50% posterior (which is the
exact posterior chosen by 93 of the 324 of the participants). Ofir’s (1988) found that
conflicting information encouraged the use of false alarm rate information (deeper
thinking).
Fifth, the existence of an over-biasing effect would reduce the effect of the
attention and motivation manipulations by eliminating the biasing effects of these
manipulations for the 25% of participants who receive the combined conditions of
focal attention and motivated conditions. This lowered the power of all analyses
involving these two manipulations using the original testing design (combining the
IVs into one dichotomous variable, biasing and non-biasing conditions).
Sixth, some dependent measures such as hypothesis focus bias and predictor
selection bias were not very sensitive (since there were only five possibilities of
numbers of conditionals selected in a category 0-4) and with most participants
selecting two probabilities conditioned on each island (71.6%) and most participants
selecting two probabilities hinted to favor each island (69.4%). In contrast Doherty in
his original study (Doherty, et al. 1979) used a situation that produced a 0-6 scale.
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Seventh, the power of the study was reduced by the pre-manipulation selection
differences that caused the eight simultaneous conditions (and half the participants) to
be dropped. These subjects demonstrated differences in their search phase behavior.
These differences appear to be caused by the size of the conditional variable, which
the participants should not have yet seen. This indicates that many of these subjects
might have misunderstood the instructions and chosen their conditional probabilities
sequentially or cheated and changed their selections after the fact. This resulted in half
the participants being dropped.
Eighth, the increase in the proportion of Bayesian participants may make
research in this area less statistically sensitive. It appears to be a safe assumption that
Bayesian participants are more aware of the need to examine probabilities conditioned
on both hypotheses, and by extensions that they would be more aware of the need to
be fair in selection information hinted to favor both hypotheses. Therefore, they would
be less vulnerable to manipulations of their attention and motivation.
Ninth, the minimal effect of the low conditionals to generate surprise, and the
minimal effect of surprise on participants’ actions appears to have interfered with the
original testing design (combining the IVs into one dichotomous variable, biasing and
non-biasing conditions). Additionally, the low conditionals may have generated
apathy, anger or confusion rather than the intended surprise in participants when they
did not receive the feedback they were expecting. For example 12 low conditionals
participants failed to answer the surprise question while only 7 high conditionals
participants failed to answer the surprise question (p=.13, df =322).
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Tenth, the script for the pilot study (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001) was in a
setting that participants would be familiar with (hiring a new employee) as opposed to
the current script that focused on a more abstract problem (but is more similar to the
one used by Doherty, et al., 1979). The intuitive conditional results support the idea
that familiarity with the context could affect performance.
Eleventh, the pilot study (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001) was conducted over
the summer, whereas the current study was conducted during the academic school
year. Summer students may be more motivated participants and / or more vulnerable
to biases (they chose diagnostic pairs at a rate less than chance in contrast to these
participants who chose diagnostic pairs at a rate more than chance).
Technical limitations. This study additionally has three technical limitations.
First, the hints were all accurate and all of the hints, the probabilities, and the base rate
were perfectly balanced between alternatives (as was required for creating a single
normatively correct answer). If participants identify any of these characteristics, their
identification may reinforce their tendency to respond with a 50%-50% final estimate
(which in this case happens to be correct). This problem would work against rejection
of the null hypotheses.
Second, the definition of predictor selection integration bias, while not a
limitation in this study because the hints were all accurate, could be a limitation in the
general case when hints might not be accurate. If the hints were not accurate then the
hints and the data would disagree as to which predictors would support the focal
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hypothesis. Then it would no longer be clear which dimensions should be considered
indicative of predictor selection integration bias.
Third, several dependent variables were not continuous and had as few as five
values. This restriction of range would work against rejection of the null hypotheses.
Limitations of external validity due to the laboratory setting. Finally, there
were at least five possible limitations of this study that stem from its laboratory
experimental design.
First, the artificial situation may have made participants less biased by making
them more cautious in order to avoid looking “bad”. This caution may have led them
to minimize the distance by which they would revise their probability estimates,
resulting in more posterior probabilities around 50%. This problem would generally
bias this research against rejecting the null hypotheses. This effect is unlikely or small
because prior published lab studies commonly achieved significant results.
Second, the fact that participants were isolated from other people may have
distorted the results, although research on group decision making has demonstrated
some of the same biases as individual decision making (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens,
& Moscovici, 2000). Consulting others who may have a different attention focus and
different motivations could reduce these biases. This problem would generally bias
this research towards rejecting the null hypotheses, and might also create an external
validity problem. Again, this effect is unlikely or small because prior published lab
studies did commonly achieve significant results.
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Third, other reactivity effects were possible since participants knew their
decision making process was being studied. One possible effect of reactivity would be
to encourage participants to use in integration all the information they selected in the
search phase. Because if participants did not use all their selected information, it
would be admitting that they made a mistake in their search selections and had chosen
useless information. A second example would be participants changing their nonnumeric strategies to a numeric strategy in an attempt to use the “correct” integration
method.
Fourth, participants may have responded randomly due to low motivation and
a desire to avoid cognitive effort on this difficult task (the 97 participants who chose
exact 50% may be an indication of this).
Fifth, any results are limited to the research paradigm employed (Bayesian
conditionals selection paradigm), the situation, and the parameters employed. As just
one example, this study asked participants to choose 4 of 16 conditional probabilities,
the fact that participants then had 4 conditional probabilities in addition to the base
rate, made it likely that participants who would have used an additive strategy with
fewer numbers to work with, would switch to another strategy when they realize that
adding four or five probabilities together would result in a probability above 100% and
therefore cannot be the correct integration strategy. No other researcher has tried to
categorize individual participant’s integration strategies.
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Implications
Multi-phase research. Eventually, future research could address some of
these limitations, most notably by including all eight of Hall’s (1989) system
methodology steps. This research would require a less structured problem, which
would entail a more difficult statistical analysis. Such research would probably focus
on defining and/or classifying patterns or styles of decision making in individuals
rather than averaging across individuals. Similarly, moving the study out of a
laboratory environment would resolve the five potential limitations listed above for
this study due to its laboratory setting. However, the use of field studies is largely
prevented by the logistical difficulties of observing decision making in a field study.
Some of the limitations of a laboratory study can be addressed while still in the
laboratory environment, such as having married couples perform both joint and
individual decision making.
Once studies are expanded to all eight of Hall’s (1989) system methodology
steps, other biases that have sometimes been labeled confirmation bias (and were
excluded from this study) could be included. These include biases in the interpretation
of (Kelley, 1950) and memory for information (Perkins, et al., 1991). These two biases
could interact with the biases explored in this study. For example, when memory is
involved, participants may use information from dimensions that are normatively anticonfirmatory (e.g. predictor-focus integration anti-bias) but they misremember the
information to be confirmatory.
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Technical improvements for future laboratory research. There are at least
five ways to make technical improvements to laboratory research in this area.
The first way would be to strengthen the manipulations. One critical failing of
this study was the weakness of the manipulations. In order to overcome this problem
several options are available. For the attention manipulation, the use of an uneven base
rate and/or the presentation of the search choices in a form other than a table would
strengthen the attention manipulation. For the motivation manipulation, more real
world motivations could be stronger. These could include a promise of a real life
reward for the desired outcome (e.g. getting out of the study earlier, small cash
reward, more extra credit points) or the use of a decision involving a topic participants
have an existing strong opinion on (e.g. Iraq War or Abortion). Another technique to
maximize the size of the bias would be to ask participants to deliberately be biased.
This technique has been used extensively in personality testing for employment
purposes (see Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999 for a meta-analysis and review).
The second way to improve the study would be to automate the study through
computer programming. The use of an automated script could prevent some of the
more common participant mistakes, such as selecting more than 4 conditional
probabilities and providing less than all 12 of the intuitive conditional probabilities.
The third way to improve the study would be change it to a within-subjects
design. The most interesting participants for this topic are the least numerically
oriented. Unfortunately, these participants’ integration strategies proved very difficult
to classify without any mathematical notations to guide our understanding of their
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thinking. In a within-subjects design, individual integration strategies can be inferred
more accurately from their repeated judgments.
The fourth way to improve the design would be to cut up the study into a series
of smaller experiments. While we need to understand the whole system, the length and
complexity of this study may have contributed to some of its failing and therefore,
simplifying the study may improve the quality of the resulting data. This could be
done by running an initial experiment limited to the search phase with just the
attention manipulation. Each succeeding experiment could build on the prior study by
adding or changing one feature (i.e. changing how attention is manipulated or by
adding a motivation manipulation). This research plan would have avoided some of
the problems experienced by this study (e.g. failure of attention and motivation to
consistently cause biases, and failure of surprise to reduce biases).
The fifth way to improve the study would be to improve the hints. The hints in
this study may have been both artificial and weak. The pilot study used an employee
selection cover story, in which the hints were whether or not the job applicant passed
each test. This form of a diagnostic hint is simultaneously understandable (pass is
good, failed is bad), familiar, and subtle (no need for a long explanation as to what
passed means). Additionally, these hints could easily be modified to be strong or weak
in their diagnosticity.
Future research topics. The results of this study suggest at least seven
implications for future laboratory research in this area.
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Phase interactions. The most important implication of this study is that future
research must be careful about making conclusions about effects in phases that are not
examined. The search and integration phases were shown to be both partly-dependent
on each other, and partly-independent (see Primary Goals for a discussion of the
evidence of partial dependence). Thus, cross-phase generalizations need to be made
cautiously, if at all.
Intuitive conditionals. The finding that intuitive conditionals are used in
Bayesian integration has three important research implications. First, research should
not be conducted in this area without gathering intuitive conditionals. Second support
is provided for Gigerenzer’s arguments that the degree to which cognitive errors found
in laboratory experiments can be a product of the artificial environment. If participants
use intuitive controls then it is not automatically a cognitive error for people to search
pseudodiagnostically. Third, this raises questions regarding other findings of cognitive
errors from laboratory experiments. Future research could further investigate this
phenomenon, and the related issue of the participants’ familiarity with the context.
Studies could ask participants about intuitive controls after actual conditional
probabilities are provided but before their posterior probability is collected. Similarly,
intuitive conditionals could be gathered before the search phase selections are made or
after the selection are made but before feedback is provided. Another way to gauge
their impact would be to vary the number of dimensions while keeping the number of
selections constant. This would determine whether the number of unexamined
dimensions of intuitive conditionals (diagnostic pairs of intuitive conditionals) affects
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the decision process. If participants can be accurately classified according to their
integration strategies, then their use of intuitive conditional probabilities could be
more effectively examined.
Relative size of biases from attention and motivation. This study found weak
support that attentional biases are greater than motivational ones. (Exploratory
Hypotheses 4 and 5 found that for both attention and motivation the effects were
greater on focal search bias than predictor selection bias. Additionally, attention
produced more and stronger effects than did motivation.) Therefore, research should
focus on attentional processes more than on motivational ones.
Surprise. This study’s failure to replicate prior findings regarding surprise
indicates that surprise may not be inherently debiasing, or that what other researchers
labeled as surprise was something else. Future research employing surprise as a
variable should use a manipulation check to ensure that they are actually surprising the
participants.
Overbiasing. This study’s finding of an overbiasing effect between attention
and motivation could either indicate a demand characteristic or some other
mechanism. One possibility is that what was here found and labeled as overbiasing,
may in fact be related to conservatism, which is the tendency to under-adjust for new
information. The participants’ initial positions are assumed to be the base rate.
Therefore any adjustment from it, whether caused by attentional or motivational
processes, would have to work against an inherent resistance to change. Future
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research should determine the extent of overbiasing, and the degree it is related to
broader decision making concepts.
Predictor selection bias and the Biased Bayesian Integration Strategy. The
findings regarding predictor selection bias and the biased Bayesian integration strategy
call for a re-examination and interpretation of prior findings. Even in situations where
the research did not intentionally include hints as to the diagnostic direction of
information, participants may have their own ideas / prejudices. The use of cover
stories with familiar situations (e.g. the color of a cab) in prior studies may have
activated participants’ biases as to the diagnosticity of a dimension. This possibility
should be investigated.
Increase in frequency of Bayesian participants. The finding of a greater
number of Bayesian participants raises a caution for future research. Since Bayesian
participants (133 participants selected at least 1 diagnostic pair) are presumably more
resistant to biases, an increase in the proportion of Bayesian participants will lower the
effect size of any biasing manipulation in a between-subjects design. Research may
have to compensate through increasing the strength of their manipulations, or running
more participants.
Specific future studies. Three specific studies are suggested by this research.
A first study could systematically manipulate the base rate in order to examine the
base rate’s attentional impact on predictor selection bias, hypothesis focus bias and
pseudodiagnosticity. This would help determine why the results of this study differ
from its pilot study.
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A second study could examine the interaction between attention and
motivation. This study found evidence for additive, sub-additive (when the effect of
two variables together is less than the combination of the two effects separately) and
over-biasing (when the effects of two variables together is less than either of the
effects separately) effects of attention and motivation. The interaction appears subadditive or over-biasing in the integration phase while additive in the search phase.
Determining why this interaction effect changes would be useful.
A third study could examine the possibility of mediator relationships among
the variables. The current study’s definition of confirmation bias (as a confirmatory
effect on the posterior) implies that the effects of the independent variables on
confirmation bias are mediated through the three search phase biases:
pseudodiagnosticity, hypothesis focus bias and predictor selection bias. Similarly,
these three search phase biases may (also) mediate the relationship between the
independent variables and their corresponding integration phase biases
(pseudodiagnostic integration, Hypothesis-Focus Integration Bias, and predictor
selection integration bias). The current study did not find consistent patterns of search
phase biases causing parallel integration phase biases.
Researchers have always assumed that search phase biases produced a
confirmatory effect, but they now need to not only demonstrate the confirming effect,
but also the process of how a search phase bias becomes transmitted across phases.
Implications for practice. Implications for practice can be divided into those
for decision analysts and those for untrained decision makers. Decision analysts’ use
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of software for computational purposes ensures that appropriate probabilities will be
obtained and that they will be integrated optimally. However, decision analysts and
their software are still vulnerable to errors in identifying diagnostic information and in
judging probabilities. This study has two findings that can impact these areas of
vulnerability. First, this study showed that the judgment of a conditional probability
can be affected by the size of other conditional probabilities. Second, this study also
highlighted the possibility that the diagnostic information considered might be
vulnerable to predictor selection bias.
For decision makers unaided by decision analysts and decision analysis
software, this study provides three issues to be aware of in addition to those for
decision analysts. First, attention may be a more important bias to be aware of than
motivation, so tables or trees should be used to equalize attention. Second, they should
be aware that they need to find and use diagnostic pairs of conditional probabilities.
Third, despite the use of an optimal search strategy and integration with Bayes’
Theorem, bias is still possible (the Biased Bayesian integration strategy). Therefore,
decision makers should ensure that all diagnostic pairs are integrated. Fourth, they
should be aware that the size of intuitive conditionals may affect their judgment of the
posterior probability, and therefore should be careful about any intuitive conditional
probabilities excluded from the analysis.
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Appendix A
Experimental Script.
IV1 Attention
1 Balanced
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your research has
led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed and was created on
either Shell Island or nearby Coral Island, two islands that share a unique culture. You
have found this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean floor between Shell and Coral
Islands.
Of the 10 urns that have previously been found at this spot on the ocean floor, 5 have
been determined to have been made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral Island. Since there
are no other islands with the same culture as Shell and Coral, no other island of origin
is possible.
2 Focused
Imagine you are an archeologist specializing in South Sea cultures. Your research has
led you to believe that the legendary Urn of Zor actually existed. While conducting
underwater excavations, from your research facility on Shell Island, you have found
this Urn of Zor, resting on the ocean floor.
IV2 Motivation
1 Not Motivated
The Urn of Zor is believed to have been created soon after the first settlements on the
islands. Finding the Urn provides new information about the early colonization of the
islands and will trigger new interest and research opportunities for you and your
fellow South Sea archeologists and greatly enhance your prestige. This is especially
important to you, since you are coming up for promotion and tenure next year.
2 Motivated
If it could be established that this urn had come from Shell Island, this would dispute
the legend that Shell Island was the last island in the South Sea area to be settled. This
would provide abundant research opportunities for you and your fellow South Sea
archeologists and greatly enhance your prestige. This is especially important to you,
since you are coming up for promotion and tenure next year.

Appendices 215
IV1 Attention
1 Balanced
You need to make a determination as to the island on which the urn was more
probably made. Your first step is to analyze the mineral content of the Urn of Zor.
You find that the Urn of Zor has high content of the 8 minerals listed in the table
below. Your second step is to determine the content of these minerals in the clay pits
now in use on the two islands. The table below displays the results of the mineral
content of the Urn of Zor and that of the current clay pits on the two islands:
Mineral found to be in
Island whose current clay pits are
abundance in the Urn of
characterized by an abundance of this mineral
Zor
Aluminum
Shell Island
Calcium
Shell Island
Chromium
Shell Island
Copper
Shell Island
Iron
Coral Island
Magnesium
Coral Island
Nickel
Coral Island
Zinc
Coral Island
Unfortunately, the islanders have migrated around the islands over the years and have
changed the clay pits they use. While the mineral content of the current clay pits is
probably similar to the mineral content of those clay pits used in ancient times to make
the Urn of Zor, it is certainly not identical. Therefore you will need an additional step
in your analysis.
At this point what is the probability the urn came from:
Shell Island _______?
Coral Island _______?
2 Focused
When you return to your research facility on Shell Island, your first thought is to
analyze the mineral content of the Urn of Zor. The results indicate that the Urn of Zor
has a high content of eight minerals (Aluminum, Calcium, Chromium, Copper, Iron,
Magnesium, Nickel and Zinc). Four (Aluminum, Calcium, Chromium and Copper) of
these high content minerals are characteristic of the clay pits in current use on Shell
Island. When you tell your research team the results, one of your co-workers states
that some of these minerals remind him of the current clay pit on the side of Shell
Island he has been working on. A second co-worker states that some of these minerals
remind her of the current clay pit on another side of Shell Island on which she has
been working. This sets off a furious debate among your research team as to the side
of Shell Island on which the Urn was more probably made. Unfortunately, the
evidence is not conclusive because, the islanders have migrated around the islands
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over the years and have changed the clay pits they use. While the mineral content of
the current clay pits is probably similar to the mineral content of those clay pits used
in ancient times to make the Urn of Zor, it is certainly not identical. Therefore you will
need an additional step in your analysis.
At this point what is the probability the Urn came from anywhere on Shell Island
________?
IV2 Motivation
1 Not Motivated
(No manipulation check)
2 Motivated
Would it be good for your career if the probability were higher or lower that the Urn
came from Shell Island? _______
IV1 Attention
1 Balanced
(Nothing)
2 Focused
You announce the finding of the Urn of Zor and your intention to give it to the Shell
Island National Museum, which you believe to be the most appropriate representative
of the rightful owners. Coral Island, which has the same culture as Shell Island,
quickly requests that you investigate the possibility that the Urn might have been made
on their island, and requests that you not give the Urn to the Shell Island National
Museum until you confirm that the Urn came from Shell Island.
Coral Island argues that of the 10 urns that have previously been found at the spot on
the ocean floor where the Urn of Zor was found, 5 have been determined to have been
made on Shell Island and 5 on Coral Island. Since there are no other islands with the
same culture as Shell and Coral, no other island of origin is possible.
Additionally, they argue that despite the fact that four of the minerals (Aluminum,
Calcium, Chromium and Copper) characterize the current clay pits of Shell Island, the
other four minerals (Iron, Magnesium, Nickel and Zinc) characterize the current clay
pits of Coral Island.
(These two pages are page 2)

Appendices 217
All Conditions
Since the evidence you have collected so far is not definitive as to which island the
Urn of Zor was made on, you decide to take the additional step of comparing the
mineral content of the Urn of Zor with the mineral content of urns made at the same
time as the Urn of Zor. A private collector owns all the urns from that era whose
island of origin has been clearly established (20 urns known to have been made on
Shell Island and 20 known to have been made on Coral Island).
This private collector, in order to limit damage to his urns, requires you to remove
only enough material from his urns to perform 4 of the 16 possible mineral tests. Each
test is specific to a mineral and an island. Each test would tell you the number of the
20 urns from the specified island that have the same high content of the specified
mineral as that in the Urn of Zor.
Choose 4 of the following 16 tests to perform, as the most efficient way to determine
the origin of the Urn of Zor, following the instructions below.
IV3 Timing
1 Sequential
Put the number 1 next to the first test you would like to perform, and then remove the
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
Next choose your second test, put the number 2 next to that test and then remove the
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
Next choose your third test, put the number 3 next to that test and then remove the
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
Finally, choose your fourth test, put the number 4 next to that test and then remove the
corresponding sticker to reveal the test result.
2 Simultaneous
Put a number (1 to 4) next to the four tests you would like to perform in the order of
importance to you (1 being top priority, 4 being lowest). Then remove the four
corresponding stickers to reveal the four test results.

Appendices 218

Analysis of the urns made at the same time as the Urn of Zor
Mineral found
to be in
abundance in
the Urn of Zor
Aluminum
Calcium
Chromium
Copper
Iron
Magnesium
Nickel
Zinc

Characterizes
the current
clay pits of
Shell Island
Shell Island
Shell Island
Shell Island
Coral Island
Coral Island
Coral Island
Coral Island

Number of the 20 old urns
from Shell Island that
have an abundance of this
mineral
2 or 12
Choice #_____
8 or 18
Choice #_____
6 or 16
Choice #_____
4 or 14
Choice #_____
2 or 7
Choice #_____
3 or 8
Choice #_____
4 or 9
Choice #_____
1 or 6
Choice #_____

Number of the 20 old urns
from Coral Island that
have an abundance of this
mineral
1 or 6
Choice #_____
4 or 9
Choice #_____
3 or 8
Choice #_____
2 or 7
Choice #_____
4 or 14
Choice #_____
6 or 16
Choice #_____
8 or 18
Choice #_____
2 or 12
Choice #_____

The actual #s are covered by stickers the numbers are IV 4 (see below)
IV4 Conditionals:
1 Low
p (d|h2) 20% - 10% (2-1, 4-2, 6-3, 8-4)
2 High
p (d|h1) 80% - 40% (18-9, 16-8, 14-7, 12-6)

All Conditions
Which Island do you now believe the Urn of Zor is more likely to have come from?
__________
What do you now believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from that island?
______%
What do you believe is the probability that the Urn of Zor came from the other island?
_______________%
(These two pages will be page 3 of the script)
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All Conditions
What information did you use in making this estimate of the probability of the island
of origin? Put a check on the right next to all the pieces of information below that you
used.

Location the Urn was Found
Of the 10 urns that have previously been found at this spot of the ocean floor 5 have
been determined to have been made on Shell Island and the other 5 on Coral Island.
_____
Current Clay Pit Information
Mineral Tested that the
This mineral content characterizes the
Urn of Zor had High content
current clay pits of
Aluminum
Shell Island
_____
Calcium
Shell Island
_____
Chromium
Shell Island
_____
Copper
Shell Island
_____
Iron
Coral Island
_____
Magnesium
Coral Island
_____
Nickel
Coral Island
_____
Zinc
Coral Island
_____
Old Urns Information
Your first choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.
Your second choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.
Your third choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.
Your fourth choice of the mineral tests on the old urns.

_____
_____
_____
_____

Other Information
Please describe _______________________________________________ _____
(This would be page 4 of the script)
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All Conditions
If you used indicated on the previous page that you used one piece of evidence, then
go to question 3 below.
If you used indicated on the previous page that you used more than one piece of
evidence, then go to question 1 below.
1) Tell me how you went about making your estimate of the probability that the Urn
came from the island you chose. You can use a verbal description or a formula to
describe the method you used.

2) Place a check next to all the mathematical processes you used? (Check all that
apply)
Type of Method
Mathematical Example using two pieces of evidence
_____ Addition
(evidence #1 + evidence #2)
_____ Subtraction
(evidence #1 - evidence #2)
_____ Multiplication
(evidence #1 * evidence #2)
_____ Division
(evidence #1 / evidence #2)
_____ Averaging
(evidence #1 + evidence #2)/ 2
_____ Other
3) Did you find the results of any of the tests on the old urns surprising? (Yes / No)
4) If yes, indicate which ones and whether they were higher or lower than expected.
(Please look back to see your four selections on page three and then circle higher or
lower below).
First Choice Surprising

higher

lower

Second Choice Surprising

higher

lower

Third Choice Surprising

higher

lower

Fourth Choice Surprising

higher

lower

5) Please go back to page three again and, without removing any more stickers, write
down on the stickers what you think the value of the tests would be that you did not
choose to perform.
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All Conditions
6) Circle one or more of the following racial / ethnic groups that best applies to you.
African American
Caucasian
Latino / Hispanic
Asian / Pacific Islander
Native American
Other
7) Circle your gender.

Male

Female

8) What is the number of college level statistics classes you have completed?
__________
9) What is your college G.P.A. (on a 4 point scale 4=A, 3=B etc.) ____________

Appendices 222
Appendix B
Instructions.
Participants will be told to read the experimental instructions and to raise their
hands when they have a questions or when they have completed the experiment. They
will be told not to talk to or look at their neighbors papers.
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Appendix C
Demographic Variables.
1) Race

(African American, Caucasian, Latino / Hispanic, Asian / Pacific
Islander, Native American, Other)

2) Gender

(Male, Female)

3) Number of college level statistics classes completed.
4) What is your college G.P.A.
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Appendix D
Informed Consent Form.
Decision Making Study
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Geoffrey
Borthwick from Portland State University, Psychology. The researcher hopes to learn
how people make decisions in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a doctoral
degree, under the supervision of Barry Anderson. You were selected as a possible
participant in this study because you because you have not participated in this study
previously.
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to read a scenario and answer
hypothetical questions in it, including making decision and asking you about how you
made those decisions. The study will take approximately 30 minutes. While
participating in this study you may feel uncomfortable in answering these questions.
You may receive extra credit from the instructor in the class from which you were
recruited.
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be
linked to you or identify you will be kept confidential, except the possibility of
reporting your participation to your instructor solely for the purpose of your obtaining
extra credit in that class. This information will be kept confidential by separating it
from your name and storing all materials in a locked room.
Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, and
it will not affect your relationship with Portland State University. You may also
withdraw from this study at any time without affecting your relationship with Portland
State University.
If you have any concerns or problems about your participation in this study or
your rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland
State University, (503) 725-4288. If you have any questions about the study itself,
contact Geoffrey Borthwick at borthwg@pdx.edu or (503) 725-3989.
Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above
information and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may
withdraw your consent at any time without penalty, and that, by signing, you are not
waiving any legal claim, rights or remedies. The researcher will provide you with a
copy of this form for your own records.
_____________________________________
Signature

________________
Date
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Appendix E
Pilot Study Integration Strategies.
Integration Strategies found in pilot study, and the number (and percentages) of
subjects who used each (Borthwick & Anderson, 2001).
Strategy (Numbered as in the present study)
1 Bayesian
2 Highest probability conditioned on focal island
11 Highest probability, conditioned on and
expected to favor focal Island
3 Average of all available conditional probabilities
4 Average of the probabilities conditioned on focal
island
5 Average of the base rate and the probabilities
conditioned on focal island
6 Sum of all probabilities conditioned on focal
island
7 Sum of all probabilities conditioned on focal
island, minus the sum of all probabilities
conditioned on the non-focal island
8 Sum of all probabilities conditioned on focal
island plus the base rate, minus the sum of all
probabilities conditioned on the non-focal island
9 Base Rate
10 Even (50%-50%)
12 Base Rate with non-numeric adjustment

Number of
participants
0
5 (Sub-strategies not
distinguished in pilot
study)
5
5

Percentage

9.4%
9.4%

1

1.9%

24 (Sub-strategies
not distinguished in
pilot study)

45.3%

6
2
5

11.3%
3.8%
9.4%

0%
9.4%

